







THE FATEFUL MEETING IN THE ST. LOUIS HOTEL.

THE STRUGGLE FOR MISSOURI

BY

JOHN McELROY

*States are not great except as men may make them,
Men are not great, except they do and dare.*

—EUGENE F. WARE.

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
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The Struggle for Missouri.

CHAPTER I.

A SALIENT BASTION FOR THE SLAVERY EMPIRE.



THE CAPITOL, JEFFERSON CITY,
MO.

WHATEVER else may be said of Southern statesmen, of the elder school, they certainly had an imperial breadth of view. They took in the whole continent in a way that their Northern colleagues were slow in doing.

It cannot be said just when they began to plan for a separate Government

which would have Slavery as its cornerstone, would dominate the Continent and ultimately absorb Cuba, Mexico and Central America as far as the Isthmus of Panama.

Undoubtedly it was in the minds of a large number of them from the organization of the Government, which they regarded as merely a temporary expedient—an alliance with the Northern States until the South was strong enough to “assume among the Powers of the Earth the separate

and equal station to which the laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them."

They achieved a great strategic victory when in 1818 they drew the boundaries of the State of Missouri.

The Ordinance of 1787 dedicated to Freedom all of the immense territory which became the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin. The wonderful growth of these in population, wealth and political influence alarmed the Slave Power—keenly sensitive, as bad causes always are, to anything which may possibly threaten,—and it proceeded to erect in the State of Missouri a strong barrier to the forward march of the Free Soil idea.

When the time for the separation came, the Northern fragment of the Republic would find itself almost cut in two by the northward projection of Virginia to within 100 miles of Lake Erie. It would be again nearly cut in two by the projection of the northeast corner of Missouri to within 200 miles of Lake Michigan.

In those days substantially all travel and commerce was along the lines of the rivers. For the country between the Alleghany Mountains and the Mississippi the Ohio River was the great artery. Into it empty the Alleghany, Monongahela, Muskingum, the Kanawhas, Big Sandy, Scioto, the Miamis, Licking, Kentucky, Green, Wabash, Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, each draining great valleys, and bringing with its volume of waters a proportionate quota of travel and commerce. The Illinois River also entered the Mississippi from the

east with the commerce of a great and fruitful region.

West of the Mississippi the mighty Missouri was the almost sole highway for thousands of miles.

The State was made unusually large—68,735 square miles, where the previous rule for States had been about 40,000 square miles—stretching it so as to cover the mouths of the Ohio and the Illinois, and to lie on both sides of the great Missouri for 200 miles. A glance at the map will show how complete this maneuver seemed to be. Iowa and Minnesota were then unbroken and unvisited stretches of prairie and forest, railroads were only dreamed of by mechanical visionaries, and no man in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky or Tennessee could send a load of produce to market without Missouri's permission; he could make no considerable journey without traversing her highways, while all of the imperial area west of the Mississippi was made, it seemed, forever distinctly tributary to her.

New Orleans was then the sole mart of the West, for the Erie Canal had not been dug to convert the Great Lakes into a colossal commercial highway.

Out of a country possessing the unusual combination of surpassing agricultural fertility with the most extraordinary mineral wealth they carved a State larger in area than England and Wales and more than one-fourth the size of France or Germany.

All ordinary calculations as to the development of such a favored region would make of it a barrier which would effectively stay the propulsive waves of Free Soilism.

So far as man's schemes could go there would never be an acre of free soil west of Illinois.

The Anti-Slavery men were keenly alive to this strategic advantage of their opponents. Though the opposition to Slavery might be said to be yet in the gristle, the men hostile to the institution were found in all parties, and were beginning to divide from its more ardent supporters.

Under the ban of public opinion Slavery was either dead or legally dying in all the older States north of Mason and Dixon's line. In the kingly stretch of territory lying north of the Ohio and between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi there was no taint of the foot of a slave, and the settlers there wanted to "set the bounds of Freedom wider yet."

The Anti-Slavery men everywhere, and at that time there were very many in the Southern States, protested vigorously against the admission of Missouri into the Union as a Slave State, and the controversy soon became so violent as to convulse the Nation. In 1818, when the bill for the admission of Missouri was being considered by the House of Representatives, Gen. James Tallmadge, of New York, introduced the following amendment:

And provided, That the introduction of slavery, or involuntary servitude, be prohibited, except for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party has been duly convicted; and that all children born within the said State, after the admission thereof into the Union, shall be declared free at the age of 25 years.

This was adopted by practically all the votes from the Free States, with a few from the Border States, which constituted a majority in the House. But the Senate, in which the Slave States had a major-

ity, rejected the amendment, and the struggle began which was only ended two years later by the adoption of the famous Missouri Compromise of 1820, which admitted Missouri as a Slave State, but prohibited for the future any "Slavery or involuntary servitude" outside the limits of that State north of 36 degrees 30 minutes.

As in all compromises, this was unsatisfactory to the earnest men on both sides of the dispute.

The Anti-Slavery men, who claimed that Freedom was National and Slavery local, were incensed that such an enormous area as that south of 36 degrees 30 minutes had been taken from Freedom by the implication that it was reserved for Slavery.

The Pro-Slavery men, on the other hand, who had shrewdly made Slavery extension appear one of the fundamental and cherished rights of the South, set up the clamorous protest, which never ceased till Appomattox, that the denial of the privilege of taking property in Slaves to any part of the National domain won by the arms or purchased by the money of the whole country, was a violation of the compact entered into at the formation of the Government, guaranteeing to the citizens of all the States the same rights and privileges.

They also complained that under this arrangement the Free-Soilers gained control of 1,238,025 square miles of the Nation's territory, while Slavery only had 609,023 square miles, or less than half so much. This complaint, which seemed so forceful to the Pro-Slaveryites, appeared as rank impudence to their opponents, since it placed Slavery on the same plane with Freedom.

The great State, however, did not flourish in accordance with the expectations based upon its climate, natural resources and central position. The tide of immigration paused before her borders, or swept around under colder skies to Iowa and Minnesota, or to the remote prairies of Kansas and Nebraska. Careless as the average home-seeker might seem as to moral and social questions so long as he found fertile land at cheap prices, yet he appeared reluctant to raise his humble cabin on soil that had the least taint of Slavery. In spite of her long frontage on the two greatest rivers of the continent, and which were its main highways; in spite of skies and soils and rippling streams unsurpassed on earth; in spite of having within her borders the great and growing city of St. Louis, the Metropolis of the Mississippi Valley, Missouri in 1860, after 40 years of Statehood, had only 1,182,012 people, against 1,711,951 in Illinois, 1,350,428 in Indiana, 674,913 in Iowa, 172,023 in Minnesota, 2,329,511 in Ohio, 749,113 in Michigan, 775,881 in Wisconsin, with nearly 150,000 in Kansas and Nebraska.

More than a million settlers who had crossed the Mississippi within a few years had shunned her contaminated borders for the free air of otherwise less attractive localities.

Nor had the Slaveholders gone into the country in the numbers that were expected. Less than 20,000 had settled there, which was a small showing against nearly 40,000 in Kentucky and 55,000 in Virginia. All these had conspicuously small holdings. Nearly one-third of them owned but one

slave, and considerably more than one-half had less than five. Only one man had taken as many as 200 slaves into the State.

The Census of 1860 showed Missouri to rank eleventh among the Slave States, according to the following table of the number of slaves in each:

1. Virginia	490,865	10. Texas	182,566
2. Georgia	462,198	11. Missouri	114,931
3. Mississippi	436,631	12. Arkansas	111,114
4. Alabama	435,080	13. Maryland	87,189
5. South Carolina	402,406	14. Florida	61,745
6. Louisiana	331,726	15. Delaware	1,798
7. North Carolina	331,059	16. New Jersey	18
8. Tennessee	275,719	17. Nebraska	15
9. Kentucky	225,483	18. Kansas	2

There were 3,185 slaves in the District of Columbia and 29 in the Territory of Utah, with all the rest of the country absolutely free.

The immigrant Slaveowners promptly planted themselves where they could command the great highway of the Missouri River, taking up broad tracts of the fertile lands on both sides of the stream. The Census of 1860 showed that of the 114,965 slaves held in the State, 50,280 were in the 12 Counties along the Missouri:

Boone	5,034	Jackson	3,944
Calloway	4,257	Lafayette	6,357
Chariton	2,837	Pike	4,056
Clay	3,456	Platte	3,313
Cooper	3,800	St. Charles	2,181
Howard	5,889	Saline	4,876

Two-thirds of all the slaves in the State were held within 20 miles of the Missouri River.

As everywhere, the Slaveowners exerted an influence immeasurably disproportionate to their numbers, intelligence and wealth.

A very large proportion of the immigration had not been of a character to give much promise as to the future.

The new State had been the Adullam's Cave for the South, where "every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt and every one that was discontented gathered themselves." Next to Slavery, the South had been cursed by the importation of paupers and criminals who had been transported from England for England's good, in the early history of the Colonies, to work the new lands. The negro proving the better worker in servitude than this class, they had been driven off the plantations to squat on unoccupied lands, where they bred like the beasts of the field, getting a precarious living from hunting the forest, and the bolder eking out this by depredations upon their thriftier neighbors. Their forebears had been paupers and criminals when sent from England, and the descendants continued to be paupers and criminals in the new country, forming a clearly marked social class, so distinct as to warrant the surmise that they belonged to a different race. As the eastern part of the South and the administration of the laws improved, this element was to some extent forced out, and spread in a noisome trail over Mississippi, Arkansas and Missouri. While other immigrants went into the unbroken forest with a few rude tools and in the course of several years built up comfortable homes, their's never rose above abject squalor. The crudest of cabins sufficed them for shelter, beds of beech leaves were all the couches they required; they had more guns in their huts

than agricultural or mechanical implements; they scarcely pretended to raise anything more than a scanty patch of corn; and when they could not put on their tables the flesh of the almost wild razor-back hog which roamed the woods, they made meat of woodchucks, raccoons, opossums or any other "varmint" their guns could bring down. They did not scorn hawks or owls if hunger demanded and no better meat could be found.

It was this "White Trash" which added so much to the horrors of the war, especially in Missouri, and so little to its real prosecution. Wolf-like in ferocity, when the advantages were on their side, they were wolf-like in cowardice when the terms were at all equal. They were the Croats, Cossacks, Tolpatches, Pandours of the Confederacy—of little value in battle, but terrible as guerrillas and bushwhackers. From this "White Trash" came the gangs of murderers and robbers, like those led by the Youngers, Jameses, Quantrils and scores of other names of criminal memory.

As has been the case in all times and countries, these dregs of society became the willing tools of the Slaveholding aristocrats. With dog-like fidelity they followed and served the class which despised and overrode them. Somehow, by inherited habits likely, they seemed to avoid the more fertile parts of the State. They thus became "Bald Knobbers" and "Ozarkers" in Missouri, as they had been "Clay Eaters" in South Carolina, or "Sang Diggers" in Virginia.

With these immigrants from the South came also large numbers of a far better element even than

the arrogant Slaveowners or the abject "White Trash."

The Middle Class in the South was made up of much the same stock as the bulk of the Northerners—that is of Scotch, Scotch-Irish and North English—Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Baptists and Dissenters generally—who had been forced out of Great Britain by the intolerant Episcopalians when the latter gained complete power after the suppression of the Rebellion of 1745. With these were also the descendants of the sturdy German Protestants who had been driven from Europe during the religious wars when the Catholics gained the ascendancy in their particular country. These were the backbone of the South, and had largely settled along the foothills of the Alleghanies and in the fruitful valleys between the mountains, while the "White Trash" lived either on the barren parts of the lowlands or the bare and untillable highlands.

It is a grave mistake to confound these two classes of Non-Slaveholding whites in the South. They were as absolutely unlike as two distinct races, and an illustration of the habits of the two in migrating will suffice to show this. It was the custom in the Middle Classes when a boy attained majority that he chose for his wife a girl of the same class who was just ripening into vigorous womanhood. Both boy and girl had been brought up to labor with their own hands and to work constantly toward a definite purpose. They had been given a little rudimentary education, could read their Bibles and almanacs, "cipher" a little, write their names and a letter which could be read. When quite a lad the boy's

father had given him a colt, which he took care of until it became a horse. To this, his first property, was added a suit of stout homespun cloth, which, with a rifle, an ax and some few other necessary tools, constituted his sole equipment for married life. The girl had been given a calf, which she had raised to a heifer; she had also a feather bed and some blankets of her own making and a little stock of the most obvious housekeeping utensils. With this simple outfit the young couple were married, and either went in debt for a little spot of land near home or pushed out into the new country. There they built a rude log cabin to shelter them from the storm, and by the time their children had reached the age they were when they married they had built up an unpretentious but very comfortable home, with their land well cleared and fenced, and stocked with cattle, pigs, sheep and poultry sufficient to maintain them in comfort. From this class came always the best and strongest men in the South. Comparatively few of them became Slave-owners, and then but rarely owned more than one or two negroes. A very large proportion found homes in the great free States north of the Ohio River.

On the other hand, none of this accession to comparative wealth seemed possible to the "White Trash." The boys and girls mated, squatted on any ground they could find unoccupied, raised there the merest shelter, which never by any chance improved, no matter how long they lived there, and proceeded to breed with amazing prolificacy others like themselves, destined for the same lives of ignor-

ance and squalor. The hut of the "Clay Eater" in South Carolina, the "Sand Hiller" in Georgia, the "Sang Digger" in Virginia was the same as that his grandfather had lived in. It was the same that his sons and grandsons to the third and fourth generations built on the bleak knobs of the Ozarks or the malarious banks of the Mississippi.

The Census of 1850 showed that about 70,000 of the population of Missouri had come from Kentucky, 45,000 from Tennessee, 41,000 from Virginia, 17,000 from North Carolina and 15,000 from the other Southern States. Nearly 40,000 had gone from Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, but a very large proportion of this number was the same element which had streamed across the southern parts of those States on its way to Missouri. Only 13,000 had entered from the great States of New York and Pennsylvania, and but 1,100 from New England. Nearly 15,000 Irishmen, mostly employed along the rivers, had settled in the State.

While the Slaveowners and their "White Trash" myrmidons were Pro-Slavery Democrats, the Middle Class were inclined to be Whigs, or if Democrats, belonging to that wing of the party less subservient to Slavery which in later years was led by Stephen A. Douglas.

Upon these three distinct strata in society, which little mingled but were all native Americans, was projected an element of startling differences in birth, thought, speech and manners. The so-called Revolution of 1848 in Germany was a movement by the educated, enthusiastic, idealistic youth of the Fatherland to sweep away the horde of petty

despots, and unite their pigmy Principalities and Duchies into a glorious and wide-ruling Germany. They were a generation too soon, however, and when the movement was crushed under the heavy hand of military power, hundreds of thousands of these energetic young men thought it safest and best to make new homes in the young Republic beyond the seas. The United States therefore received a migration of the highest character and of inestimable benefit to the country.

Somewhere near 150,000 of these went to Missouri. They had none of the antipathy of Northern Americans to a Slave State. They were like their Gothic forebears, to whom it was sufficient to know that the land was good. Other matters could be settled by their strong right arms. The climate and fertility of Missouri pleased them; they saw the State's possibilities and flocked thither. Possibly one-half settled in the pleasant valleys and on the sunny prairies, following the trail of good land in the Southwest clear down to the Arkansas line. The other half settled mostly in St. Louis, and through them the city experienced another of its wonderful transformations. Beginning as a trading post of the French with the Indians, it had only as residents merchant adventurers from sunny France, officers and soldiers of the royal army and the half-breed voyageurs and trappers who served the fur companies. Next the Americans had swarmed in, and made the trading post a great market for the exchange of the grain and meat of the North, for the cotton and sugar of the South. Its merchants and people took their tone and complexion from the

plantations of the Mississippi Valley. Now came these Germans, intent upon reproducing there the characteristics of the old world cities beyond the Rhine. They brought with them lager beer, to which the Americans took very readily, and a decided taste for music, painting and literature, to which the Americans were not so much inclined. German signs, with their quaint Gothic lettering and grotesque names, blossomed out on the buildings, military bands in German uniforms paraded the streets, especially on Sundays. German theaters also open on Sunday represented by astonishingly good companies the popular plays of the Fatherland, and newsboys cried the German newspapers on the streets. Those who went into the country were excellent farmers, shrewd in buying and selling, and industrious workers. They dreamed of covering the low hills of the western part of the State with the vineyards that were so profitable on the Rhine and of rivaling the products of Johannesburg and the Moselle on the banks of the Gasconade and the Maramec.

The newcomers were skilled men in their departments of civilized activities—far above the average of the Americans. They were good physicians, fine musicians, finished painters, excellent actors and skillful mechanics, and each began the intelligent exercise of his vocation, to the great advantage of the community, which was, however, shocked at many of the ways of the newcomers, particularly their devoting Sunday to all manner of merrymaking. Still more shocking was their attitude toward the Slavery question. Even those Americans who



GEN. NATHANIEL LYON

were opposed to Slavery had a respect approaching awe of the "Sacred Institution." It had always been in the country; it was protected by a network of laws, and so feared that it could only be discussed with the greatest formality and circumspection. The radical Germans had absolutely none of this feeling. In their scheme of humanity all Slavery was so horrible that there could be no reason for its longer continuance, and it ought to be put to an end in the most summary manner. The epithet "Abolitionists," from which most Americans shrank as from an insult, had no terrors for them. It frankly described their mental attitude, and they gloried in it as they did in being Free Thinkers. They had not rebelled against timeworn traditions and superstitions in Germany to become slaves to something worse in this.

Vigorous growths as they were, they readily took root in the new soil, became naturalized as fast as they could, and entered into the life of the country which they had elected for their homes. They joined the Republican Party from admiration of its Free Soil principles, and in the election of 1860 cast 17,028 votes for Abraham Lincoln.

Such were the strangely differing elements which were fermenting together in the formation of the great Commonwealth during those turbulent days from 1850 to 1860, and which were to be fused into unexpected combinations in the fierce heat of civil war. The same fermentation—minus the modifying influences of the radical Germans—was going on in all the States of the South except South Carolina, where the Middle Class hardly existed. Every-

where the Middle Class was strongly attached to the Union, and averse to Secession. Everywhere the Slaveowners, a small minority, but of extraordinary ability and influence, were actively preaching dissatisfaction with the Union, bitterly complaining of wrongs suffered at the hands of the North, and untiring in their machinations to win over or crush the leaders of those favorable to the Union. Everywhere they had the "White Trash" solidly behind them to vote as they wished, and to harry and persecute the Union men. As machinery for malevolence the "White Trash" myrmidons could not be surpassed. Criminal instincts inherited from their villain forefathers made them ready and capable of anything from maiming a Union man's stock and burning his stacks to shooting him down from ambush. They had personal feeling to animate them in this, for their depredations upon the hogs and crops of their thriftier neighbors had brought them into lifelong collisions with the Middle Class, while they had but little opportunity for resentment against the owners of the large plantations. In every State in the South the story was the same, of the Middle Class Union men being harassed at the command of the Slaveowners by the "White Trash" hounds. They had been sent into Kansas to drive out the Free State immigrants there and secure the territory for Slavery, but though backed up by the power of the Administration, they had been signally defeated by the numerically inferior but bolder and hardier immigrants from the North.

Force rules this world; it always has; it always will. Not merely physical force, but that incom-

parably higher type—intellectual force—Power of Will. It seemed that in nearly all the States of the South the Slaveowners by sheer audacity and force of will succeeded in dominating the great majority which favored the Union, and by one device or another committing them hopelessly to the rebellion. This was notably the case in Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia, where the majority repeatedly expressed itself in favor of the Union, but was dragooned into Secession.

In Missouri, however, the Secessionists encountered leaders with will and courage superior to their own. Many of these were Slaveowners themselves, and nearly all of them were of Southern birth. Head and shoulders above these, standing up among them like Saul among the Sons of Israel, was Frank P. Blair, then in the full powers of perfect manhood. He was 42 years old, tall and sinewy in body, blue-eyed and sandy-haired. He came of the best Virginia and Kentucky stock, and had long been a resident and slaveowner in Missouri. As a boy he had served in the ranks in the Mexican War, had an adventurous career on the Pacific Coast, had gone back to Missouri to achieve prominence at the bar, and as early as 1848 had come to the front as the unflinching advocate of Emancipation and the conversion of Missouri into a Free State. Against his perfect panoply of courage and resource all the lances of the Slaveowners were hurled in vain. Their violence recoiled before him, their orators were no match for him upon the stump, and their leaders not his equal in party management. In 1852 he was elected to the Missouri Legislature as a Free Soiler,

was re-elected in 1854, and in 1856 to Congress. His value to the Union was immeasurable, for he was a leader around whom the Union men could rally with the utmost confidence that he would never weaken, never resort to devious ways, and never blunder. As a Southerner of the best ancestry, he was not open to the charge of being a "Yankee Abolitionist," which had so much effect upon the Southern people of his State.

A very dangerous element was composed of a number of leaders who belonged to the Pro-Slavery wing, but desiring to be elected to offices, masked their designs under the cover of the Douglas Democracy. The most important of these was Claiborne F. Jackson, a politician of moderate abilities and only tolerable courage, but of great partisan activity. He professed to be a Douglas Democrat, and as such was elected Governor at the State election. Born in Kentucky 54 years before, he had resided in Missouri since 1822. A Captain in the Black Hawk War, his service had been as uneventful and brief as that of Abraham Lincoln, who was two years his junior, and he was one of the Pro-Slavery clique who had hounded the great Thomas H. Benton out of politics on account of his mild Free Soilism. In person he was tall, erect, with something of dignity in his bearing. He essayed to be an orator, had much reputation as such, but his speeches developed little depth of thought or anything beyond the customary phrases which were the stock in trade of all the orators of his class south of Mason and Dixon's line.

The fermentation period culminated in the Presi-

dential campaign of 1860, the hottest political battle this country had ever known.

The intensity of the interest felt in Missouri was shown by the bigness of the vote, which aggregated 165,618. As the population was but 1,182,012, of which 114,965 were slaves, it will be seen that substantially every white man went to the polls.

The newly-formed Republican Party, mostly confined to the radical Germans of St. Louis, cast 17,028 votes for Abraham Lincoln.

The Slaveowners and their henchmen—"Southern Rights Democrats"—cast 31,317 votes for John C. Breckinridge.

The "Regular Democrats" polled 58,801 votes for Stephen A. Douglas and "Squatter Sovereignty."

The remains of the "Old Line Whigs," and a host of other men who did not want to be Democrats and would not be Republicans, cast 58,372 votes for John Bell, the "Constitutional Union" candidate.

Thus it will be seen that out of every 165 men who went to the polls 17 were quite positive that the extension of Slavery must cease; 31 were equally positive that Slavery should be extended or the Union dissolved; 59 favored "Squatter Sovereignty," or local option in the Territories in regard to Slavery; 58 thought that "all this fuss about the nigger was absurd, criminal, and dangerous. It ought to be stopped at once by suppressing, if necessary, by hanging, the extremists on both sides, and letting things go on just as they have been."

Thus so great a proportion as 117 out of the total of 165—nearly five-sevenths of the whole—professed

strong hostility to the views of the "extremists, both North and South."

The time was at hand, however, when they must make their election as to which of these opposite poles of thought and action they would drift. They could no longer hold aloof, suggesting mild political placeboes, lamenting alike the wickedness of the Northern Abolitionists and the madness of the Southern Nullifiers, and expressing a patriotic desire to hang selected crowds of each on the same trees.

South Carolina had promptly responded to the election of Abraham Lincoln as President of the United States by passing an Ordinance of Secession, and seizing all the United States forts, arsenals and other places, except Fort Sumter, within her limits.


The rest of the Cotton States were hastening to follow her example.

To the 117 "Middle-of-the-Road" voters out of every total of 165 it was therefore necessary to choose whether they would approve of the withdrawal of States and seizures of forts, and become Secessionists, or whether they would disapprove of this and ally themselves with the much-contemned Black Republicans.

It was the old, old vital question, asked so many times of neutrals with the sword at their throats:

"Under which King, Bezonian? Speak, or die."

CHAPTER II.



BRIG.-GEN. D. M. FROST,
C. S. A.

THE storm-clouds gathered with cyclonic swiftness.

South Carolina seceded Dec. 20, 1860, and sent a Commission to Washington to negotiate for the delivery of all the forts, arsenals, magazines, lighthouses, and other National property within her boundaries, organizing in the meanwhile to seize them.

Her Senators and Representatives formally withdrew from Congress; the Judges and other Federal officials solemnly resigned their places; and Maj. Robert Anderson, recognizing the impossibility of defending the decrepit Fort Moultrie against assault, transferred his garrison to Fort Sumter.

President Buchanan announced the fatal doctrine that while no State had the right to secede, the Constitution gave no power to coerce a State which had withdrawn, or was attempting to withdraw from the Union.

Mississippi seceded Jan. 9, 1861; Florida, Jan. 10; Alabama, Jan. 11; Georgia, Jan. 19; Louisiana, Jan. 26; and Texas, Feb. 1;—all the Cotton States precipitately following South Carolina's example.

Each made haste—before or after Secession—to seize all the United States forts and property within her borders.

In the midst of this political cataclysm the Legislature of Missouri met on the last day of 1860.

The Senate consisted of 25 Democrats, seven Unionists, and one Republican; the House of 85 Democrats, 35 Unionists, and 12 Republicans.

The retiring Governor—Robert M. Stewart—sent in his final message Jan. 3, and the same day his successor—Claiborne F. Jackson—was inaugurated, and delivered his address. Gov. Stewart was a typical Northern Democrat, born in New York, but long a resident of Missouri. He was a strong Douglas man, and believed that the Southern people had the Constitutional right to take their slaves into the Territories and hold them there, and that this right ought to be assured them. He had never pretended to be in love with Slavery, but he believed that the Constitution and laws granted full protection to the Institution. He denied the right of Secession, particularly as to Missouri, which had been bought with the money of the whole country. In his final message he did not hesitate to clearly set this forth, and to denounce South Carolina as having acted with consummate folly. He recognized the Union as the source of innumerable blessings, and would preserve it to the last. He said:

As matters are at present Missouri will stand by her lot, and hold to the Union as long as it is worth an effort to preserve it. So long as there is hope of success she will seek for justice within the Union. She cannot be frightened from her propriety by the past unfriendly legislation of the North, nor be dragooned into secession by the extreme South. If those who should be our friends and allies undertake to render our property worthless by a system of prohibitory laws, or by re-



Fold-out Placeholder

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future date.


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94°

92°

90°

N

I L L I N O I S

40°

38°

Cities and Towns: Bloomfield, Burlington, Peoria, Princeton, Lancaster, Memphis, Keokuk, Macomb, Havana, Hirsville, Quincy, Carthage, Hannibal, New London, Palmyra, St. Joseph, Weston, Chillicothe, Laclede, Buchanan, Madison, Naples, Jacksonville, Springfield, Whitehall, Parkville, Camden, Missouri R., Warsaw, Cambridge, Warsaw, Marshall, Glasgow, Centralia, Mexico, Hillsboro, Westport, Lexington, Dover, Arrow Rock, Franklin, Rockport, Martiasville, Florence, Delhi, Alton, Pleasant Hill, Warrensburg, Knobloster, Seaside, Tipton, California, Portiaged, St. Charles, St. Louis, Sandoval, Paoli, Harrisonville, Cole Camp, Versailles, Jefferson City, Lynn, Newport, Washington, Union, Franklin, Belleisle, West Point, Papinsville, Clinton, Warsaw, Tuscumbia, Vienna, Delpho, Harrison, Hillsboro, De Soto, Coloma, Ft. Scott, Nevada City, Osgo, Osceola, Erie, Gasconade, Holta, Stearns, Mineral Pt., Chester, Frequent, Hermitage, Lebanon, Wayneville, Iron Mt., Ironton, Pilot Knob, Perryville, Jonesboro, Lamar, Medoc, Greenfield, Macfield, Hartsville, Oedar Bluff, Eminena, Jackson, C. Girardeau, Commerce, Benton, Cairo, Caethage, Springfield, Macfield, Hartsville, Kings Mt., Van Buren, Greenville, Belmont, Mr. Vernon, Wilson's Creek, Ozark, West Plains, Doniphan, New Madrid, Pleasant Pt., Neosho, Granby, Cassville, Galena, Forsyth, Gainesville, Pocahontas, Black R., St. Francis R., Obion R., Berryville, Carrollton, Carleton, Fayetteville, Huntsville, Jasper, Smithville, Boonshoro.

Rivers: Des Moines R., Illinois R., Sangamon R., Missouri R., Mississippi R., St. Francis R., White R., North Fork, Black R., Obion R.

Other Labels: I, U, R, I

opening the slave trade in opposition to the moral sense of the civilized world, and at the same time reduce us to the position of an humble sentinel to watch over and protect their interests, receiving all the blows and none of the benefits, Missouri will hesitate long before sanctioning such an arrangement. She will rather take the high position of armed neutrality. She is able to take care of herself, and will be neither forced nor flattered, driven nor coaxed, into a course of action that must end in her own destruction.

The inaugural address of the new Governor was, under a thin veil of professed love for the Union, a bitter Secession appeal. He said that the destiny of the Slaveholding States was one and the same; that what injured one necessarily hurt all; that separate action meant certain defeat by the insolent North, which was alone and wholly responsible for the present deplorable conditions. He applauded the "gallantry" of South Carolina, urged that she be not condemned for "precipitancy," and said significantly: "If South Carolina has acted hastily, let not her error lead to the more fatal one—an attempt at coercion."

With reference to the Republican Party and the future policy of Missouri, he said:

The prominent characteristic of this party * * * is that it is purely sectional in its locality and its principles. The only principle inscribed upon its banner is Hostility to Slavery;—its object not merely to confine Slavery within its present limits; not merely to exclude it from the Territories, and prevent the formation and admission of any Slaveholding States; not merely to abolish it in the District of Columbia, and interdict its passage from one State to another; but to strike down its existence everywhere; to sap its foundation in public sentiment; to annoy and harass, and gradually destroy its vitality, by every means, direct or indirect, physical and moral, which human ingenuity can devise. The triumph of such an organization is not the victory of a political party, but the domination of a Section. It proclaims in significant tones the destruction of that equality among the States which is the vital cement for our Federal Union. It places 15 of the 33 States in the position of humble recipients of the bounty, or sullen submissionists to the power of a Government which they had no voice in creating, and in whose councils they do not participate.

It cannot, then, be a matter of surprise to any—victors or vanquished—that these 15 States, with a pecuniary interest at stake reaching the enormous sum of \$3,500,000,000 should be aroused and excited at the advent of such a party to power.

Would it not rather be an instance of unprecedented blindness and fatuity, if the people and Governments of these 15 Slaveholding States were, under such circumstances, to manifest quiet indifference, and to make no effort to avoid the destruction which awaited them?

The meeting of the Legislature naturally brought to the State Capital at Jefferson City all of the powerful coterie which was self-charged with the work of taking Missouri into the road whither South Carolina was leading the Cotton States. This coterie included the Judges of the Supreme Court and all the State officials, and the United States Senators and Representatives. Ever since the Anti-Benton faction had accomplished the great Senator's defeat, the shibboleth for admission into the higher circles of Missouri Democracy had been "Southern Rights." As the mass of the Middle Class Democrats favored Senator Douglas's plan of letting the settlers in each Territory decide for themselves whether they would have Slavery, it was highly politic for every candidate to claim that he was a Douglas Democrat. It must be known to the inner ring, however, that he was at heart fully in accord with the views of the extreme Pro-Slavery men, and ready at the word to join the Secessionists. So thorough was this preliminary organization, that while in Missouri tens of thousands of professed Union men went over to Secession when the stress came, there was no instance of an avowed Pro-Slavery man cleaving to the side of the Union.

Next to Gov. Jackson,—surpassing him in intellectual acuteness and fertile energy,—was Lieut.-

Gov. Thos. C. Reynolds, then in his 40th year, a short, full-bodied man, with jet-black hair and eyes shaded by gold-rimmed glasses. He boasted of being born of Virginia parents in South Carolina, but some of the Germans claimed to know that his right name was Reinhold, and that he was a Jew born in Prague, the Capital of Bohemia, and brought to this country when a child. He was a man of more than ordinary ability, and had accomplishments quite unusual in that day.

He spoke French, German and Spanish fluently, wrote profusely and with considerable force, and prided himself on being a diplomat. He had seen some service as Secretary of Legation and Charge d' Affaires at Madrid. He had been elected as a Douglas Democrat, but was an outspoken Secessionist, and as he was ex-officio President of the Senate, he had much power in forming committees and shaping legislation. He clung to the wrecked rebel ship of state to the last, went with Gov. Jackson and the rest when they were driven out of the State, assumed the Governorship when Jackson—worn out by the terrible strains and vicissitudes—died at Little Rock, Ark., in December, 1862—and was last heard from near the end of the war, with the shattered and melancholy remnants of the Missouri State Government and troops, on the banks of the Rio Grande, writing furious diatribes against Gen. Sterling Price, the admired leader of the Missouri Confederates.


Another man of great influence in the State was United States Senator James S. Green, a Virginian by birth, but who had been a resident of Missouri

for about a quarter of a century. He was a lawyer of fine talents, and in the Senate ranked as a debater with Douglas, Seward, Chase, Toombs, Wigfall, Fessenden, Wade, and others of that class. In Missouri he was one of the leaders of the Ultra-Slavery "Softs" against Thos. H. Benton; had been Minister to New Granada, and Representative in Congress, and in the Senate belonged to the Jefferson Davis-Toombs-Wigfall cabal, which was planning the disruption of the Union. His term expiring March 3, 1861, he was now in Jefferson City for the rather irreconcilable purposes of securing his re-election to the United States Senate and of fulfilling his pledge to his Secessionist colleagues to carry Missouri out of the Union.

His colleague—Senator Trusten Polk—a strong, kindly, graceful man—was there to assist him in both purposes. Born in Delaware, he had been a resident of Missouri since 1835, elected Governor of the State in 1856, resigned to accept Benton's seat in the Senate, from which he was to be expelled in 1862 for disloyalty, and to follow the failing fortunes of the Missouri Confederates to the banks of the Rio Grande.

The problem of absorbing intensity for the Secession leaders—Messrs. Jackson, Reynolds, Green, Polk and others—was to win over, entrap or constrain a sufficient number of the 117 "Doubtful" voters out of every 165, to give them a working majority in the State. There was fiery zeal enough and to spare on the Secession side; what was needed was skillful management to convince the Union-loving peace-loving majority that the Northern "Abo-

litionists," flushed with victory, meant unheard-of wrongs and insults to the South; that Missouri must put herself in shape to protect her borders, call a halt on the insolent North, and in connection with the other Border States be the arbiter between the contending sections, and in the last resort ally herself with the other Slave States for mutual protection.



THE HARNEY MANSION.

A man to be reckoned with in those days was the Commander of the Department of the West, which included all that immense territory stretching from the Mississippi to the Rocky Mountains, except Texas, New Mexico, and Utah. This man was the embodiment of the Regular Army as it was developed after the War of 1812. At this time that Army was a very small one—two regiments of dragoons, two of cavalry, one of mounted riflemen, four of artillery, and 10 of infantry, making, with engineers,

ordnance and staff, a total of only 12,698 officers and men—but its personnel and discipline were unsurpassed in the world. Among its 1,040 commissioned officers there was no finer soldier than William Selby Harney. A better Colonel no army ever had. A Colonel, mind you—not a General; there is a wide difference between the two, as we found out during the war. There are very many Americans—every little community has at least one—who, given a regiment, where every man is within reach of his eye and voice, will discipline it, provide for it, rule it, and fight it in the very best fashion. Give him some piece of work to do, of which he can see the beginning and the end, and he will make the regiment do every pound of which it is capable. But put in command of a brigade, anything beyond voice and eye, set to a task outreaching his visual horizon, he becomes obviously unequal to the higher range of duty.

A form of commanding height, physique equal to any test of activity or endurance, a natural leader of men through superiority of courage and ability, William Selby Harney had for 43 years made an unsurpassed record as a commander of soldiers. He had served in the everglades of Florida, on the boundless plains west of the Mississippi, and in Mexico, during the brilliantly spectacular war which ended with our “reveling in the Halls of the Montezumas.” He it was, who, eager for his country’s honor and advancement, had, while the diplomats were disputing with Great Britain, pounced down upon and seized the debatable island of San Juan in Vancouver waters. For this he was recalled, but

the island remained American territory. He was soon assigned to the Department of the West, with headquarters at St. Louis.

He had been for 12 years the Colonel of the crack 2d U. S. Dragoons, and for three years one of the three Brigadier-Generals in the Regular Army, his only seniors being Maj.-Gen. and Brevet Lieut.-Gen. Winfield Scott, the General-in-Chief; Brig.-Gen. John E. Wool, commanding the Department of the East; and Brig.-Gen. David E. Twiggs, commanding the Department of Texas.

Gen. Harney's assignment, while a recognition of his eminent fitness for ruling the territory over which he had campaigned for more than a quarter of a century, was highly gratifying to him inasmuch as he was married to a wealthy St. Louis woman, and in that city he had an abundance of the luxurious social enjoyment so dear to the heart of the old warrior. A Southerner by birth and education, a large Slave-owner, with all his interests in the South, and at all times seemingly in full sympathy with the Southern spirit that dominated the Army, the Secessionists sanguinely expected that he would prove as pliant to their proposals as had Gen. Twiggs, the Commander of the Department of Texas. We shall see how soldierly instincts and training measurably disappointed them.

To return to the Missouri Legislature: Lieut.-Gov. Reynolds could, as a lieutenant always can, be more outspoken and radical than his chief, who labored under responsibility. On the day the Legislature met he published an important letter which thoroughly indicates the feeling of the Secessionists at

that period. He urged the General Assembly to promptly express the determination of Missouri to resist every attempt by the Federal Government to coerce any State to remain in the Union, or to use force in any way to collect revenues or execute the laws in any seceding State. He denounced President Buchanan's distinction between "coercing a State" and "compelling the citizens of the State to obey the laws of the United States" as a "transparent sophistry." "To levy tribute, molest commerce, or hold fortresses, are as much acts of war as to bombard a city." He also urged immediate and thorough organization of the militia and other preparations for "putting the State in complete condition for defense." If the present controversy could not be adjusted before March 4, the State of Missouri "should not permit Mr. Lincoln to exercise any act of Government" within her borders.

This was certainly distinctly defiant, and shrewdly calculated to gather about the new administration all the wavering men who could be attracted by inflammatory appeals to their prejudices against the North, to their State pride, and to their hopes of making Missouri the arbiter in the dispute.

Lieut.-Gov. Reynolds followed up his pronouncement by carefully organizing the Senate committees with radical Secessionists at the head, and the immediate introduction of bills ably contrived to put the control of the State in the hands of those who favored Secession. These committees promptly reported several bills.

One provided for calling a State Convention, an effective device by which the other Southern States



GOV. CLAIBORNE F. JACKSON

had been dragged into Secession. Another provided for the organization of the Militia of the State, which would be done by officers reliable for Secession, and the third was intended to extinguish resistance by taking away much of the police power of the Republican Mayor of St. Louis, who had at his back the radical Germans, organized into semi-military Wide-Awake Clubs. All these bills seemed to be heartily approved all over the State, and the Southern Rights leaders were exultant at their success. Apparently the 117 "Doubtfuls" were flocking over to them.

It seemed for a few momentous days in the opening of 1861 that Missouri would be inevitably swept into the tide of Secession, and even in St. Louis, the stronghold of Republicanism, a monster mass meeting, called and controlled by such afterwards-strong loyalists as Hamilton R. Gamble, later the Union Governor of the State, Nathaniel Paschall, James E. Yeatman, and Robert Campbell, unanimously passed resolutions declaring slave property to be held as a Constitutional right which the Government should secure, and if it did not, Missouri "would join with her sister States and share their duties and dangers," and that the Government should not attempt to coerce the seceding States. This word "coerce" had an extraordinarily ugly sound to all ears, and was a potent enchantment in taking many of the professedly Union men into the ranks of the rebellion. Even Horace Greeley recoiled from "a Union held together by bayonets."

The bill "to call a Convention to consider the relations of the State of Missouri to the United States,

and to adopt measures for vindicating the sovereignty of the State, and the protection of her institutions," was promptly reported back to both Houses on the 9th of January, and as promptly passed by them, with only two adverse votes in the Senate and 18 in the House. Of the latter 11 were from St. Louis.

The Secessionists proceeded to a joyful celebration of this new triumph. They hastened at once to another step to ally Missouri with the South. A Commissioner arrived from the State of Mississippi to ask the co-operation of Missouri in measures of common defense and safety. The Governor received him with the distinction accredited an Ambassador from a foreign power, and recommended the Legislature to do likewise. The serviceable Lieut.-Gov. Reynolds carried out this idea by putting through a joint resolution to receive the Commissioner in the House Chamber, with both bodies, the Governor and other chief officers of the State, and the Judges of the Supreme Court in attendance, and with every other honor. He dictated that upon the announcement of the entrance of the Commissioner, the whole body should respectfully rise. The radical Union men from St. Louis resisted this vehemently, and did not hesitate to apply the ugly word "traitor" to the Commissioner, and those who were aiding and abetting him.

The Commissioner made a long address, in which he said that the Union had been dissolved, could never be reconstructed; that war was inevitable, and the people of Mississippi earnestly invited those of Missouri to unite with their kindred for common

defense and safety. A few days later the Legislature adopted a resolution against coercion, and another introduced by George Graham Vest, of the Committee on Federal Relations, afterwards Senator in the Confederate House from Missouri, and for 24 years representing Missouri in the Senate of the United States. This resolution declared that so "abhorrent was the doctrine of coercion, that any attempt at such would result in the people of Missouri rallying on the side of their Southern brethren to resist to the last extremity." There was only one vote against this in the Senate, and but 14 in the House.

The eager young Secessionists were impatient to emulate their brethren farther south, and strike a definite blow—seize something that would wreck the sovereignty of the United States. Forts there were none. In the historic old Jefferson Barracks, below St. Louis, there were only a small squad of raw recruits, and a few officers, mostly of Southern proclivities, whom it would be cruel to turn out of house and home while they were waiting "for their States to go out."

There were but two Arsenals in the State; a small affair at Liberty, in the northwest, near the Missouri River, which contained several hundred muskets, a dozen cannon, and a considerable quantity of powder. The other was the great Arsenal at St. Louis, one of the most important in the country. It covered 56 acres of ground, fronting on the Mississippi River, was inclosed by a high stone wall on all sides but that of the river, and had within it four massive stone buildings standing in a rectangle. In these

were stored 60,000 stands of arms, mostly Enfield and Springfield rifles, 1,500,000 cartridges, 90,000 pounds of powder, a number of field pieces and siege guns, and a great quantity of munitions of various kinds. There were also machinery and appliances of great value. The Arsenal was situated on rather low ground, and was commanded from hills near by. At the beginning of 1861 the only persons in it were some staff officers, with their servants and orderlies, and the unarmed workmen. The officer in command was Maj. Wm. Haywood Bell, a North Carolinian, graduate of West Point, and Ordnance Officer, but who had spent nearly the whole of his 40 years' service in Bureau work, attending meanwhile so providently to his own affairs that he was quite a wealthy man, with most of his investments in St. Louis.

Gov. Claiborne F. Jackson had as his military adviser and executant Maj.-Gen. Daniel M. Frost, a New Yorker by birth and a graduate of West Point. He had served awhile in the Mexican War, where he received a brevet as First Lieutenant for gallantry at Cerro Gordo, and then became Quartermaster of his regiment. He had been sent to Europe as a student of the military art there, but resigned in 1853, to take charge of a planing mill and carpentry work in St. Louis. He subsequently became a farmer, was elected to the Missouri Senate, entered the Missouri Militia, rose to be Brigadier-General, and was sanguinely expected to become for Missouri what Lee and Jos. E. Johnston were for Virginia, Beauregard for South Carolina, and Braxton Bragg for Louisiana. He was really a good deal of a soldier, with foresight and initiative force, and had the

Governor had the courage to follow his bold counsels, the course of events might have been different. As early as Jan. 8 he visited the Arsenal, and had an interview with its commandant, which he reported to the Governor as entirely satisfactory. Maj. Bell was wholly in sympathy with the South, and regarded the Arsenal as being virtually Missouri's property when she should choose to demand it. His honor as a soldier would compel him to resist any attack from an irresponsible mob, but a summons from the sovereign State of Missouri would meet with the respectful obedience to which it was entitled. It was therefore decided that this was the best shape in which to leave matters. Maj. Bell would hold the Arsenal in trust against both the radical St. Louis Germans and over-zealous Secessionists, who wanted to seize it and arm their particular followers. When Gen. Frost had organized the Missouri Militia to his satisfaction, he would march into the Arsenal, and under the plea of protecting it from mobs, use its contents to thoroughly arm and equip his Militia, which would thus be put in very much better shape than the troops of any other State.

Meanwhile, Gen. Frost recommended that as little as possible be said about the Arsenal, in order to avoid attracting attention to it.

All the same, the Arsenal was intently watched by both sides, and for the next four months it was the great stake for which they played, since its possession would go far toward giving possession of the State. There were but 150,000 stands of arms in the rest of the South, while here were 60,000.

Even before South Carolina seceded the ardent young Secessionists of St. Louis had begun the organization of "Minute Men" to "protect the State." Naturally, their first step in protecting the State would be to seize the Arsenal, to prevent its arms being used to "coerce the people." Their headquarters were in the Berthold House, a fine residence at the corner of Fifth and Pine streets, over which floated the Secession flag.

Into these companies went numbers of young men from the best families of the South, who had come to St. Louis to take advantage of business opportunities, and young Irishmen, of whom there were many thousands in the city, and who, having in their blood an antipathy to "the Dutch" dating from William of Orange's days, were skillfully wrought upon by the assertion that the "infidel, Sabbath-breaking, beer-drinking Dutch who had invaded St. Louis" were of the same breed as those who harried Ireland and inflicted innumerable persecutions in 1689. Very effective in this was one Brock Champion, a big-hearted, big-bodied young Irishman, of much influence among his countrymen, who played little part, however, in the war which ensued. More conspicuous later was Basil Wilson Duke, a bright Kentucky lawyer, 25 years old, who was Captain of one of the companies, and afterwards became the second in command and an inspiration to John H. Morgan, the great raider. The Captain of another company was Colton Greene, a South Carolinian, a year or two younger than Duke, a merchant, a man of delicate physique and cultivated mind, but of great courage and constancy of purpose.

Everywhere in the State began a systematic persecution of the Unconditional Union men and the bullying of the Conditional Union men. Secession flags in numbers floated from buildings in St. Louis, Rolla, Lexington, Jefferson City, Kansas City, and elsewhere. Union meetings were disturbed and broken up in all the larger towns, the Star Spangled Banner torn down and trampled upon, and the borders of Kansas and Iowa were thronged with Union refugees telling how they had been robbed, maltreated, and threatened with death, their stock killed, their houses and crops burned by the "White Trash" which the Slave Power had turned loose upon them.

When Maj. Bell had talked of "irresponsible mobs," he may have thought of premature young fire-eaters like Duke, Greene, and Champion, eager for the distinction of capturing the Arsenal, covetous of distributing its arms to their followers. Most likely, however, he had in mind forays from Illinois, or by the radical Germans of St. Louis, who were ill disposed toward seeing their enemies equipped from its stores.

Gen. Frost had the Germans in mind as early as Jan. 8, probably immediately following his interview with Maj. Bell, for he sent out a secret circular to his trusted subordinates instructing them that "upon the bells of the churches sounding a continuous peal, interrupted by a pause of five minutes, they should assemble with their men in their armories, and there await further orders." One of these circulars fell into the hands of a good Union man, who immediately took it to Frank P. Blair. It was found

that it was the Catholic church bells that were relied upon to do the ringing, implying that the enthusiastic, reckless Irishmen were to take the initiative. The Archbishop of St. Louis was immediately seen, to prohibit the bells of the churches being used as a tocsin to light the flames of civil war. Mr. Blair sent the circular with other information to Gen. Scott, with an urgent request that an officer of sounder loyalty supersede Maj. Bell, and that some troops be sent to Jefferson Barracks against an emergency. Mr. Montgomery Blair, brother of F. P. Blair, Jr., and soon to be Postmaster-General, Gov. Yates, of Illinois, and President-elect Lincoln supported this request. A fortnight later Maj. Bell was relieved, and assigned to duty in the East.

A gallant one-armed Irish First Lieutenant of the 2d U. S., one Thomas W. Sweeny, of whom we shall hear more later, was ordered to Jefferson Barracks, where it was supposed his influence with his countrymen might offset that of Mr. Champion. A small squad of Regulars was sent him from Newport Barracks.

Maj. Bell foreseeing that the Army was to be no longer a place for a quiet gentleman with business tastes, resigned his commission, to remain with his well-placed investments in St. Louis.

All this disturbed the Secessionists. They saw that the Government had an eye on the important Arsenal, and did not intend to give it up as tamely as it had other places in the South. The arrival of the Regulars was made the basis of inflammatory appeals that the Government was trying to "overawe and coerce the people." Two days later this "intimi-

dation" became flagrant. Isaac H. Sturgeon, Assistant United States Treasurer at St. Louis, a Kentuckian and Secessionist, had for reasons of his own reported to President Buchanan that he was concerned about the safety of \$400,000 in gold in his vaults. The President handed the letter to Gen. Scott, who sent an order to Jefferson Barracks which resulted in a Lieutenant with 40 men being sent to the Post Office Building to protect the removal of the gold. The city was thrown into the greatest excitement as the troops marched through the streets, the papers issued extras, and it required all the efforts of the officials and the leaders on both sides to preserve the peace.

Gov. Claiborne Jackson took advantage of the occasion to send a message to the Legislature, in which he said that this was an "act insulting to the dignity and patriotism of the people."

The gold having been removed, Gen. Harney ordered the troops back to the Arsenal, and quiet was restored.

Maj. Peter B. Hagner, of the District of Columbia, who graduated from West Point in 1832, and had distinguished himself in the Mexican War, succeeded Maj. Bell in the command of the Arsenal. His sympathies were strongly with the South, but not so strongly as to overmaster his desire to retain his commission and its emoluments. He was willing to go any length in serving the Secessionists that did not involve his dismissal from the Army. He had two brothers in the service, and all three held on to their commissions until forced from their hands by the grim grasp of death.

Meanwhile, Lieut.-Gov. Reynolds was pushing the Legislative work to carry Missouri out of the Union. The acts which proved so successful in the other Southern States in binding the people hand and foot and dragging them over to the rebellion were closely imitated. One of these was the celebrated "Military Bill" introduced in the Senate, Jan. 5, 1861. This put every man of military age in the State into the Militia, and at the disposal of the Governor, who was given \$150,000 outright to enable him to carry out his plans. It made everybody owe paramount allegiance to the State, and prescribed severe penalties, including even death, to be inflicted by drum-head court martial for "treason" to the State—for even the utterance of disrespectful words against the Governor or Legislature. This went a little too far for many of the members, and by obstinate fighting the passage of the bill was postponed from time to time and at last defeated.

Another bill was generally understood as one to stamp out Republicanism in St. Louis, but officially designated as "An Act to amend an act for the suppression of riot in St. Louis City and County." This took out of the hands of the Republican Sheriff and Mayor most of their peace-preserving powers, which were given to a Board to be appointed by the Governor, thereby to tie their hands when the time came for taking the Arsenal. One of the Governor's Police Commissioners was Basil Duke, the leader of the "Minute-Men."

Though they had none of the noisy aggressiveness of the Secessionists, the leaders of the Unionists, during those bitterly intense Winter days, were no

less able, courageous, and earnest. Blair had a masterful courage and determination not equalled by any man opposed to him. He was one of those men of mighty purpose who set their faces toward an object with the calm resolution to die rather than fail. Against the hardened steel of his relentless will the softer iron of such thrasonic Secessionists as Gov. Jackson, Lieut.-Gov. Reynolds, United States Senators James S. Green and Trusten Polk, Gen. Frost and lesser leaders, clashed without producing a dent.

Blair had skill and tact equal to his courage. He foresaw every movement of his antagonists and met it with a prompt countermove. To their inflammatory rhetoric he opposed clear common sense, loyalty and wise judgment as to the future. When occasion demanded, he did not hesitate to publicly express the hope "that every traitor among them would be made to test the strength of Missouri hemp." He was swift to subordinate himself and "the Cause," when anything could be gained. There were many prominent men who wanted to save the Union, but would deny to Frank Blair the credit of it. He unhesitatingly gave them the highest places, and took the subordinate one for himself. There were tens of thousands of Whigs and Democrats who loved the Union, but shuddered at the thought of becoming Black Republicans. He abolished the Republican Party, that they might form a Union Party, the sole principle of which should be support of the Government.

Next to Blair was the famous "Committee of Safety," which did such high work for the Union during

those fermenting days. These and their birthplaces were:

O. D. Filley, New England.

John How, Pennsylvania.

Samuel T. Glover, Kentucky.

James O. Broadhead, Virginia.

J. J. Witzig, Germany.

These self-denying, self-sacrificing patriots worked together with Blair in perfect harmony and with the utmost skill. They were more than a match for their Secession opponents in organization and management, and lost very few points in the great game that was played throughout the Winter, with the possession of the City, the State, and the Arsenal for the main prizes.

The Committee of Safety had its Home Guards to offset the Minute Men. Where there were hundreds of these latter drilling more or less openly, with much fifeing and drumming and flaunting of Secession flags, there were thousands of Home Guards meeting and training with greatest secrecy in old foundries, breweries, and halls, with pickets out to prevent surprise, sawdust on the floors to drown the sound of their feet, and blankets at the windows to arrest the light and the words of command. The drill hall was only approached at night, and singly or by twos or threes, to avoid attracting attention. Most of these Home Guards were Germans, and a large proportion had had military training in Europe. The great problem with them, as with the Minute Men, was to get arms, and both sides watched the Arsenal with its 60,000 rifles and 1,500,000 cartridges with sharp covetousness. The Governor of

Illinois loaned the Home Guards a few arms, but it was expected that these would be repaid with interest from the stores of the Arsenal.

The appointment of Maj. Hagner to the command of the Arsenal was satisfactory to the Secessionists, but there was naturally a good deal of interest as to the bias of Capt. Thomas W. Sweeny. One day a man presented himself at the west gate of the Arsenal and asked to see Capt. Sweeny. Sweeny went to the gate and recognized an old acquaintance, St. George Croghan, the son of that Lieut. Croghan who had so brilliantly defended Fort Stéphenson, at Lower Sandusky, in the War of 1812, and who afterwards was for many years Inspector-General of the United States Army. Croghan's grandfather had been a gallant officer in the Revolution. It was a cold day, and Croghan wore a citizen's overcoat. On their way to the quarters, the guards properly saluted Sweeny as they passed. Said Croghan, "Sweeny, don't you think those sentinels ought to salute me—my rank is higher than yours?" at the same time throwing open his overcoat and revealing the uniform of a rebel field officer.

"Not to such as that, by heavens!" responded Sweeny; and added: "If that is your business, you can have nothing to do with me. You had better not let my men see you with that thing on."

Croghan assured him his business in calling was one of sincere friendship; but he would remark while on the subject, that Sweeny had better find it convenient to get out of there, and very soon, too.

"Why?" asked Sweeny.

Replied Croghan: "Because we intend to take it."

Sweeny in great excitement exclaimed: "Never! As sure as my name is Sweeny, the property in this place shall never fall into your hands. I'll blow it to hell first, and you know I am the man to do it."

Nine months later this Croghan was to fall mortally wounded at the head of a cavalry regiment while attacking the Union troops near Fayetteville, W. Va., while Sweeny was to do gallant service in the Union army, rising to the rank of Brigadier-General of Volunteers, and command of a Division, and being retired in 1870 with the rank of Brigadier-General.

CHAPTER III.


THE Secessionists were in the meanwhile hard-ly making the headway in the Legislature that they had anticipated, in spite of the stimulating events in the extreme Southern States.

A curious situation developed in the Legislature leading to the arrest for a while of Lieut.-Gov. Reynolds's plans for organizing the State for rebellion. The term of Senator James S. Green expired on the 3d of March, and he was desirous of being his own successor. The first consideration was whether Missouri was likely to stay in the Union and have a Senator. At the moment this seemed probable enough to warrant going on and electing a Senator, and the Pro-Slavery men made strenuous efforts to re-elect Mr. Green, but it was significant that he was deemed too ultra a Secessionist, and Waldo P. Johnson was elected in his stead. Among the many things in the war which turned out surprisingly different from what men had confidently expected was that Mr. Green took the selfish politician's view of the "in-gratitude" of those who refused to re-elect him, sullenly retired to private life, and did not raise his hand nor his voice for the South during the war, while Mr. Johnson, who was elected because he was a better Union man, soon resigned his seat in the United States Senate, entered the Confederate army, became Lieutenant-Colonel of the 4th Mo. (Confederate), and fought till the close of the war.

Jan. 18, after a prolonged debate, both Houses passed a bill to call a Convention "to consider the relations of Missouri to the United States." This was the successful device which had been used in carrying other States out of the Union, and despite the conservatism of the language of the act it was hoped that it would be successful in this instance. In the Senate there were only 26 votes against it, and in the House but 18, of whom 11 were from St. Louis. The Southern Rights men regarded this as a great triumph, however, and made much jubilation throughout the State. The election for members to the Convention was fixed for Feb. 18, and the Convention was to meet on the last day of the month. This act was followed by the adoption of a joint resolution which expressed profound regret that the States of New York and Ohio had tendered men and money to the President for "the avowed purpose of coercing certain sovereign States of the South into obedience to the Federal Government," and declaring that the people of Missouri would rally to the side of their Southern brethren to resist the invaders and to the last extremity." Only 14 votes were cast against this resolution.

The main interest now centered upon the election of delegates to the Convention. New political lines ran among the people, dividing them into Secessionists, "Conditional Union" men and "Unconditional Union" men.

Blair's leadership was able to efface the Republican Party for the time being, and carry all of the members over to the Unconditional Unionists. The



GEN. STERLING PRICE

result of the election was a blow to the Secessionists, not one of whose candidates was elected.

In St. Louis the Unconditional Union candidates were elected by over 5,000 majority.

The bitterly-disappointed Secessionists denounced the majority as "Submissionists," and threatened all manner of things.

The election occurred on the same day that Jefferson Davis was inaugurated President of the Southern Confederacy.

When the State Convention met at Jefferson City, it was found that of its 99 members 53 were natives of either Virginia or Kentucky, and all but 17 had been born in Slave States. Only 13 were natives of the North, three were Germans, and one an Irishman. A struggle at once ensued for the organization of the Convention, which resulted in a victory for the Union men, ex-Gov. Sterling Price being elected President by 75 votes, to 15 cast for Nathaniel W. Watkins, a half-brother of Henry Clay, and a strenuous advocate of Southern Rights. As soon as the Convention completed its organization it adjourned to St. Louis, to avoid the badgering of the pronounced Secessionists, who constituted the State Government, and the clamorous bullying of the crowd assembled in the State Capital to influence its action.

On assembling at St. Louis the Convention immediately addressed itself to the duty for which it had assembled. Judge Hamilton R. Gamble, a Virginian, leader of the Unconditional Union men, and afterwards Governor of the State, as Chairman of the Committee on Federal Relations, made a long report,

in which it was denied that the grievances complained of were sufficient to involve Missouri in rebellion; that in a military sense Missouri's union with the Southern Confederacy meant annihilation; that the true position of the State was to try to bring back her seceding sisters, and to this effect a Convention of all the States was recommended, to adopt the Crittenden Proposition. An attempt to amend this report by the declaration that if the Northern States refused to assent to the Crittenden Compromise Missouri would then side with her sister States of the South received only 23 votes, but among them was that of Sterling Price, who had begun to drift southward.

The Convention adopted Gamble's report, and a few days afterward adjourned subject to call of the committee.

The Secessionists were greatly discouraged by the result, and the Legislature also adjourned. Then came another fluctuation in public opinion. The great majority wanted peace. The attitude of the Governor and his faction, who seemed to look toward peace by putting Missouri in a state of defense to prevent the new Republican President from making war, appealed to many, and in the Spring elections the Unconditional Union men were defeated by a small majority, and St. Louis passed from their official control to that of the Conditional Union Men.

While these events were occupying public attention there occurred another, little noted at the time, but which was soon to be of controlling importance. Feb. 6 there marched up from the steamboat landing to the Arsenal a company of 80 Regular soldiers

of the 2d U. S., from Fort Riley, Kan., at the head of which was a Captain, under the average hight, and a well knit but rather slender frame. He had a long, narrow face, with full, high forehead, keen, deep-set blue eyes, and hair and whiskers almost red. His face was thoughtful but determined, his manner quick and nervous. He bore himself towards his men as an exact and rigid disciplinarian, mingled with thoughtful kindness for all who did their duty and tried their best. This was Capt. Nathaniel Lyon, born in Connecticut, descended from old Puritan stock, with the blood of Cromwell's Ironsides flowing in his veins. He was then 42 years old, and before another birthday was to fill the country with his fame, and fall in battle—face to the front. He had graduated from West Point in 1841, the 11th in his class. That his intellectual abilities were of high order is shown by his standing in that class, of which Zealous B. Tower, an eminent engineer, and brevet Major-General, U. S. A., was the head, and Horatio G. Wright, who commanded the Sixth Corps during the last and greatest year of its history, was the second.

Gen. John F. Reynolds, the superb commander of the First Corps and of the Right Wing of the Army of the Potomac, with which he brought on the battle of Gettysburg, where he was killed, graduated 26th in the class, and Gen. Don Carlos Buell, who organized and commanded the Army of the Ohio, graduated 32d. Gen. Robert Garnett, the first Confederate General officer to fall in the struggle,—killed July 13, 1861, at Carrick's Ford,—was the 27th in the class. Julius P. Garesche, who graduated 16th

in the class, became Chief of Staff to Gen. Rosecrans, and was killed at Stone River.

Besides being thoroughly versed in all that related to his profession of arms, Capt. Lyon was well informed in history and general literature; was a devoted student of the Bible and Shakspeare, and wrote well and forcibly. What was very rare among the officers of the old Army, he was a radical Abolitionist, and believer in the National Sovereignty. He was so outspoken in these views as to render his position quite unpleasant, where nearly every one was so antagonistic. A weaker-willed man would have been forced either out of the Army or into tacit acquiescence with the prevailing sentiment.

Upon graduation he had been assigned to the 2d U. S., and sent to get his first lessons in actual war fighting the Florida Indians. There his superiors found occasion to remark that his zeal sometimes outran his discretion—not an infrequent fault of earnest young men. He had distinguished himself and received a brevet in the Mexican War for gallantry at Contreras and Churubusco, and had then been sent to California. With a slender force he was charged with the duty of keeping a long frontier in order against turbulent Indians. He accomplished this by making the Indians more afraid of him than the whites could possibly be of them. No quick retreat, no impregnable fastness, could shelter them from his inexorable pursuit. On one occasion he carried boats on wagons over a mountain range to cross a river and strike an Indian lair where the marauders were resting in the fullest sense of security. His company had next been transferred to

Kansas in the midst of the political troubles there, where, while doing his official duty with strict impartiality, his sympathies were actively with the Free State settlers.

For 42 years he had been growing and fitting himself for a great Opportunity.

For once Opportunity and the Man equal to it met.

Immediately after settling his company in the Arsenal, Capt. Lyon went to the city to meet Frank P. Blair. The two strong men recognized each the other's strength, and at once came into harmonious co-operation.

The fate of the Arsenal, of the City of St. Louis, and of the State of Missouri, was settled.

Before Capt. Lyon arrived, the Committee of Safety had had an alarm about the Arsenal, and rallied a strong force of their Home Guards in waiting to go to the assistance of Capt. Sweeny and his 40 men, should the Minute Men attack him. But the Secessionist leaders had such confidence in Maj. Hagner that they dissuaded the impatient Basil Duke, Colton Greene, Brock Champion and other eager young Captains from making the attack.

Capt. Lyon was soon reinforced. Lieut. Warren L. Lothrop, of the 4th U. S. Art., a Maine man, who had risen from the ranks, came in with 40 men. He was afterwards to succeed Frank P. Blair, Jr., as Colonel of the 1st Mo. Light Art. Next came Capt. Rufus Saxton, also of the 4th Art., a Massachusetts man, later to rise to brevet Major-General of Volunteers, and to play an important part in caring for the freedmen of the South Carolina coast. Still later came Capt. James Totten, of the 2d U. S. Art.,

with his company. He had been born in Pennsylvania, but was appointed to West Point from Virginia, and was in command of the Arsenal at Little Rock until he evacuated his post, Feb. 8, before a large force of rebels, and retired with his command to the Indian Territory, by virtue of the agreement with the Governor of the State. While Lothrop and Saxton appear to have been taken at once into the councils of Capt. Lyon, Capt. Totten does not, probably because the uncompromising Lyon did not like his methods in Arkansas. He was, however, true to his loyalty, and rose eventually to the rank of Brigadier-General.

There were now in the Arsenal nine officers and 484 men. Hagner and Lyon at once came into collision. Though Hagner belonged to the Ordnance, and not therefore regarded as eligible to command troops, he secured an order assigning himself to command according to his brevet rank of Major, which made him superior to Lyon. Hagner had been five years longer in the service than Lyon, but his commission as Captain was 20 days junior to Lyon's. Lyon energetically protested against Hagner's assignment in a letter to Blair, who was then in Washington, D. C., looking out for matters at that end of the line, in which he said:

It is obvious that the fine stone wall inclosing our grounds affords us an excellent defense against attack, if we will take advantage of it; and for this purpose platforms should be erected for our men to stand on and fire over; and that artillery should be ready at the gates, to be run out and sweep down a hostile force; and sand-bags should be prepared and at hand to throw up a parapet to protect the parties at these pieces of artillery; inside pieces should be placed to rake the whole length, and sweep down each side a party that should get over the walls, traverses being erected to protect parties at these pieces. A pretty strong field work, with three heavy

pieces, should be erected on the side toward the river, to oppose either a floating battery or one that might be established on the island; and, finally, besides our houses, every building should be mined, with a train arranged so as to blow them up successively, as occupied by the enemy. Maj. Hagner refuses, as I mentioned to you, to do any of these things, and has given his orders not to fly to the walls to repel an approach, but to let the enemy have all the advantages of the wall to lodge himself behind it, and get possession of all outside buildings overlooking us, and to get inside and under shelter of our outbuildings, which we are not to occupy before we make resistance. This is either imbecility or d——d villainy, and in contemplating the risks we run and the sacrifices we must make in case of an attack in contrast to the vigorous and effective defense we are capable of, and which, in view of the cause of our country and humanity, the disgrace and degradation to which the Government has been subject by pusillanimity and treachery, we are now called upon to make, I get myself into a most unhappy state of solicitude and irritability. With even less force and proper disposition, I am confident we can resist any force which can be brought against us; by which I mean such force as would not be overcome by our sympathizing friends outside. These needful dispositions, with proper industry, can be made in 24 hours. There cannot be, as you know, a more important occasion nor a better opportunity to strike an effective blow at this arrogant and domineering infatuation of Secessionism than here; and must this all be lost, by either false notions of duty or covert disloyalty? As I have said, Maj. Hagner has no right to the command, and, under the 62d Article of War, can only have it by a special assignment of the President, which I do not believe has been made; but that the announcement of Gen. Scott that the command belongs to Maj. Hagner is his own decision, and done in his usual sordid spirit of partisanship and favoritism to pets, and personal associates, and toadies; nor can he, even in the present straits of the country, rise above this, in earnest devotion to justice and the wants of his country.

Lyon went to Gen. Harney to urge his right to command, from seniority of commission; but Harney sustained Hagner, who was in some things much more Harney's style than Lyon. Lyon thereupon appealed to President Buchanan, which meant to Gen. Scott, who, of course, sustained Hagner. Lyon was, therefore, forced to submit until Lincoln was inaugurated.

There was no vanity or self-seeking in this urgency of Lyon's. In the Army he was distinguished

for his readiness to subordinate himself to carry out any plans which commended themselves to him. He had repeatedly offered to subordinate himself to Hagner if the latter would take what Lyon thought only the most necessary steps at that crisis for the defense of the position and stores of priceless importance.

What Lyon dreaded above all things was something akin to that which had freshly occurred at Little Rock, where Capt. Totten had withdrawn from the Little Rock Arsenal with his company in the face of a large mob of Secessionists, upon a receipt by the Governor for the arms and stores, and the promise that he would account for them to the United States Government. Lyon was determined to bury himself and his men in the ruins of the Arsenal before it should pass into the hands of the Secessionists.

Basil Duke, Colton Greene, and the other chafing young Captains had matured a plot with the connivance of Gen. Frost, of the Militia, probably somewhat at his instigation, which would brush aside the network of intrigue which Claiborne Jackson and others were spinning, bring matters to a focus, and in one blow crush Union sentiment, overawe the timid, fasten the wavering, seize the Arsenal and launch Missouri upon the tide of Secession with the Cotton States.

The police powers of the city of St. Louis had been taken away from the Mayor, Frost had his Militia in readiness, the Irish were properly worked up to a state of exasperation against the "infidel, Sabbath-breaking Dutch," and hosts of Americans were in

the same net when on the day of Lincoln's inauguration the Secession flag was boldly hoisted from the roof of the Berthold Mansion, in the most prominent part of the city. At once excitement burned to fever heat. Incensed by the wanton insult, the Germans and other Unconditional Union men raged that the flag should be torn down, and crowds gathered around the Berthold Mansion for that purpose. The house had, however, been converted into an arsenal, with all the arms and ammunition that could at that time be gathered, and filled with determined men under the leadership of Duke, Greene and others, eager to precipitate a riot, under the cover of which the Irish and Americans could be hurled against the Germans, and the Arsenal seized.

Blair and the Committee of Safety saw the danger of this. Their followers were not so ready for battle as the enemy was, and in conjunction with the more conservative leaders of the other side they succeeded in restraining their indignant friends from opening up a day of blood which would have been forever memorable in the history of St. Louis. Blair at once hastened back to Washington, and a few days after the Inauguration secured from the new Secretary of War an order assigning Capt. Lyon to the command of the Arsenal. This had to come through Gen. Harney's hands, and in transmitting it he informed Capt. Lyon:

You shall not exercise any control over the operations of the Ordnance Department. The arrangements heretofore made for the accommodation of the troops at the Arsenal and for the defense of the place will not be disturbed without the sanction of the Commanding General.

This was to save Hagner's pride, as well as propitiate Gen. Harney's Secession friends in St. Louis,

who were becoming very uneasy at the way the "Yankee Abolitionist" was taking hold.

The dilemma into which Gen. Harney was becoming daily more involved was far more perplexing than any he had encountered in his fighting days. A question that could be settled sword in hand never had troubled him much. Alas! this could not be—not then. On the one side were the lifelong associations and habits of thought of the plain old soldier. All of his friends were Southerners and Slaveholders, as he himself was. Nearly all of the public men he knew, the officials of the State of Louisiana, which he called his home; of Missouri, which was almost equally his home, had either gone over irrevocably to Secession, or were preparing to do so. In his real home, the Army, it was almost as bad. The next Brigadier-General above him, Daniel E. Twiggs, had just surrendered all the men and property under his command to the State of Texas. The men who controlled the War Department,—Secretary Floyd, Adjutant-General Samuel Cooper, Quartermaster-General Joe E. Johnston, Assistant Adjutants-General John Withers and George Deas, had gone into the Confederate army. Robert E. Lee, Gen. Scott's prime favorite, was preparing to do so.

On the other hand were the deep, ineradicable instincts of soldierly loyalty to the Flag under which he had fought for 40 years. The man who had hanged 60 men at one time in Mexico for deserting the Flag was likely to have a severe struggle before he could bring himself to do the same. He was deeply incensed at the "Black Republicans" for irritating the Southerners so that they felt compelled

to secede, but did not believe that the latter should have seceded. At least, until Missouri seceded he was going to maintain, as best he could, the National authority in his Department.

A flashlight is thrown on his mental attitude by his reply to Lieut. (afterwards General) Schofield, when informed by him of the above-mentioned preparations for seizing the Arsenal under the cover of a riot. "A —— outrage," he exclaimed in his usual explosive way. "Why, the State has not yet passed the Ordinance of Secession. Missouri has not gone out of the United States."

The limitations placed by Gen. Harney upon Lyon's assignment to command were aggravating. Hagner commanded the buildings, the arms, ammunition, and other stores, and the strong walls surrounding the grounds. Lyon commanded merely the men. He could not draw a musket, a cannon, or a cartridge for either, not even a hammer, a spade nor an ax, without a requisition duly approved by Harney. Nor could he change a single arrangement of the grounds without Harney's approval.

Lyon was almost nightly meeting with the Committee of Safety, and visiting the drill-rooms of the Home Guards, where he advised, encouraged and drilled the men. The Secessionists were extremely fearful that in some way he would manage to get the arms and ammunition, and besought Harney and Hagner to omit no precaution to prevent this.

When away from his Secessionist environment, Harney's soldierly instincts asserted themselves. Lyon's vigorous, uncompromising course was far more to his mind than the dull, shifty Hagner's.

One was zealous in the performance of his duty, and the other a red-tape bureaucrat, whose first thought always seemed to be to clog and hamper the men in the field. Harney had suffered too much from these "office fellows" to be especially enamored of them. Therefore he had moods, when he gave Lyon a free hand, which the latter made the most of until the General's mood changed.

During one of these Lyon had undermined the walls of the buildings, placed batteries, built banquettes for the men to fire over the walls, cut port-holes, reinforced the weaker places with sandbags, and established a vigilant sentry system to prevent surprise.

The Secessionists were equally full of plans, though not of performances. Minute Men were organizing throughout the State to rush in at the given day by every train and overwhelm St. Louis, taking the Arsenal by sheer force of numbers. Many of the Captains of the large steamboats which carried on the trade between St. Louis and New Orleans were zealous Secessionists, and mooted plans for assailing the Arsenal on the river side with cannon mounted on boats, backed up by large crowds of men. But Gov. Jackson and his coterie still relied mainly upon inciting some form of riot in the city, which would allow Gen. Frost to get possession of the Arsenal with his Militia and "protect it from violence." Once in Gen. Frost's hands—then!

The Secessionists scored a point and carried dismay to the Unionists by securing an order from Gen. Scott for Capt. Lyon to attend a Court of Inquiry at Fort Leavenworth. While he was gone they might

carry out their plans with comparative ease and safety. Blair, however, succeeded in getting Gen. Scott to revoke the order.

To find out precisely what the position of affairs inside the Arsenal was, and to spy out its defenses, a number of prominent citizens, among whom was James S. Rains, afterwards Brigadier-General in the Confederate army, calling themselves Grand Jurors for the United States District Court, presented themselves at the Arsenal and attempted an entrance. The Sergeant of the Guard held them awhile till he could communicate with Capt. Lyon, and they went away in anger.

There were other officers in the Arsenal whom Lyon could trust as little as he could Maj. Hagner, but Capts. Saxton and Sweeny and Lieut. Lothrop stood firmly by him in every movement, going so far as to mutually agree that they would shoot Maj. Hagner before he should be allowed to turn over the arms to the Secessionists.

The bombardment and surrender of Fort Sumter and the President's call for troops threw the country into a tumult of excitement, and changed the political relations everywhere. All over the South the Secessionists were jubilant, and those in Missouri particularly exultant. Very many of the waverers at once flocked over to the Secessionists, while others sided with the Union. To what extent this change took place was as yet unknown, nor which side had a majority. Public sympathy as voiced by the leading papers seemed to be that the Union had "been riven asunder by the mad policy of Mr. Lincoln, and that it was necessary for Missouri to take

a stand with the other Border States to prevent his attempting to subjugate them.”

Gen. Frost submitted a memorial to Governor Jackson, in which were the following recommendations:

1. Convene the General Assembly at once.
2. Send an agent to the South to procure mortars and siege guns.
3. Prevent the garrisoning of the United States Arsenal at Liberty.
4. Warn the people of Missouri “that the President has acted illegally in calling out troops, thus arrogating to himself the war-making power, and that they are therefore by no means bound to give him aid or comfort in his attempt to subjugate by force of arms a people who are still free; but, on the contrary, should prepare themselves to maintain all their rights as citizens of Missouri.”
5. Order me (Frost) to form a military camp of instruction at or near the city of St. Louis; to muster military companies into the service of the State; and to erect batteries and do all things necessary and proper to be done in order to maintain the peace, dignity, and sovereignty of the State.
6. Order Gen. Bowen to report with his command to me (Frost) for duty.

He proposed to form a camp of instruction for the Militia on the river bluffs near the Arsenal, from which it could be commanded by guns and mortars to be obtained from the South when Frost with his brigade and that of Gen. John S. Bowen, who was afterwards to be a Major-General in the Confederate army and command a division at Vicksburg, with what volunteers they could obtain, would force Lyon to surrender the Arsenal and its stores.

While considering these recommendations the Governor received a request from the Secretary of War for four regiments of infantry, Missouri's quota of the 75,000 men the President had called for. To this Governor Jackson replied the next day:

Your dispatch of the 13th instant, making a call upon Missouri for four regiments of men for immediate service, has been received. There can be, I apprehend, no doubt but these

men are intended to form a part of the President's army to make war upon the people of the seceded States. Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its objects, inhuman and diabolical, and cannot be complied with. Not one man will the State of Missouri furnish to carry on such an unholy crusade.

The same day he sent Capts. Greene and Duke to Montgomery with a letter to the President of the Confederacy, requesting him to furnish the siege guns and mortars which Gen. Frost wanted, and another messenger to Virginia with a similar request. He also called the Legislature to meet at Jefferson City May 2, to take "measures to perfect the organization and equipment of the Militia and raise the money to place the State in a proper attitude for defense." He did not dare order Gen. Frost to establish his military camp of instruction in St. Louis, but he took the more prudent and strictly legal course of ordering the commanding officers of the several Militia Districts of the State to assemble their respective commands at some convenient place, and go into encampment for six days for drilling and discipline. This order authorized Gen. Frost to establish his camp wherever he pleased within the City or County of St. Louis.

Gen. Bowen, who was in command of a force in the southwest to guard the State against the marauders from Kansas, was ordered to report with certain of his troops to Gen. Frost. The Arsenal at Liberty was at once seized by the Secessionists in that neighborhood, who secured several hundred muskets, four brass guns, and a large amount of powder. These proceedings of the Governor disturbed Gen. Harney greatly, and he wrote at once to Gen. Scott asking him for instructions.

Capt. Lyon did not ask or wait for instructions. He wrote at once to Gov. Dick Yates, of Illinois, to obtain authority to hold in readiness for service in St. Louis the six regiments which Illinois was called upon to furnish. Gov. Yates acted promptly, and received authority to send two or three regiments "to support the garrison of the St. Louis Arsenal." Lyon received orders to equip these troops, and to issue 10,000 additional stands of arms to the agent of the Governor of Illinois.

Mr. Blair reached St. Louis from Washington, April 17, and at once began acting with the boldness and foresight that the situation demanded. By his advice Col. Pritchard and other Union officers of the Militia resigned. He procured from the War Department an order placing 5,000 stands of arms at the disposal of Lyon for arming "the loyal citizens"—the Home Guards—and requested orders by telegraph for Capt. Lyon to muster men into the service to fill Missouri's requisition, and to have Hagner removed.

Lyon, determined not to be taken by surprise, had the streets leading to the Arsenal nightly patrolled and pickets stationed outside the walls. Gov. Jackson's Police Board complained that this was a violation of the City ordinances and in direct interference with their duties. They demanded that he should obey the law, but he refused. When they appealed to Harney, he at once ordered Lyon to quarter his men in the Arsenal and forbade him to issue arms to anyone without Harney's sanction. This brought Blair and Lyon to a parting of the ways with Harney. They demanded his removal, and April 21



GEN. FRANCIS P. BLAIR, JR.

Harney was removed from the command, and ordered to repair to Washington and report to the General-in-Chief.

On the same day Capt. Lyon was instructed to immediately execute the order previously given to "arm loyal citizens." He was also ordered to muster into the service four regiments, which the Governor had refused to furnish. As the men had long been in waiting, Lyon quickly organized the four regiments, which elected him their Brigadier-General. Some of the field officers of these regiments were notable men, and were to have brilliant careers during the war. The Colonel of the 1st Regiment was F. P. Blair, afterwards to become Major-General commanding a corps; the Lieutenant-Colonel was George L. Andrews, afterwards to be a Colonel in the Regular Army; the Major was John M. Schofield, later to be Major-General commanding the Twenty-third Corps, and still later Lieutenant-General commanding the Army of the United States. The Colonel of the 3d Regiment was Franz Sigel, afterwards Major-General commanding the Eleventh Corps and the Army of the Shenandoah.

The four regiments having been filled to the maximum, there were large numbers yet demanding muster. From these a fifth regiment of Missouri Volunteers and five regiments of "United States Reserves" were formed. The most notable among the field officers of these were John McNeil, Colonel of the 3d Regiment, who afterwards became a Brigadier-General, and B. Gratz Brown, Colonel of the 4th U. S. Reserves, afterwards Vice Presidential nominee on the Greeley ticket. These additional

regiments formed another brigade, and elected Capt. Sweeny their Brigadier-General. After arming these 10,000 men Lyon secured the balance of the stores from all danger of treachery or capture by transferring them to Alton, Ill., where they would be under the guardianship of loyal men.

Thus, in a few, swift weeks after the inauguration of President Lincoln, Blair and Lyon, bold even to temerity, and even more sagacious than bold, had snatched away from the sanguine Secessionists the great Arsenal, with its momentous contents, which were placed at the service of the Union.

More than 10,000 loyal men of Missouri were standing, arms in hand, on her soil to confront their enemies.

Above all, the Government showed that it would no longer tamely submit to being throttled and stabbed, but would fight, then, there, and everywhere, for its life.

CHAPTER IV.

UP to the time that Gen. Harney was relieved and ordered to Washington, and Capt. Lyon was given a free hand, Gen. D. M. Frost's course and advice were worthy of his reputation as a resolute, far-seeing commander. With the organized military companies of his district and the Minute Men he had a good nucleus for action, and had he made a rush on the Arsenal at any of the several times that he seems to have contemplated, it would have been backed up by several thousand young Irishmen and Americans in St. Louis, as well as by tens of thousands from the country swarming in as fast as they could have gotten railroads and steamboats to carry them.

Then the capture of the Arsenal would have opened the war instead of the firing on Fort Sumter.

He was then, however, restrained by Gov. Jackson and his coterie, who expected to gain their ends by intrigues and manipulations which had proved so successful in the other States.

After, however, Capt. Lyon had equipped some 10,000 Missourians from the Arsenal and sent most of the rest of the arms across the river into Illinois, Frost seems to have suddenly become doddering. The Rev. Henry W. Beecher used to tell a very effective story about an old house dog named Noble. Some time in the dim past Noble had found a rabbit in a hole under an apple tree. Every day ever after, for the rest of his life, Noble would go to the hole

and bark industriously at it for an hour or so, with as much zeal as if he had found another rabbit there, which he never did.

There seemed to be something of this in Gen. Frost's carrying out his idea of establishing a camp ostensibly for the instruction of his Militia, on the hills near the Arsenal, which he did May 3. It is hard to reconcile this with any clear purpose. If he intended to assault and capture the Arsenal, the force that he gathered was absurdly inadequate, in view of what he must have known Lyon had to oppose him. Accounts differ as to the highest number he ever had assembled, but it must have been less than 2,000.

His camp, which was in a beautiful grove, then in the first flush of the charms of early Springtime, was quite an attractive place for the "knightly" young Southerners who, filled with the chivalrous ideas of Sir Walter Scott's novels, then the prevalent romantic literature of the South, had made much ado before their "ladye loves" of "going off to the warres," and the aforesaid "ladye loves," decorated with Secession rosettes and the red-white-and-red colors then emblematic of Secession, followed their "true-loves" to the camp, and made Lindell Grove bright with the gaily-contrasting hues in bonnets and gowns. There were music and parades, presentations, flags and banners, dancing and feasting, and all the charming accessories of a military picnic. But some how the material for common soldiers did not flock to the Camp as the Secessionists had hoped. Possibly the stern uprising of the loyal people of the North in response to the firing upon

Fort Sumter, and the mustering of solid battalions in Illinois, Iowa, and Kansas, immediately around the Missouri borders, had a repressing effect upon those who had at first thought of going with a light heart into Secession. It began to look as if there were going to be something more serious than a Fourth of July barbecue about this work of breaking up the Union.

Certainly, recruits had not come to Camp Jackson, which Frost had so named in honor of the Governor of the State, as they had flocked into similar camps farther South. Nor had they come in the numbers which were assembled around Lyon and Blair, appealing for arms. Still, the men in Camp Jackson had a resolute purpose, under all the frivolity and merry-making of the gay camp, and presently Capts. Colton Greene and Basil Duke returned with the cheering news that their mission to Jefferson Davis had been entirely successful. Heavy artillery would be furnished with which to batter down the walls of the Arsenal, and force the Home Guards to fight or surrender. They brought with them the following encouraging letter from the President of the Southern Confederacy:

Montgomery, Ala., April 23, 1861.

His Excellency C. F. Jackson, Governor of Missouri.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 17th instant, borne by Capts. Greene and Duke, and have most cordially welcomed the fraternal assurances it brings.

A misplaced but generous confidence has, for years past, prevented the Southern States from making the preparation required by the present emergency, and our power to supply you with ordnance is far short of the will to serve you. After learning as well as I could from the gentlemen accredited to me what was most needful for the attack on the Arsenal, I have directed that Capts. Greene and Duke should be furnished with two 12-pounder howitzers and two 32-pounder guns, with the proper ammunition for each. These, from the commanding hills, will be effective, both against the garrison and

to breach the inclosing walls of the place. I concur with you as to the great importance of capturing the Arsenal and securing its supplies, rendered doubly important by the means taken to obstruct your commerce and render you unarmed victims of a hostile invasion.

We look anxiously and hopefully for the day when the star of Missouri shall be added to the constellation of the Confederate States of America.

With best wishes, I am, very respectfully, yours,
JEFFERSON DAVIS.

This promise was at once made good by a letter to the Governor of Louisiana to deliver the required war material from the stores in the lately-captured arsenal at Baton Rouge. These, carefully disguised as marble, ale, and other innocent stores, were shipped upon the steamboat J. C. Swan, and consigned to a well-known Union firm in St. Louis, with private marks to identify them to the Secessionists, who, on the watch for them, had them at once loaded on drays and taken to Camp Jackson. Their movements, however, were made known to Blair and the Committee of Safety by their spies, and Capt. Lyon was urged to seize the stores upon their arrival at the wharf, but he preferred to allow them to reach their destination, where they would serve to fix the purpose of the camp upon those commanding the garrison.

Lyon, who as a soldier had naturally chafed under the insulting presence on the hills of a force hardly concealing its hostility under a thin veil of professed loyalty, at once resolved upon the capture of the camp. The more cautious of the Union men tried to restrain him. They argued that the camp would expire by legal limitation within a few days. To this Lyon opposed the probability that the Legislature would pass the military bill in some form and

make the camp a permanent one. Then, those timorous ones insisted that the forms of the law should be employed, and that the United States Marshal, armed with a writ of replevin to recover United States property, should precede the attack upon the camp. Lyon fretted under this. The writ of replevin was a tiresome formality to men who talked of fighting and were ready to fight; furthermore, if served and recognized, Frost might put off the Marshal with some trumpery stuff of no value. Still further came the news that Harney, with Gen. Scott's assistance, had reinstated himself in favor at Washington, and would return the following Sunday. It was now Wednesday, the 8th of May.

Above all, Lyon saw with a clearer insight than the strict law-abiders the immense moral effect of his contemplated action. Heretofore all the initiative, all the aggressiveness, all the audacity, had been on the side of the Secessionists. They were everywhere taking daring steps to the confusion and overthrow of the conservative Unionists, and so dragging with them hosts of the wavering. He longed to strike a quick, sharp blow to teach the enemies of the Government that they could no longer proceed with impunity, but must expect a return blow for every one they gave, and probably more.

On Wednesday evening, May 8, Capt. Lyon requested Mr. J. J. Witzig, one of the Committee of Safety, to meet him at 2 o'clock the next day with a horse and buggy. At the appointed hour Witzig went to Lyon's quarters and inquired for the "General," by which title Lyon was known after his election as Brigadier-General of the Missouri Militia. As

he entered Lyon's room, Witzig saw a lady seated near the door, veiled and evidently waiting for some one. He inquired if she was waiting for the General to come in, and seating himself near the window awaited the coming of Lyon. A few minutes later the lady arose, lifted her veil, and astonished Mr. Witzig with the very unfeminine features of Lyon himself. Mrs. Alexander had loaned him the clothes, and succeeded in attiring him so that the deception was complete. Taking a couple of heavy revolvers, Gen. Lyon entered a barouche belonging to the loyal Franklin Dick, and was driven by Mr. Dick's servant leisurely out to Camp Jackson, followed by Mr. Witzig in a buggy. Lyon saw everything in the camp that he wished to see; noticed that the streets were named Davis Avenue, Beauregard Avenue, and the like; took in the lay of the ground, and returning toward the Arsenal, stopped and directed Witzig to summon the other members of the Committee of Safety to immediately meet him at the Arsenal.

He stated to them, when they gathered, the necessity of at once capturing the camp, and his determination to do so and hold all in it as prisoners of war. Blair and Witzig warmly approved this; Filley and Broadhead finally acquiesced, while How and Glover were opposed to both the manner and time and wanted a writ of replevin served by the United States Marshal. If Gen. Frost refused to respect this, Lyon could then go to his assistance.

Lyon yielded so far as to allow Glover to get out the writ of replevin, but he was not disposed to dally long with that subterfuge, and his line of battle would not be far behind the Marshal. Even before

he went out to the camp he had sent an Aid to procure 36 horses for his batteries from the leading livery stables in the city, because he feared that Maj. McKinstry, the Chief Quartermaster of the Department, could not be trusted; a doubt which seems to have been well founded, for Maj. McKinstry afterwards refused to pay for the horses until he was compelled to do so by a peremptory order from Lyon.

The Secessionist spies were as vigilant and successful as those of the Unionists, and Gen. Frost was promptly informed of the designs upon him, whereupon on the morning of the fateful May 10 he dispatched Col. Bowen, his Chief of Staff, with the following letter to Gen. Lyon:

Headquarters, Camp Jackson,
Missouri Militia, May 10, 1861.

Capt. N. Lyon, Commanding United States troops in and about
St. Louis Arsenal.

Sir: I am constantly in receipt of information that you contemplate an attack upon my camp. Whilst I understand you are impressed with the idea that an attack upon the Arsenal and the United States troops is intended on the part of the Militia of Missouri, I am greatly at a loss to know what could justify you in attacking citizens of the United States, who are in the lawful performance of duties devolving upon them, under the Constitution, in organizing and instructing the Militia of the State in obedience to her laws, and therefore have been disposed to doubt the correctness of the information I have received.

I would be glad to know from you personally whether there is any truth in the statements that are constantly poured into my ears. So far as regards any hostility being intended toward the United States or its property or representatives, by any portion of my command, or as far as I can learn (and I think I am fully informed) of any other part of the State forces, I can say positively that the idea has never been entertained. On the contrary, prior to your taking command of the Arsenal, I proffered to Maj. Bell, then in command of the very few troops constituting its guard, the services of myself and all my command, and, if necessary, the whole power of the State to protect the United States in the full possession of all her property. Upon Gen. Harney's taking command of this Department I made the same proffer of services to him and authorized his Adjutant-General, Capt. Williams, to communicate the fact that such had been done to the War

Department. I have had no occasion to change any of the views I entertained at that time, neither of my own volition nor through orders of my constitutional commander.

I trust that after this explicit statement we may be able, by fully understanding each other, to keep far from our borders the misfortunes which so unhappily afflict our common country.

This communication will be handed you by Col. Bowen, my Chief of Staff, who may be able to explain anything not fully set forth in the foregoing.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. M. FROST,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Camp Jackson, M. V. M.

It is an almost impossible task for the historian to reconcile this extraordinary letter with Gen. Frost's standing as an officer and a gentleman. It certainly passes the limits of deception allowable in war, and has no place in the ethics of civil life.

The camp was located where it was for the generally understood purpose of attacking the Arsenal, and this purpose had been recommended to the Governor of the State by Gen. Frost himself. Every Secessionist, North and South, understood and boasted of it. Jefferson Davis approved of this, and he sent artillery with which to attack the Arsenal, which was then in Frost's camp. Gen. Lyon refused to receive the letter. He was busily engaged in preparations to carry its answer himself. He had under arms almost his entire force. Two regiments of Home Guards were left on duty protecting the Arsenal, and to be ready for any outbreak in the city, and a majority of the Regulars were also so employed.

Gen. Lyon was a thorough organizer, and had his work well in hand with every one of his subordinates fully instructed as to his part. The previous military training of the Germans here came into good play, and regiments formed quickly and moved

promptly. Col. Blair, with his regiment and a battalion of Regulars, marched to a position on the west of the camp. Col. Schuttner with his regiment went up Market street; Col. Sigel led his column up Olive street; Col. Brown went up Morgan street; and Col. McNeil up Clark avenue. A battery of six pieces went with a Regular battalion, at the head of which rode Gen. Lyon. The news of the movement rapidly diffused through the city; everybody was excited and eagerly expectant; and the roofs of the houses were black with people watching events. Not the least important factor were the Secessionist belles of the city, whose lovers and brothers were in Camp Jackson, and who, with that inconsequence which is so charming in the young feminine mind, were breathlessly expectant of their young heroes each surrounding himself with a group of "Dutch myrmidons," slain by his red right hand.

So admirably had Lyon planned that the heads of all his columns appeared at their designated places almost simultaneously, and Gen. Frost found his camp entirely surrounded in the most soldierly way. The six light pieces galloped into position to entirely command the camp. With a glance of satisfaction at the success of his arrangements, Gen. Lyon rode up to Sweeny, his second in command, and said:

"Sweeny, if their batteries open on you, deploy your leading company as skirmishers, charge on the nearest battery, and take it."

Sweeny turned to the next two companies to him, and ordered them to move their cartridge-boxes to the front, to prepare for action. Lyon then sent

Maj. B. G. Farrar with the following letter to Gen. Frost:

Headquarters United States Troops,
St. Louis, Mo., May 10, 1861.

Gen. D. M. Frost, Commanding Camp Jackson.

Sir: Your command is regarded as evidently hostile to the Government of the United States.

It is for the most part made up of those Secessionists who have openly avowed their hostility to the General Government, and have been plotting at the seizure of its property and the overthrow of its authority. You are openly in communication with the so-called Southern Confederacy, which is now at war with the United States; and you are receiving at your camp, from said Confederacy and under its flag, large supplies of the material of war, most of which is known to be the property of the United States. These extraordinary preparations plainly indicate none other than the well-known purpose of the Governor of this State, under whose orders you are acting, and whose purpose, recently communicated to the Legislature, has just been responded to in the most unparalleled legislation, having in direct view hostilities to the General Government and co-operation with its enemies.

In view of these considerations, and of your failure to disperse in obedience to the proclamation of the President, and of the eminent necessities of State policy and welfare, and the obligations imposed upon me by instructions from Washington, it is my duty to demand, and I do hereby demand of you, an immediate surrender of your command, with no other conditions than that all persons surrendering under this demand shall be humanely and kindly treated. Believing myself prepared to enforce this demand, one-half hour's time before doing so will be allowed for your compliance therewith.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. LYON,
Captain, 2d United States Infantry, Commanding Troops.

There were a few anxious minutes following this, but it must be said to Frost's credit as a soldier that he promptly recognized the situation and acted upon it. Soon a horseman rode out from the camp, and approaching Lyon handed him the following note:

Camp Jackson, Mo., May 10, 1861.

Capt. N. Lyon, Commanding U. S. Troops.

Sir: I, never for a moment having conceived the idea that so illegal and unconstitutional a demand as I have just received from you would be made by an officer of the United States Army, am wholly unprepared to defend my command

from this unwarranted attack, and shall therefore be forced to comply with your demand.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. M. FROST,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Camp Jackson, Missouri Volunteer Militia.

Lyon read it, turned to his second in command and remarked: "Sweeny, they surrender."

Sweeny turned to his men with the order to replace their cartridge-boxes, which they did with an air of disappointment. There had been so much talk during the weeks and months of preparation about fighting and such irritating threatenings, that the Union troops were anxious to "take a fall" out of their opponents, and see what would be the result. Lyon dismounted, and unfortunately the fractious horse of one of his Aids at that instant kicked him in the stomach, knocking him senseless. While in this condition, Wm. D. Wood, Frost's Adjutant-General, rode up and inquired for Gen. Lyon. Gen. Sweeny, desiring to conceal Lyon's condition from the enemy, replied that he would receive any message intended for the General. Col. Wood then said:

"Gen. Frost sends his compliments to Gen. Lyon, and wishes to know if the officers will be allowed to retain their side-arms, what disposition shall be made of Government property, and if a guard will be sent to relieve his men now on post, and take possession of everything when the camp shall be evacuated?"

Sweeny replied affirmatively, when Wood rode off and Sweeney returned to Lyon, to find him slowly recovering. Lyon approved of Sweeny's answer, and directed Sweeny to take possession of the camp

with two companies of Regulars. Frost's men stacked arms and marched off through a lane formed by the 1st Mo., which faced inward. Up to this time everything had gone on peacefully. The surrendered Militia, without any special protest or demonstration, took their places quietly under guard. Not so with the immense mob which had gathered, expecting to see the Militia make sanguinary havoc of their assailants. These were deeply chagrined at the tame issue of the affair, and after exhausting all the vile epithets at their command, began throwing stones, brickbats, and other missiles, which the soldiers received as patiently as they did the contumely, when the bolder of the mob began firing with revolvers. Presently one of Co. F, 3d Mo., commanded by Capt. C. Blandowski, was shot dead, several severely wounded, and the Captain himself fell with a bullet through his leg. As he fell he ordered his men to fire, which resulted in about 20 of the rioters dropping under a volley from the soldiers' muskets. The mob fled in dismay, and Gen. Lyon ordered his troops to cease firing.

One of the leaders of the mob had deliberately fired three times at Capt. Saxton, of the Regulars, and had laid his revolver across his arm for a fourth more deliberate shot, when one of Capt. Saxton's men bayoneted while another shot him. When the smoke cleared away, it was found that 15 had been killed. Three of these were prisoners from Camp Jackson, and two were women whose morbid curiosity, or worse, had led them to mingle with the mob. One was a child.

Capt. Blandowski died of his wounds the next day,

At 6 o'clock the troops and prisoners marched back to the Arsenal, leaving Gen. Sweeny with his Regulars in charge of Camp Jackson. On the way rioters thronged the line of march and vilely abused the soldiers, but Lyon was vigilant in restraining his men, and prevented their making any return by firing upon their assailants.

During the night and the next day the prisoners were all released, the privates taking an oath not to serve in any capacity against the Government during the war, and the officers giving a parole not to serve in any military capacity against the United States. It was provided that the parole should be returned upon anyone surrendering himself as a prisoner of war, and was accompanied with a protest against the justice of executing it. One exception, Capt. Emmett MacDonald, who had been efficient in bringing the Irishmen into opposition to the "Dutch," refused to accept the parole on the ground taken by all the others that they had done nothing wrong, and finally secured his release through a writ of habeas corpus.

The excitement that night in St. Louis was fearful, with the Secessionists raging. It is to the credit, however, of James McDonough, whom Governor Jackson's Secessionist Police Commissioners had appointed Chief of Police, that, whatever his sympathies, he did not allow them to interfere with his official duties, and exerted himself to the utmost to preserve the municipal peace. The violent Secessionists started to mob the offices of the Republican papers, and to attack the residences of Union leaders, but were everywhere met by squads of police

backed up by an armed force of Home Guards, which, with the appeals of the conservative men of influence on both sides, managed to stay the storm. McDonough could not, however, prevent a number of outrages, and several of the Home Guards caught alone were killed by the rowdies that night and the next day—Saturday. This incensed the Germans terribly, and stories reached the Secession parts of the city that they contemplated fearful revenge, which they could wreak, having arms in their own hands, while the “natural protectors” of the people—Frost’s military companies—were prisoners of war and disarmed.

The Mayor issued a proclamation to quiet the people, and requested all keepers of drinking places to at once close and remain closed during the excitement. All minors were ordered to remain in doors for three days, and all good citizens were requested to remain in doors after nightfall and to avoid gatherings and meetings.

As was usual, a good many people who meant no evil obeyed this proclamation, while the mobites, who meant a great deal of harm, paid no attention to it. Saturday afternoon, the 5th Regiment of United States Reserves, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Robert White, attempted to go to their barracks, when they were assailed by a mob with stones, brickbats and pistol shots. The patience of the soldiers finally gave way, and they fired into the crowd, killing several persons and wounding many others.

Sunday the Secessionists were in a panic, and began a wild flight from the city. Every vehicle that



GEN. JOHN C. FREMONT

could be obtained was employed at exorbitant prices to carry men, women and children, baggage and personal effects, to the depots and wharves, where the railroads and steamboats were ready to receive them. The Mayor attempted to stay the stampede by a speech at the Planters' House, in which he assured the people that the Home Guards were entirely under the control of their officers, and would only be used to preserve the peace and protect property.

What was more effective was the news that Gen. Harney, hurrying back from Washington, had arrived the preceding evening and resumed command. Harney had reached the city on Saturday evening, May 11, and Sunday morning called at the Arsenal on Col. Blair, not Gen. Lyon, whom he informed of his intentions to remove the Home Guards from the Arsenal and disband them. Blair succeeded in convincing him that this was beyond his authority, and did not hesitate to say that his attempt to do so would be resisted. Being convinced, Harney sent a messenger to the Board of Police Commissioners, who were anxiously awaiting the result of his visit, to the effect that he had "no control over the Home Guards," which was intended to mean that he could not remove or disband them, but which the Commissioners and the people understood to mean that he had lost control over them.

The panic at once resumed its former proportions, and Gen. Harney found it necessary to issue a proclamation, in which he said that the public peace must and would be preserved, and the lives and property of the people protected, but he trusted that he would not be compelled to resort to martial law. He

would avoid all cause of irritation and excitement whenever called upon to aid the local authorities by using in preference the Regular troops. Therefore he began by restricting the Home Guards to the German parts of the city, while he moved about 250 Regulars, under the command of Capts. Totten and Sweeny and Lieuts. Saxton and Lothrop, with four pieces of artillery, into a central position, where they went into quarters, to the great relief of everybody.

It will be perceived that a remarkable change had come over the people since a few weeks before, when the arrival of a little squad of Regulars at the Sub-Treasury to protect its gold had thrown the city in the wildest excitement over "the attempt to overawe and cow the people of Missouri."

Confidence was restored, and quiet ensued. Gen. Frost lodged a protest with Gen. Harney, in which he recited the circumstances of Lyon's attack upon him, claimed that every officer and soldier in his command had taken, with uplifted hand, the following oath:

You, each and every one of you, do solemnly swear that you will honestly and faithfully serve the State of Missouri against her enemies, and that you will do your utmost to sustain the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this State against all violence, of whatsoever kind or description, and you do further swear that you will well and truly execute and obey the legal orders of all officers properly placed over you whilst on duty; so help you God.

A casual inspection shows how cunningly this was framed. It will be perceived that every one solemnly swore to "serve the State of Missouri against all her enemies," and to "obey the orders of the officers" placed over him, while he was merely enjoined to do his utmost to sustain the Constitution and laws of the United States and this State against all violence.

It is easy to see how such an obligation would be construed.

Gen. Frost recited again that he had offered to help Gen. Lyon protect the United States property with his whole force, and if necessary with that of Missouri, and appealed to Gen. Harney not to require the indignity of a parole, but to order the restoration of all the officers and men to liberty, and of all the property of the State and of private individuals. The language of this protest did as little to enhance the reputation of Gen. Frost as his letter to Gen. Lyon.

It was an intense disappointment to the Secessionists everywhere that he made no show of a fight before surrendering. It would have been the greatest satisfaction to all of them had he chosen to make Camp Jackson a Thermopylae or an Alamo. Such a sacrifice would have been of priceless worth in firing the Southern heart, and placing him high among the world's heroes. Somehow the idea of martyrdom did not appeal to him, as it has not to millions of other men placed in critical positions. The wonder to the calm student of history is that, having made such a bold bluff at Lyon, he did not "fill his hand" better, to use a sporting phrase, and prevent Lyon from "calling" him so effectually. The frost which was in his name settled on this "young Napoleon" thereafter—the country was filled with young Napoleons at that time—and though he commanded a brigade in the Confederate army for some two years or more, his name is only "mentioned" afterward in the Rebellion Records.

Lyon's decisive act did not meet with the unani-

mous approval of the Union men of the State. There began then that unhappy division between the "Conservative Union men" and the "Radicals" which led to so many collisions, and sorely distracted President Lincoln. The "Radicals" who fell under the lead of F. P. Blair, and had their representative in the Cabinet at Washington in the shape of Montgomery Blair, the Postmaster-General, dubbed their opponents "Claybanks," while the latter, whose representative in the Cabinet was Edward Bates, the Attorney-General, tainted with the name of "Charcoals" their opponents. The "Conservatives," who represented a very large portion of the wealth and education of the State, had for leaders such men as Hamilton R. Gamble, Robert Campbell, James E. Yeatman, H. S. Turner, Washington King, N. J. Eaton, and James H. Lucas. They at once sent a delegation to Washington to represent to Mr. Lincoln that Lyon, while undoubtedly "a loyal and brave soldier," was "rash," "imprudent," and "indiscreet." This representation carried great weight, for they were all men of the highest character and standing, and at their instance Gen. Harney was pushed further to the front again.

The "Old Dragoon" now asserted itself in Harney, as it was likely to when there was the smell of gunpowder in the air. Lyon's course was, in spite of the intense influence of Harney's Secession convives, very much to the taste of the old fighter. He wrote to Gen. Scott that he approved Lyon's action, and replied to the Judge in the habeas corpus writ of Capt. McDonald, that the man had been properly ar-

rested. May 14 he issued a proclamation in which he said:

It is with regret that I feel it my duty to call your attention to the recent act of the General Assembly of Missouri, known as the "Military Bill," which is the result, no doubt, of the temporary excitement that now pervades the public mind. This bill cannot be regarded in any other light than an indirect Secession ordinance, ignoring even the form resorted to by other States. Manifestly, its most material provisions are in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States. To this extent it is a nullity, and cannot and ought not to be upheld or regarded by the good citizens of Missouri. There are obligations and duties resting upon the people of Missouri under the Constitution and laws of the United States which are paramount, and which I trust you will carefully consider and weigh well before you will allow yourselves to be carried out of the Union under the form of yielding obedience to this military bill, which is clearly in violation of your duties as citizens of the United States.

It must be apparent to every one who has taken a proper and unbiased view of the subject that, whatever may be the termination of the unfortunate condition of things in respect to the so-called Cotton States, Missouri must share the destiny of the Union. Her geographical position, her soil, productions, and, in short, all her material interests, point to this result. We cannot shut our eyes against this controlling fact. It is seen and its force is felt throughout the Nation. So important is this regarded to the great interests of the country, that I venture to express the opinion that the whole power of the Government of the United States, if necessary, will be exerted to maintain Missouri in her present position in the Union. I express to you, in all frankness and sincerity, my own deliberate convictions, without assuming to speak for the Government of the United States, whose authority here and elsewhere I shall at all times and under all circumstances endeavor faithfully to uphold. I desire above all things most earnestly to invite my fellow-citizens dispassionately to consider their true interests as well as their true relations to the Government under which we live and to which we owe so much.

In this connection I desire to direct attention to one subject which, no doubt, will be made the pretext for more or less popular excitement. I allude to the recent transactions at Camp Jackson, near St. Louis. It is not proper for me to comment upon the official conduct of my predecessor in command of this Department, but it is right and proper for the people of Missouri to know that the main avenue of Camp Jackson, recently under the command of Gen. Frost, had the name of Davis, and a principal street of the same camp that of Beauregard, and that a body of men had been received into that camp by its commander which had been notoriously organized in the interests of the Secessionists, the men openly wearing the dress and badge distinguishing the Army of the

so-called Southern Confederacy. It is also a notorious fact that a quantity of arms had been received into the camp which were unlawfully taken from the United States Arsenal at Baton Rouge, and surreptitiously passed up the river in boxes marked "Marble."

Upon facts like these, and having in view what occurred at Liberty, the people can draw their own inferences, and it cannot be difficult for any one to arrive at a correct conclusion as to the character and ultimate purpose of that encampment. No Government in the world would be entitled to respect that would tolerate for a moment such openly treasonable preparations. It is but simple justice, however, that I should state the fact that there were many good and loyal men in the camp who were in no manner responsible for its treasonable character. Disclaiming as I do all desire or intention to interfere in any way with the prerogatives of the State of Missouri or with the functions of its executive or other authorities, yet I regard it as my plain path of duty to express to the people, in respectful but at the same time decided language, that within the field and scope of my command and authority the "supreme law" of the land must and shall be maintained, and no subterfuges, whether in the forms of legislative acts or otherwise, can be permitted to harass or oppress the good and law-abiding people of Missouri. I shall exert my authority to protect their persons and property from violations of every kind, and shall deem it my duty to suppress all unlawful combinations of men, whether formed under pretext of military organizations or otherwise.

WM. S. HARNEY.

Brigadier-General, United States Army, Commanding.

These were certainly "brave words, my masters," and had great influence upon the people of Missouri. Unhappily there was reason to think afterwards that Gen. Harney was not quite living up to them.

When the account of stock of the capture of Camp Jackson came to be taken, the invoice was as follows:

Three 32-pounders.

Three mortar-beds.

A large quantity of balls and bombs in ale barrels.

Artillery pieces, in boxes of heavy plank, the boxes marked "Marble," "Tamaroa, care of Greeley & Gale, St. Louis—Iron Mountain Railroad."

Twelve hundred rifles, of late model, United States manufacture.

Tents and camp equipage.

Six brass field pieces.

Twenty-five kegs of powder.

Ninety-six 10-inch bombshells.

Three hundred six-inch bombshells.


Six brass mortars, six inches diameter.
One iron mortar, 10 inches.
Three iron cannon, six inches.
Five boxes of canister shot.
Fifty artillery swords.
Two hundred and twenty-seven spades.
Thirty-eight hatchets.
Eleven mallets.
One hundred and ninety-one axes.
Forty horses.
Several boxes of new muskets.

A very large number of musket stocks and musket barrels; together with lots of bayonets, bayonet scabbards, etc.

One thousand one hundred and ten enlisted men were taken prisoners, besides from 50 to 75 officers.

Nothing legislates so firmly and finally as a successful sword-blow for the right. Gen. Lyon's capture of Camp Jackson was an epoch-making incident. In spite of the protests of the wealthy and respectable Messrs. Gamble, Yeatman, and others, it was the right thing, done at the right time, to stay the surging sweep of the waves of Secession. It destroyed the captivating aggressiveness of the "Disunionists," and threw their leaders upon the defensive. Other people than they had wants and desires which must be listened to, or the Loyalists would find a way to compel attention. The Secessionists must now plead at their bar; not they in the court of those who would destroy the Government.

CHAPTER V.



M. JEFF. THOMPSON.

THE General Assembly of Missouri met at Jefferson City, in obedience to the Governor's call, on the 2d of May, and the Governor, after calling attention of the body to the state of the country, made an out-and-out appeal for Secession, saying that the interests

and sympathies of Missouri were identical with those of other Slaveholding States, and she must unquestionably unite her destiny with theirs. She had no desire for war, but she would be faithless as to her honor and recreant as to her duty if she hesitated a moment to make complete preparations for the protection of her people, and that therefore the Legislature should "place the State at the earliest practicable moment in a complete state of defense."

As this is what the Legislature had expected, and what it had met for, no time was lost in going into secret session to carry out the program.

The first of these was the odious Military Bill, the passage of which was stubbornly resisted, step by step, by the small band of Union men. This, it will be recollected, put every able-bodied man into the Militia of Missouri, under the orders of officers to be appointed by the Governor; compelled him to

obey implicitly the orders received from those above him, and prescribed the heinous crime of "treason to the State," which extended even to words spoken in derogation of the Governor or Legislature. Offenses of this kind were to be punished by summary court-martial, which had even the power to inflict death. Other bills perverted the funds for the State charitable institutions into the State military chest, seized the school fund for the same purpose, and authorized a loan from the banks of \$1,000,000 and another of \$1,000,000 of State bonds, to provide funds by which to carry out the program.

On the evening of Friday, May 10, while these measures were being fought over, the Governor entered the House with a dispatch which he handed to Representative Vest, afterwards United States Senator from Missouri, who sprang upon a chair and thrilled all his hearers by reading that "Frank Blair, Capt. Lyon and the Dutch" had captured Camp Jackson, seized all the property there, and marched the State troops prisoners to the Arsenal. The wild scene that followed is simply indescribable. For many months there had been much talk about "firing the Southern heart," and here was something of immediate and furnace heat.

As soon as the members recovered from the stun of the blow, they went into paroxysms of passion. In a few minutes the Military Bill was rushed through, followed by the others, and a new one to appropriate \$10,000 for the purpose of securing an alliance with the Indians on the borders of the State. This done, the members bolted out in search of weapons with which to arm themselves, as there

was a rumor that the awful Blair and Lyon with their "mercenaries" were on the march to subject the Legislature to the same treatment that they had Frost's Militia. Muskets, shotguns, rifles, pistols and pikes were brought out, cleaned up, bullets molded and cartridges made, and the Governor ordered the members of his staff to seize a locomotive and press on as fast as possible towards St. Louis to reconnoiter the advance of the enemy; if necessary, to destroy the bridges over the Gasconade and Osage Rivers to obstruct the march.

No enemy was found, but the zealous Basil Duke, in order not to be guilty of any sin of omission, burnt a part of the Osage bridge. The meeting of the Legislature in the evening was grotesque, as every member came with a more or less liberal supply of arms, usually including a couple of revolvers and a bowie-knife in belt. During the exciting session which followed, rifles stood by the desks or were laid across them, with other arms, and it was good luck more than anything else that no casualty resulted from accidental discharge of fire-arms. The excitement grew over the stirring events in St. Louis of Saturday and Sunday, and the Governor immediately proceeded to the exercise of the extraordinary powers conferred upon him by the Military Bill.

As the star of Gen. D. M. Frost sank ingloriously below the horizon of Camp Jackson, that of Sterling Price rose above it to remain for four years the principal luminary in the Confederate firmament west of the Mississippi.

Gen. Price was a remarkable instance of the indefinable quality of leadership. This is something

that does not seem to depend upon intellectual superiority, upon greater courage or devotion, or even upon clearer insight. A man leads his fellows—many of whom are his superiors in most namable qualities—simply because of something unnamable in him that makes him assume the leadership, and they accept it. There was hardly a prominent man in Missouri who was not Price's superior in some quality usually regarded as essential. For example, he was a pleasing and popular speaker, but Missouri abounded in men much more attractive to public assemblages. He was a fair politician, but rarely got more than the second prize. He had distinguished himself in the Mexican War, but Claiborne Jackson made more capital out of his few weeks of inconsequential service in the Black Hawk War than Price did out of the conquest of New Mexico and the capture of Chihuahua.

He served one term in Congress, but had failed to secure a renomination. He had been elected Governor of Missouri while his Mexican laurels were yet green, but when he tried to enter the Senate, he was easily defeated by that able politician and orator, James S. Green.

Though he belonged to the dominant Anti-Benton faction of the Missouri Democracy and the Stephen A. Douglas wing, he never was admitted to the select inner council, nor secured any of its higher rewards, except one term as Governor.

At the outbreak of the war he was holding the comparatively unimportant place of Bank Commissioner. For all that, he was to become and remain

throughout the struggle the central figure of Secession in the trans-Mississippi country.

Officers of high rank and brilliant reputation like Ben McCulloch, Earl Van Dorn, Richard Taylor and E. Kirby Smith were to be put over him, yet his fame and influence outshone them all.

Unquestionably able soldiers such as Marmaduke, Shelby, Bowen, Jeff Thompson, Parsons, M. L. Clark and Little, were to serve him with unfaltering loyalty as subordinates.

The Secessionist leaders of Missouri, headed by Gov. Reynolds, were to denounce him for drunkenness, crass incapacity, gross blundering, and a most shocking lack of discipline and organization.

Very few commanding officers ever had so many defeats or so few successes. He was continually embarking upon enterprises of the greatest promise and almost as continually having them come to naught; generally through defeats inflicted by Union commanders of no special reputation.

MAJ.-GEN. STERLING PRICE.

Yet from first to last his was a name to conjure with. No other than his in the South had the spell in it for Missourians and the people west of the Mississippi. They flocked to his standard wherever it was raised, and after three years of failures they followed him with as much eager hope in his last disastrous campaign as in the first, and when he died in St. Louis, two years after the war, his death was regretted as a calamity to the State, and he had the largest funeral of any man in the history of Missouri.

Sterling Price was born in 1809 in Prince Edward County, Va., of a family of no special prominence, and in 1831 settled upon a farm in Chariton County, Mo. He went into politics, was elected to the Legislature, and then to Congress for one term, after which he commanded a Missouri regiment in Doniphan's famous march to the Southwest, where he showed great vigor and ability. He was a man of the finest physique and presence, six feet two inches high, with small hands and feet and unusually large body and limbs; a superb horseman; with a broad, bland, kindly face framed in snow-white hair and beard. His name would indicate Welsh origin, but his face, figure, and mental habits seemed rather Teutonic. He had a voice of much sweetness and strength, and a paternal way of addressing his men, who speedily gave him the sobriquet of "Pap Price." He appeared on the field in a straw hat and linen duster in the Summer, and with a blanket thrown over his shoulders and a tall hat in Winter. These became standards which the Missourians followed into the thick of the fight, as the French did the white plume of Henry of Navarre.

He had been elected as a Union man to the Convention, which at once chose him for President, but his Unionism seemed to be a mere varnish easily scratched off by any act in favor of the Union.

Thus, immediately after the occurrences in St. Louis, he went to the Governor with the remark that "the slaughter of the people of Missouri" in St. Louis had proved too much for him, and his sword was at the service of the State.

It is significant of the way men were swayed in

those days, that the murder of the German volunteers patriotically rallying to the defense of the Arsenal, and the murder and outrages upon the Union people throughout the State, did not affect Gen. Price at all, but he was moved to wrath by the shooting down of a few rioters.

His going over was welcomed as a great victory by the Secessionists, offsetting the capture of Camp Jackson. Gov. Jackson promptly availed himself of the offer, and at once appointed Gen. Price Major-General in command of the forces of Missouri to be organized under the Military Bill.

Though even to Gen. Harney's eyes the Military Bill was repugnant and he denounced it as direct Secession, the Governor proceeded with all speed to execute it.

Each Congressional District in the State was made a Military Division. A Brigadier-General was appointed to the command of each, and ordered to immediately proceed to the enrollment of the men in it who were fit for military duty, and to prepare them for active service.

The able and witty Alexander W. Doniphan—"Xenophon" Doniphan of Mexican fame—who had made the astonishing march upon New Mexico and Chihuahua, was appointed to command one of the Divisions, but he was too much of a Union man, and declined. It was significant from the first that all the officers commissioned were more or less open Secessionists, and commissions were refused to some who sought them because they would not swear to make allegiance to Missouri paramount to that of the United States.

As finally arranged the Divisions were commanded as follows:

First Division, M. Jeff Thompson.

Second Division, Thos. A. Harris.

Third Division, M. L. Clark.

Fourth Division, Wm. Y. Slack.

Fifth Division, A. E. Steen.

Sixth Division, M. M. Parsons.

Seventh Division, J. H. McBride.

Eighth Division, Jas L. Rains.

All of these were men of decided ability and standing, and Parsons, M. L. Clark and Slack had served with credit in the Mexican War. Parsons became a Major-General in the Confederate army, and Clark, Slack, Steen and Rains Brigadier-Generals.

A striking figure among them was M. Jeff Thompson, called the "Missouri Swamp Fox" by his admirers, and who aspired to become the Francis Marion of the Southern Confederacy. He was a tall, lank, wiry man, at least six feet high, about 35 years old, with a thin, long, hatchet face, and high, sharp nose, blue eyes, and thick, yellow hair combed behind his ears. He wore a slouch white hat with feather and a bob-tailed coat, short pantaloons, and high rough boots. A white-handled bowie-knife, stuck perpendicularly in his belt in the middle of his back, completed his armament, and he was never seen without it. His weakness was for writing poetry, and he "threw" a poem on the slightest provocation. Fortunately none of these has been preserved.

Each Brigadier-General soon raised in his Division several regiments and battalions of infantry, troops of cavalry, and batteries of artillery, com-

posed of very excellent material, for the young men of the Middle Class were persuaded that it was their duty to respond to the State's call to defend her. The strongest political, social and local influences were brought to bear to bring them into the ranks, and the Missouri State Guard was formed, which was to fight valorously against the Government on many bitterly contested fields.

The White Trash, always impatient of the restraints of law and organization, did not enter so largely into these forces, but remained outside, to form bands of bushwhackers and guerrillas, to harry Union men and curse the State with their depredations, in which the Secessionists were scarcely more favored than the Union men.

The influence of Gen. Scott and Attorney-General Bates, added to the passionate representations of the Gamble-Yeatman delegation, and the frantic telegrams from Missouri, had restored Harney to full power, with Lyon, who had been commissioned a Brigadier-General of Volunteers, as his subordinate.

Harney was exerting himself to the utmost to restore peace and confidence in Missouri, and when free from the social influence of the Secessionists who surrounded him his soldierly instincts made him perceive that the emergency was greater than he had calculated upon. In one of these better moods he telegraphed to the Adjutant-General, May 17, that he ought to have 10,000 stand of arms placed at his disposal to arm the Union men of Missouri; that Iowa be called upon to send him 6,000, and Minnesota 3,000 men. Then the Secessionists would get hold of him again, and induce another mood, such



GEN. FRANZ SIGEL

as brought about a conference between him and Gov. Jackson and Gen. Price, leading to an agreement which Gen. Harney published in a proclamation. The agreement was as follows :

Saint Louis, May 21, 1861.

The undersigned, officers of the United States Government and of the Government of the State of Missouri, for the purpose of removing misapprehensions and allaying public excitement, deem it proper to declare publicly that they have this day had a personal interview in this city, in which it has been mutually understood, without the semblance of dissent on either part, that each of them has no other than a common object equally interesting and important to every citizen of Missouri—that of restoring peace and good order to the people of the State in subordination to the laws of the General and State Governments. It being thus understood, there seems no reason why every citizen should not confide in the proper officers of the General and State Governments to restore quiet, and, as among the best means of offering no counter-influences, we mutually recommend to all persons to respect each other's rights throughout the State, making no attempt to exercise unauthorized powers, as it is the determination of the proper authorities to suppress all unlawful proceedings, which can only disturb the public peace.

Gen. Price, having by commission full authority over the Militia of the State of Missouri, undertakes, with the sanction of the Governor of the State, already declared, to direct the whole power of the State officers to maintain order within the State among the people thereof, and Gen. Harney publicly declares that, this object being thus assured, he can have no other occasion, as he has no wish, to make military movements, which might otherwise create excitements and jealousies which he most earnestly desires to avoid.

We, the undersigned, do mutually enjoin upon the people of the State to attend to their civil business of whatever sort it may be, and it is to be hoped that the unquiet elements which have threatened so seriously to disturb the public peace may soon subside and be remembered only to be deplored.

STERLING PRICE,

Major-General Missouri State Guard.

WILLIAM S. HARNEY,

Brigadier-General Commanding.

Harney was convinced of the sincerity of Jackson and Price in carrying out this agreement, which he submitted for approval to the War Department.

F. P. Blair wrote to the Secretary of War urging that the four regiments assigned to Missouri for

three years' service, which Lyon was to command, should not be officered by the Governor of Missouri, but that it would be better that they be nominated by Gen. Lyon, subject to the approval of the President, and he said: "The agreement between Harney and Gen. Price gives me great disgust and dissatisfaction to the Union men; but I am in hopes we can get along with it, and think that Harney will insist on its execution to the fullest extent, in which case it will be satisfactory."

In spite of Gen. Harney's faith, he was inundated with complaints from all parts of the State as to loyal citizens in great numbers being outraged, persecuted, and driven from their homes. These complaints also reached the President, and Adjutant-General Thomas called Gen. Harney's attention to them in a strong letter May 27, in which he said: "The professions of loyalty to the Union by the State authorities of Missouri are not to be relied upon. They have already falsified their professions too often, and are too far committed to Secession to be entitled to your confidence, and you can only be sure of desisting from their wicked purposes when it is out of their power to prosecute them."

Two days later Gen. Harney replied that the State was rapidly becoming tranquilized; that he was convinced that his policy would soon restore peace and confidence in the ability of the Government to maintain its authority. He asserted that the agreement between himself and Price was being carried out in good faith. At the same time he called the attention of Gen. Price to the reports that the Secessionists had seized 15,000 pounds of lead at Lebanon, a lot

of powder elsewhere, had torn down the American Flag from several post offices, and hoisted Secessionist flags in their places, and that troops and arms were coming into Missouri from Arkansas and elsewhere, etc., etc. Price replied that he was satisfied that the information was incorrect; that neither he nor the Governor knew of any arms or troops coming into the State from any quarter; that he was dismissing his troops, and that Gen. Harney had better not send out any force, as it would exasperate the people.

Again Gen. Harney wrote Gen. Price reciting fresh acts of disloyalty and outrage, and saying that unless these ceased, he would feel justified in authorizing the organization of Home Guards among the Union men to protect themselves. Price replied at length opposing the organization of Home Guards as having a tendency to "excite those who now hold conservative peace positions into exactly the contrary attitude, an example of which we have in St. Louis. It would undoubtedly, in my opinion, lead to neighborhood collision, the forerunner of civil war." Price finished by calling attention to his orders to all citizens to scrupulously protect property and rights, irrespective of political opinion, denying the reports which had reached Gen. Harney, and reiterating that he was carrying out the agreement in good faith.

Lyon, Blair and the other Unconditional Union leaders had become convinced of what they feared; to wit, that the agreement simply tied Harney's hands, and prevented any assertion of the Government's power to protect its citizens, while leaving

the Secessionists free to do as they pleased and mature their organization until they were ready to attack the Union men and sweep the State into Secession.

In spite of Gen. Scott and Attorney-General Bates, the Administration at Washington was rapidly coming to this conclusion, and sent a special messenger to St. Louis from Washington with dispatches to Col. Blair. In an envelope was found a notice from the War Department to Capt. Lyon that he had been appointed a Brigadier-General to rank from the 18th of May, and there was also an order relieving Gen. Harney from the command of the Department of the West, and granting him leave of absence until further orders. There was a private letter to Col. Blair in the handwriting of President Lincoln, in which he expressed his anxiety in regard to St. Louis and Gen. Harney's course. He was, however, a little in doubt as to the propriety of relieving him, but asked Col. Blair to hold the order until such time as in his judgment the necessity for such action became urgent. This for several reasons:

We had better have him for a friend than an enemy. It will dissatisfy a good many who would otherwise remain quiet. More than all, we first relieved him, then restored him; now if we relieve him again the public will ask: "Why all this vacillation?"

Col. Blair fully understood and sympathized with the President. He put the letter and order in his pocket and talked confidentially to Lyon in regard to it. They decided not to publish the order until it would be wicked to delay it. They both liked and admired Harney, and if he could be decisively separated from his Secession environment, he could be

of the greatest possible value. They would give him the opportunity of thoroughly testing his policy.

Blair tried his best to arouse Gen. Harney to a sense of what was going on, and particularly to demand suspension of the execution of the Military Bill, but without effect. He sent to Gen. Harney telegrams and correspondence, showing that the Brigadier-Generals were rapidly organizing their forces, that emissaries were stirring up the Indians, and that Chief Ross, of the Cherokee Nation, had promised 15,000 well-armed men to help the Secessionists. When Harney called Price's attention to this, Price calmly pooh-poohed it all as of no consequence.

Therefore, on May 30, Blair decided that the emergency for the delivery of the order had come, and sent it to Gen. Harney, and at the same time wrote to the President in explanation of what he had done.

Gen. Harney wrote the Adjutant-General of the Army a pathetic letter, in which he said:

My confidence in the honor and integrity of Gen. Price, in the purity of his motives, and in his loyalty to the Government, remains unimpaired. His course as President of the State Convention that voted by a large majority against submitting an Ordinance of Secession, and his efforts since that time to calm the elements of discord, have served to confirm the high opinion of him I have for many years entertained.

My whole course as Commander of the Department of the West has been dictated by a desire to carry out in good faith the instructions of my Government, regardless of the clamor of the conflicting elements surrounding me, and whose advice and dictation could not be followed without involving the State in blood and the Government in the unnecessary expenditure of millions. Under the course I pursued Missouri was secured to the Union, and the triumph of the Government was only the more glorious, being almost a bloodless victory; but those who clamored for blood have not ceased to impugn my motives. Twice within a brief space of time have I been relieved from the command here; the second time in a manner that has inflicted unmerited disgrace upon a true and loyal soldier. During a long life, dedicated to my country, I have seen some service, and more than once I have held her honor in my hands; and during that time my loyalty,

I believe, was never questioned; and now, when in the natural course of things I shall, before the lapse of many years, lay aside the sword which has so long served my country, my countrymen will be slow to believe that I have chosen this portion of my career to damn with treason my life, which is so soon to become a record of the past, and which I shall most willingly leave to the unbiased judgment of posterity. I trust that I may yet be spared to do my country some further service that will testify to the love I bear her, and that the vigor of my arm may never relax while there is a blow to be struck in her defense.

I respectfully ask to be assigned to the command of the Department of California, and I doubt not the present commander of the Division is even now anxious to serve on the Atlantic frontier.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. S. HARNEY,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

He started for Washington, but the train on which he was going was captured at Harper's Ferry by a Secession force, and he was taken a prisoner to Richmond, where the authorities immediately ordered his release.

The Government made no further use of him; he was retired in 1863 as a Brigadier-General. At the conclusion of the struggle, in which he took no further part, he was brevetted a Major-General, and died in the fullness of years May 9, 1889, at his home at Pass Christian, Miss.

Once more Gen. Lyon was in the saddle, this time for good, with Frank Blair and the Radicals massed behind him.

CHAPTER VI.

BRIG.-GEN. NATHANIEL LYON was now in full command, not only of the City of St. Louis and the State of Missouri, but of all the vast territory lying between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains, except Texas, New Mexico, and Utah.

His sudden elevation from a simple Captain heading a company to wide command did not for an instant dizzy him as it seemed to McClellan and Fremont, who had made similar leaps in rank. Where McClellan surrounded himself with all the pomp and circumstance of glorious war as he had seen it exemplified by officers of his rank in Europe, where he was followed at all times by a numerous and glittering staff, resplendent with military millinery; and where Fremont set up a vice-regal court, in which were heard nearly all the tongues of the Continent, spoken by pretentious adventurers who claimed service in substantially every war since those of Napoleon, and under every possible flag raised in those wars, Lyon did not change a particle from the plain, straightforward, earnest soldier he had always been. His common dress was the private soldier's blouse with the single star of his rank, and a slouch hat. He was accoutered for the real work of war, not its spectacular effects. Grant was not simpler than he. Dominated by a great purpose, he made himself and every one and every thing about him tend directly

towards that focus. He had only enough of a staff to do the necessary work, and they must be plain, matter-of-fact soldiers like himself, devoting their energies through all their waking hours to the cause he had at heart.

His first Chief of Staff was Chester Harding, a Massachusetts man, a thoroughgoing, practical, businesslike Yankee, animated by intense love of the Union. He preferred, however, service in the field, and became Colonel of the 10th Mo., then of the 25th, and later of the 43d Mo., doing good service wherever placed, and receiving at the last a well-earned brevet as Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

While Gen. Lyon was organizing the Home Guards into volunteer regiments at the Arsenal, there came to his assistance a rather stockily-built First Lieutenant of the Regular Army, who was in the prime of manhood, with broad, full face and well-developed and increasing baldness, a graduate of West Point, and of some eight years' experience in the military establishment.

John McAllister Schofield was born in Illinois, the son of an itinerant Baptist preacher, who mainly devoted himself to the cause of church extension. Schofield's name would indicate Germanic extraction. His face and figure supports the same theory, as do most of his mental habits. The McAllister in his name hints at an infusion of Celtic blood, of which we find few if any intellectual traces. Without any special enthusiasm or public demonstration of his attachment to principle, with a great deal of the courtier in his ways, he was yet firm, courageous and persistent in the policy he had marked out for

himself. He was true to the Union cause, in his own way, from the time he offered his services to Gen. Lyon, was obedient and helpful to his superiors, always did more than respectably well what was committed to his charge, and no failure of any kind lowers the high average of his performance.

When after four years of the most careful scrutiny and tutelage the Military Academy at West Point graduates a young man, it assumes that it has absolutely determined his X—that is, has sounded and measured his moral and intellectual depth, and settled his place in any human equation.

It will, therefore, be quite interesting in making our estimate of Gen. Schofield, to examine the label attached to him upon his graduation from West Point in the class of 1853.

At the head of that class was the brilliant James B. McPherson, who was to rise to the command of a corps and then to the Army of the Tennessee, and fall before Atlanta, to the intense sorrow of every man in the army who had come in contact with him.

The second in the class was William P. Craighill, a fine engineer officer, who, however, rose no higher during the war than a brevet Colonel.

The third in the class was Joshua W. Sill, a splendid soldier, who died at the head of his brigade on the banks of Stone River.

The fourth in the class was William R. Boggs, a Georgian, who became a Brigadier-General in the Confederate army and achieved no special distinction.

The fifth in the class was Francis J. Shunk, of

Pennsylvania, who went into the ordnance and became a brevet Major.

The sixth in the class was William Sooy Smith, an Ohio man, who attained the rank of Brigadier-General, and who achieved prominence in civil life as an engineer.

The seventh in the class was John M. Schofield, who was commissioned in the artillery, and who had had some years of army experience in the forts along the South Atlantic coast.

In the 45 who graduated below Schofield were many names afterwards to become very prominent in history.

John S. Bowen, of Georgia, who commanded a regiment of the Home Guards, and who did his utmost to drag his State into Secession, afterward becoming a Major-General in the Confederate army, graduated 13th in the class.

William R. Terrill, of Virginia, killed at Perryville while in command of a Union brigade, was the 16th.

John R. Chambliss, of Virginia, who was killed while commanding a Confederate brigade at Deep Bottom, Va., was the 31st, and William McE. Dye, who commanded a brigade with success in the Trans-Mississippi, afterwards helped to organize the Khedive's army, and who died while in command of the Korean army, was the 32d.

Philip H. Sheridan, one of the most brilliant commanders the world ever saw, stood 34th in the class, and Elmer Otis, of Philippine fame, was the 37th.

John B. Hood, who rose to the rank of a full General in the Confederate army, and commanded the

forces arrayed against Sherman and Thomas at Atlanta and Nashville, was the 44th.

It is very interesting to study this list and compare it with the confident markings made by the West Point Faculty when the young men were dismissed to the active life for which the Academy had prepared them. It at least shows that, judged by West Point standards, Schofield's intellectual equipment was of the very best. He had married the daughter of his Professor of Physics, and children had come to them; promotion was very slow; he had wearied of the dull routine of the artillery officer in seacoast forts, and had seriously thought of resigning and entering the profession of law. Friends had dissuaded him from this, secured him a position as Professor of Physics in the Washington University at St. Louis, and Gen. Scott, who liked him, induced him to remain in the service and obtained for him a year's leave of absence to enable him to accept the professorship. He was engaged in his duty of teaching at the University and of writing a work on physics, of which he was very proud, when the firing on Fort Sumter took place. His political views were those of the Douglas wing of the Democracy, and he remained a Democrat ever after. He made no public profession of his views on the Slavery question or Secession, but immediately wrote to Washington offering to cancel his leave of absence, and was directed to report to Gen. Lyon for the duty of mustering in the volunteers.

Inasmuch as the Governor, with much contumely, had refused to supply the four regiments from Missouri which the President had called for, Schofield,

with his unfailing respect for the law, saw no way to fulfill his duty, until Gen. Scott, who was dimly perceiving the gigantic nature of the emergency, reluctantly gave authority to muster in and arm the Home Guards, adding the indorsement, pathetically eloquent as to his aged slowness of recognition that old things were passing away and new being born in volcanic travail—"This is irregular, but, being times of revolution, is approved."

Schofield showed his heart in the matter by becoming a Major of the first regiment organized.

The whole atmosphere at once changed with Lyon's permanent assignment to command.

The Union people of Missouri, those who really believed that the Government was worth fighting for, no longer had to retire, as they had from Harney's presence, with cold comfort, and advice to stop thinking about fighting and attend to their regular business, but were welcomed by Lyon, had their earnestness stimulated by his own, and were given direct advice as to how they could be of the most service. They were encouraged to put themselves in readiness, strike blow for blow, and if possible to give two blows for one. The work of preparation was systematized, and everything made to move toward the one great event—the Government's overwhelming assertion of its power.

Home Guards were organized in every County where Union men wanted to do so, and began presenting a stubborn front to their opponents, who were being brought together under the Military Bill.

Gov. Jackson and Gen. Price did not lose all heart at the change in commanders. They seemed to have

hopes that they might in some way mold Lyon to their wishes as they had Harney, and sought an interview with him. Gen. Lyon was not averse to an interview, and sent to Jackson and Price the following passport:

Headquarters, Department of the West,
St. Louis, June 8, 1861.

It having been suggested that Gov. Claiborne F. Jackson and ex-Gov. Sterling Price are desirous of an interview with Gen. Lyon, commanding this Department, for the purpose of effecting, if possible, a pacific solution of the domestic troubles of Missouri, it is hereby stipulated on the part of Brig.-Gen. N. Lyon, U. S. A., commanding this Military Department, that, should Gov. Jackson or ex-Gov. Price, or either of them, at any time prior to or on the 12th day of June, 1861, visit St. Louis for the purpose of such interview, they and each of them shall be free from molestation or arrest on account of any charges pending against them, or either of them, on the part of the United States, during their journey to St. Louis and their return from St. Louis to Jefferson City.

Given under the hand of the General commanding, the day and year above written.

N. LYON,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Accordingly on June 12, 1861, Price and Jackson arrived at St. Louis by special train from Jefferson City, put up at the Planters' House, and informed Gen. Lyon of their arrival. The old State pride cropped out in a little dispute as to which should call upon the other. Jackson as Governor of the "sovereign and independent" State of Missouri and Price as Major-General commanding the forces, felt that it was due them that Lyon, a Brigadier-General in the United States service, should visit them rather than they him at the Arsenal. Lyon's soul going direct to the heart of the matter, was above these technicalities, waved them aside impatiently, and said that he would go to the Planters' House and call on them.

Accompanied by Col. Frank P. Blair and Maj. Conant, of his Staff, he went at once to the Planters'

House, and there ensued a four hours' interview of mightiest consequences to the State and the Nation.

Jackson and Price were accompanied by Col. Thomas L. Snead, then an Aid of the Governor, afterwards Acting Adjutant-General of the Missouri State Guards, Chief of Staff of the Army of the West, and a member of the Confederate Congress. He makes this statement as to the opening of the conference:

“Lyon opened it by saying that the discussion on the part of his Government ‘would be conducted by Col. Blair, who enjoyed its confidence in the very highest degree, and was authorized to speak for it.’ Blair was, in fact, better fitted than any man in the Union to discuss with Jackson and Price the grave questions then at issue between the United States and the State of Missouri, and in all her borders there were no men better fitted than they to speak for Missouri on that momentous occasion.

“But despite the modesty of his opening, Lyon was too much in earnest, too zealous, too well informed on the subject, too aggressive, and too fond of disputation to let Blair conduct the discussion on the part of his Government. In half an hour it was he who was conducting it, holding his own at every point against Jackson and Price, masters though they were of Missouri politics, whose course they had been directing and controlling for years, while he was only the Captain of an infantry regiment on the Plains. He had not, however, been a mere soldier in those days, but had been an earnest student of the very questions that he was now discussing, and he comprehended the matter as well as any man,

and handled it in the soldierly way to which he had been bred, using the sword to cut knots that he could not untie."

Really the interview soon became a parley between the two strong men who were quickly to draw their swords upon one another. The talking men, the men of discussion and appeal passed out, and the issue was in the hands of the men who were soon to hurl the mighty weapons of war.

Jackson, who was a light, facile politician, used to moving public assemblies which were already of his mind, had but little to say in the hours of intense parley, but interjected from time to time with parrot-like reiteration, that the United States troops must leave the State and not enter it. "I will then disband my own troops and we shall certainly have peace."

Blair, an incomparably stronger man, but still a politician and rather accustomed to accomplishing results by speeches and arguments, soon felt himself obscured by the mightier grasp and earnestness of Lyon, and took little further part. There remained, then, the stern, portentous parley between Lyon and Price, who weighed their words, intending to make every one of them good by deadly blows. They looked into one another's eyes with set wills, between which were the awful consequences of unsheathed swords.

Gen. Price stated at some length his proposals, and claimed that he had carried out his understanding with Gen. Harney in good faith, not violating it one iota.

Gen. Lyon asked him sharply how that could be,

according to Gen. Harney's second proclamation in which he denounced the Military Bill as unconstitutional and treasonable?

Gen. Price replied that he had made no agreement whatever with Gen. Harney about the enforcement or carrying out of the Military Bill.

Gen. Lyon answered this by presenting a copy of the following memorandum which had been sent by Gen. Harney as the only basis on which he would treat with Jackson and Price:

Memorandum for Gen. Price.—May 21, 1861.

Gen. Harney is here as a citizen of Missouri, with all his interests at stake in the preservation of the peace of the State.

He earnestly wishes to do nothing to complicate matters, and will do everything in his power, consistently with his instructions, to preserve peace and order.

He is, however, compelled to recognize the existence of a rebellion in a portion of the United States, and in view of it he stands upon the proclamation of the President itself, based upon the laws and Constitution of the United States.

The proclamation demands the dispersion of all armed bodies hostile to the supreme law of the land.

Gen. Harney sees in the Missouri Military Bill features which compel him to look upon such armed bodies as may be organized under its provisions as antagonistic to the United States, within the meaning of the proclamation, and calculated to precipitate a conflict between the State and the United States.

He laments the tendency of things, and most cordially and earnestly invites the co-operation of Gen. Price to avert it.

For this purpose Gen. Harney respectfully asks Gen. Price to review the features of the bill, in the spirit of law, warmed and elevated by that of humanity, and seek to discover some means by which its action may be suspended until some competent tribunal shall decide upon its character.

The most material features of the bill calculated to bring about a conflict are, first, the oath required to be taken by the Militia and State Guards (an oath of allegiance to the State of Missouri without recognizing the existence of the Government of the United States); and, secondly, the express requirements by which troops within the State not organized under the provisions of the Military Bill are to be disarmed by the State Guards.

Gen. Harney cannot be expected to await a summons to surrender his arms by the State troops.

From this statement of the case the true question becomes immediately visible and cannot be shut out of view.



GEN. DAVID HUNTER

Gen. Price is earnestly requested to consider this, and Gen. Harney will be happy to confer with him on the subject whenever it may suit his convenience.

N. B.—Read to Gen. Price, in the presence of Maj. H. S. Turner, on the evening of the 21st of May.

Naturally this threw Gen. Price into much confusion, and his face reddened with mortification, but after a few minutes he said that he did not remember hearing the paper read; that it was true that Hitchcock and Turner had come from Gen. Harney to see him, but he could recall nothing of any such paper being presented. The discussion grew warmer as Gen. Lyon felt more strongly the force of his position. Gen. Price insisted that no armed bodies of Union troops should pass through or be stationed in Missouri, as such would occasion civil war. He asserted that Missouri must be neutral, and neither side should arm. Gov. Jackson would protect the Union men and would disband his State troops.

Gen. Lyon opposed this by saying, in effect, "that, if the Government withdrew its forces entirely, secret and subtle measures would be resorted to to provide arms and perfect organizations which, upon any pretext, could put forth a formidable opposition to the General Government; and even without arming, combinations would doubtless form in certain localities, to oppress and drive out loyal citizens, to whom the Government was bound to give protection, but which it would be helpless to do, as also to repress such combinations, if its forces could not be sent into the State. A large aggressive force might be formed and advanced from the exterior into the State, to assist it in carrying out the Secession program; and the Government could not, under the limitation proposed, take posts on these borders to meet

and repel such force. The Government could not shrink from its duties nor abdicate its corresponding right; and, in addition to the above, it was the duty of its civil officers to execute civil process, and in case of resistance to receive the support of military force. The proposition of the Governor would at once overturn the Government privileges and prerogatives, which he (Gen. Lyon) had neither the wish nor the authority to do. In his opinion, if the Governor and the State authorities would earnestly set about to maintain the peace of the State, and declare their purposes to resist outrages upon loyal citizens of the Government, and repress insurrections against it, and in case of violent combinations, needing co-operation of the United States troops, they should call upon or accept such assistance, and in case of threatened invasion the Government troops took suitable posts to meet it, the purposes of the Government would be subserved, and no infringement of the State rights or dignity committed. He would take good care, in such faithful co-operation of the State authorities to this end, that no individual should be injured in person or property, and that the utmost delicacy should be observed toward all peaceable persons concerned in these relations."

Gen. Lyon based himself unalterably upon this proposition, and could not be moved from it by anything Price or Jackson could say.

Gov. Jackson entered into the discussion again to suggest that they separate and continue the conference further by correspondence; but Lyon, who felt vividly that the main object of the Secessionists was

to gain time to perfect their plans, rejected this proposition, but said that he was quite willing that all those present should reduce their views to writing and publish them; which, however, did not strike Jackson and Price favorably. As to the close of the interview, Maj. Conant says:

“As Gen. Lyon was about to take his leave, he said: ‘Gov. Jackson, no man in the State of Missouri has been more ardently desirous of preserving peace than myself. Heretofore Missouri has only felt the fostering care of the Federal Government, which has raised her from the condition of a feeble French colony to that of an empire State. Now, however, from the failure on the part of the Chief Executive to comply with constitutional requirements, I fear she will be made to feel its power. Better, sir, far better, that the blood of every man, woman and child of the State should flow than that she should successfully defy the Federal Government.’”

Col. Snead has published this account of the close of the conference:

“Finally, when the conference had lasted four or five hours, Lyon closed it, as he had opened it. ‘Rather,’ said he (he was still seated, and spoke deliberately, slowly, and with a peculiar emphasis), ‘rather than concede to the State of Missouri the right to demand that my Government shall not enlist troops within her limits, or bring troops into the State whenever it pleases, or move its troops at its own will into, out of, or through the State; rather than concede to the State of Missouri for one single instant the right to dictate to my Government in any matter however unimportant, I would (rising as he

said this, and pointing in turn to every one in the room) see you, and you, and you, and you, and every man, woman, and child in the State, dead and buried.'

"Then turning to the Governor, he said: 'This means war. In an hour one of my officers will call for you and conduct you out of my lines.'

"And then, without another word, without an inclination of the head, without even a look, he turned upon his heel and strode out of the room, rattling his spurs and clanking his saber, while we, whom he left, and who had known each other for years, bade farewell to each other courteously and kindly, and separated—Blair and Conant to fight for the Union, we for the land of our birth."

When the great American painter shall arise, one of the grandest themes for his pencil will be that destiny-shaping conference on that afternoon in June, 1861. He will show the face of Gov. Jackson as typical of that class of Southern politicians who raised the storm from the unexpected violence of which they retreated in dismay. There will be more than a suggestion of this in Jackson's expression and attitude. He entered the conference full of his official importance as the head of the great Sovereign State, braving the whole United States, and quite complacent as to his own powers of diction and argument. He quickly subsided, however, from the leading character occupying the center of the stage to that of chorus in the wings, in the deadly grapple of men of mightier purpose—Lyon and Price, who were to ride the whirlwind he had been contriving,

and rule the storm he had been instrumental in raising.

Even Blair, immeasurably stronger mentally and morally than Jackson—Blair, tall, sinewy, alert, with face and pose revealing the ideal leader that he was—even he felt the presence of stronger geniuses, and lapsed into silence.

The time for talking men was past. Captains of hosts were now uttering the last stern words, which meant the crash of battle and the death and misery of myriads. Hereafter voices would be in swords, and arguments flame from the brazen mouths of cannon hot with slaughter.

Sterling Price, white-haired, large of frame, imposing, benignant, paternal, inflexible as to what he considered principle, was to point the way which 100,000 young Missourians were to follow through a thousand red battlefields.

Nathaniel Lyon, short of stature, red-haired, in the prime of manhood and perfected soldiership, fiery, jealous for his country's rights and dignity, was to set another 100,000 young Missourians in battle array against their opponents, to fight them to complete overthrow.

After they withdrew from the conference, Gov. Jackson, as Price's trumpeter, sounded the call "to arms" in a proclamation to the people of Missouri.

CHAPTER VII.

GEN. STERLING PRICE was soldier enough to recognize that Gen. Lyon was a different character from the talking men who had been holding the center of the stage for so long. When his trumpet sounded his sword was sure to leap from its scabbard. Blows were to follow so quickly upon words as to tread upon their heels.

At the close of the interview of June 11, Gen. Lyon, with Col. Blair and Maj. Conant, returned to the Arsenal, while Gov. Jackson and Gen. Price hurried to the depot of the Pacific Railroad, where they impressed a locomotive, tender and cars, and urged the railroad men to get up steam in the shortest possible time. Imperative orders cleared the track ahead of them, and they rushed away for the Capital of the State with all speed.

At the crossing of the Gasconade River they stopped long enough to thoroughly burn the bridge to check Lyon's certain advance, and while doing this Sterling Price cut the telegraph wires with his own hands. The train then ran on to the Osage River, where, to give greater assurance against rapid pursuit, they burnt that bridge also.

Arriving at Jefferson City about 2 o'clock in the morning, the rest of the night was spent in anxious preparation of a proclamation by the Governor to the people of Missouri, which was intended to be a trumpet call to bring every man capable of bearing

arms at once to the support of the Governor and the furtherance of his plans.

According to the Census of 1860 there were 236,402 men in Missouri capable of bearing arms, and if the matter could be put in such a way that a half or even one-third of these would respond to the Governor's mandate, a host would be mustered which would quickly sweep Lyon and his small band out of the State. The proclamation to effect this which was elaborated by the joint efforts of Gov. Jackson and Col. Snead, the editor of the St. Louis Bulletin, a Secessionist organ, and the Governor's Secretary and Adjutant-General, together with Gen. Price.

Considered as a trumpet call it was entirely too verbose. Col. Snead could not break himself of writing long, ponderous editorials. The more pertinent paragraphs were:

To the People of Missouri:

A series of unprovoked and unparalleled outrages have been inflicted upon the peace and dignity of this Commonwealth and upon the rights and liberties of its people, by wicked and unprincipled men, professing to act under the authority of the United States Government. The solemn enactments of your Legislature have been nullified; your volunteer soldiers have been taken prisoners; your commerce with your sister States has been suspended; your trade with your fellow-citizens has been, and is, subjected to the harassing control of an armed soldiery; peaceful citizens have been imprisoned without warrant of law; unoffending and defenseless men, women, and children have been ruthlessly shot down and murdered; and other unbearable indignities have been heaped upon your State and yourselves.

* * * * *

They (Blair and Lyon) demanded not only the disorganization and disarming of the State Militia, and the nullification of the Military Bill, but they refused to disarm their own Home Guards, and insisted that the Federal Government should enjoy an unrestricted right to move and station its troops throughout the State, whenever and wherever that might, in the opinion of its officers, be necessary, either for the protection of the "loyal subjects" of the Federal Government or for the repelling of invasion; and they plainly announced that it was the intention of the Administration to

take military occupation, under these pretexts, of the whole State, and to reduce it, as avowed by Gen. Lyon himself, to the "exact condition of Maryland." The acceptance by me of these degrading terms would not only have sullied the honor of Missouri, but would have aroused the indignation of every brave citizen, and precipitated the very conflict which it has been my aim to prevent. We refused to accede to them, and the conference was broken up.

* * * * *

Now, therefore, I, C. F. Jackson, Governor of the State of Missouri, do, in view of the foregoing facts, and by virtue of the power invested in me by the Constitution and laws of this Commonwealth, issue this, my proclamation, calling the Militia of the State, to the number of 50,000, into the active service of the State, for the purpose of repelling said invasion, and for the protection of the lives, liberty, and property of the citizens of this State. And I earnestly exhort all good citizens of Missouri to rally under the flag of their State, for the protection of their endangered homes and firesides, and for the defense of their most sacred rights and dearest liberties.

This proclamation was given out to the press, but even before it appeared the Governor had telegraphed throughout the State to leading Secessionists to arm and rush to his assistance.

This did not catch Gen. Lyon at all unawares. He had long ago determined upon a movement to Springfield, which, being in the midst of the farming region, was the center of the Union element of southwest Missouri. Immediately, upon reading the Governor's proclamation, he saw the necessity of forestalling the projected concentration by reaching Jefferson City with the least possible delay. Before he retired that night he had given orders for the formation of a marching column, and had placed the affairs of his great Department outside of this column, of which he proposed to take personal command, in the hands of Col. Chester Harding, to whom he gave full powers to sign his name and issue orders.

Having thought out his plans well beforehand, Gen. Lyon began his campaign with well-ordered celerity. Part of the troops he had at command were sent down the southwestern branch of the Pacific Railroad to secure it. Others were sent to points at which the militia were known to be gathering to disperse them.

Gen. Lyon himself, with his staff, the Regulars, infantry and artillery, and a force of volunteers, embarked on two steamboats to move directly upon Jefferson City by the way of the Missouri River.

They arrived at the Capital of Missouri about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of June 15, and were met with an enthusiastic reception from the loyal citizens, of whom a large proportion were Germans. Gov. Jackson had only been able to assemble about 120 men, with whom he made a hasty retreat to Boonville, about 50 miles further up the river, which had been selected by Gen. Price as one of his principal strategic points. Boonville is situated on the highlands at a natural crossing of the Missouri, and by holding it communication could be maintained between the parts of the State lying north and south of the river, and thus allow the concentration of the Militia, which Gov. Jackson had called out. The heights on the river bank would enable the river to be blockaded against expeditions ascending it, and the entire length of the stream to Kansas City, about 100 miles in a direct line, could be thus controlled.

The Missouri River divides the State unequally, leaving about one-third on the north and two-thirds on the south. Of the 99 Counties in the State, 44 are

north of the Missouri River, but these are smaller than those south.

Gov. Jackson had telegraphed orders for the Brigade-Generals commanding the districts into which the State had been divided to concentrate their men with all haste at Boonville and at Lexington, still further up the river, nearly midway between Boonville and Kansas City. The beginnings of an arsenal were made at Boonville, to furnish arms and ammunition.

Gen. Lyon saw the strategic importance of the place, and did not propose to allow any concentration to be made there. He did not, as most Regular officers were prone, wait deliberately for wagons and rations and other supplies, but with a truer instinct of soldiership comprehended that his men could live wherever an enemy could, and leaving a small squad at Jefferson City, immediately started his column for Boonville, sending orders to other columns in Iowa and Kansas to converge toward that place.

Progress up the Missouri River was tedious, as the water was low, and the troops had to frequently disembark in order to allow the boats to go over the shoals. It was reported to Gen. Lyon that about 4,000 Confederates had already concentrated at Boonville.

While Gen. Price was the Commander-in-Chief, several prominent Secessionists were commanders upon the field of the whole or parts of the force. The man, however, who was the most in evidence in the fighting was John Sappington Marmaduke, a native Missourian, born in Saline County in 1833,

and therefore 28 years old. He was the son of a farmer, had been at Yale and Harvard, and then graduated from West Point in 1857, standing 30 in a class of 38. He had been on frontier duty with the 7th U. S. until after the firing on Fort Sumter, when he resigned to return to Missouri and raise a regiment for the Southern Confederacy. He was to rise to the rank of Major-General in the Confederate army, achieve much fame for military ability, and be elected, in 1884, Governor of the State.

The column immediately under the command of Gen. Lyon consisted of Totten's Light Battery (F, 2d U. S. Art.); Co. B, 2d U. S.; two companies of Regular recruits; Col. Blair's Missouri regiment, and nine companies of Boernstein's Missouri regiment; aggregating somewhere between 1,700 and 2,000 men. On the evening of Sunday, June 16, the boats carrying the command arrived within 15 miles of Boonville, and lay there during the night. The next morning they proceeded up to within about eight miles of the town, when all but one company of Blair's regiment and an artillery detachment disembarked and began a land march upon the enemy's position. The remaining company and the howitzer were sent on with the boats to give the impression that an attack was to be made from the river side.

The people in the country reported to Gen. Lyon that the enemy was fully 4,000 strong, and intended an obstinate defense. He therefore moved forward cautiously, arriving at last at the foot of a gently undulating slope to a crest one mile distant, on which the enemy was stationed, with the ground quite favorable for them. Gen. Lyon formed a line of battle

about 300 yards from the crest, with Totten's battery in the rear and nine companies of Boernstein's regiment on the right, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Schaeffer, and the Regulars and Col. Blair's regiment on the left. It was a momentous period, big with Missouri's future.

The engagement opened with Capt. Totten shelling the enemy's position and the well-drilled German infantry advancing with the Regulars, firing as they went. The question was now to be tried as to the value of the much-vaunted Missouri riflemen in conflict with the disciplined Germans. The former had been led to believe that they would repeat the achievements of their forefathers at New Orleans.

Under the lead of Col. Marmaduke, the Confederates stood their ground pluckily for a few minutes, but the steady advance of the Union troops, with the demoralizing effect of the shells, were too much for them. Col. Marmaduke attempted to make an orderly retreat, and at first seemed to succeed, but finally the movement degenerated into a rout, and the Confederates scattered in wild flight, led by their Governor, who, like James II. at the battle of the Boyne, had witnessed the skirmish from a neighboring eminence. The losses on each side were equal—two killed and some eight or nine wounded.

Lyon pushed on at once to the camp of the enemy, and there captured some 1,200 pairs of shoes, 20 to 30 tents, and a considerable quantity of ammunition, with quite a supply of arms, blankets and personal effects.

The detachment which had gone by the river on the boats aided in securing the victory by a noisy

bombardment with their howitzer, and landing at the town, captured two six-pounders, with a number of prisoners. The Mayor of Boonville came out and formally surrendered the town to Gen. Lyon and Col. Blair. Parties were sent out the various roads to continue the pursuit, and Gen. Lyon issued the following proclamation, admirable in tone and wording, to counteract that of the Governor and quiet the people, especially as to interference with slave property :

To the People of Missouri:

Upon leaving the city of St. Louis, in consequence of the declaration of war made by the Governor of this State against the Government of the United States, because I would not assume in its behalf to relinquish its duties and abdicate its rights of protecting loyal citizens from the oppression and cruelties of Secessionists in this State, I published an address to the people, in which I declared my intention to use the force under my command for no other purpose than the maintenance of the authority of the General Government and the protection of the rights and property of all law-abiding citizens. The State authorities, in violation of an agreement with Gen. Harney, on the 21st of May last, had drawn together and organized upon a large scale the means of warfare, and having made declaration of war, they abandoned the Capital, issued orders for the destruction of the railroad and telegraph lines, and proceeded to this point to put in execution their purposes toward the General Government. This devolved upon me the necessity of meeting this issue to the best of my ability, and accordingly I moved to this point with a portion of the force under my command, attacked and dispersed hostile forces gathered here by the Governor, and took possession of the camp equipage left and a considerable number of prisoners, most of them young and of immature age, who represent that they have been misled by frauds ingeniously devised and industriously circulated by designing leaders, who seek to devolve upon unreflecting and deluded followers the task of securing the object of their own false ambition. Out of compassion for these misguided youths, and to correct impressions created by unscrupulous calumniators, I have liberated them, upon condition that they will not serve in the impending hostilities against the United States Government. I have done this in spite of the known facts that the leaders in the present rebellion, having long experienced the mildness of the General Government, still feel confident that this mildness cannot be overtaxed even by factious hostilities having in view its overthrow; but if, as in the case of the late Camp Jackson affair, this clemency shall still be

misconstrued, it is proper to give warning that the Government cannot be always expected to indulge it to the compromise of its evident welfare.

Having learned that those plotting against the Government have falsely represented that the Government troops intended a forcible and violent invasion of Missouri for the purposes of military despotism and tyranny, I hereby give notice to the people of this State that I shall scrupulously avoid all interferences with the business, rights, and property of every description recognized by the laws of this State, and belonging to law-abiding citizens; but that it is equally my duty to maintain the paramount authority of the United States with such force as I have at my command, which will be retained only so long as opposition shall make it necessary; and that it is my wish, and shall be my purpose, to devolve any unavoidable rigor arising in this issue upon those only who provoke it.

All persons who, under the misapprehensions above mentioned, have taken up arms, or who are now preparing to do so, are invited to return to their homes, and relinquish their hostile attitude to the General Government, and are assured that they may do so without being molested for past occurrences.

N. LYON,

Brigadier-General, U. S. Vols., Commanding.

Several thousand of Jackson's Militia had already assembled at Lexington, nearly midway between Boonville and Kansas City. When they heard of the affair at Boonville they realized that they were in danger of being caught between the column advancing from that direction and the one under Maj. Sturgis, which Gen. Lyon had ordered forward from Leavenworth through Kansas City, while a third, under Col. Curtis, was approaching from the Iowa line. They dispersed at once, to fall back behind the Osage River, at Gen. Price's direction. Thus Lyon gained complete control of the Missouri River in its course through the State, enabling him to cut off the Confederates in the northern from those in the southern part of the State.

Another success which came to him was the seizure of the office of the St. Louis Bulletin, and the discovery there of a letter from Gov. Jackson to the

publisher, which completely proved all the allegations that had been made as to the Governor's action, decisively contradicted the material assertions in his proclamations and vindicated Gen. Lyon from the charges against him of undue precipitancy. The letter was long, personal and confidential. In it he said:

I do not think Missouri should secede today or tomorrow, but I do not think it good policy that I should so disclose. I want a little time to arm the State, and I am assuming every responsibility to do it with all possible dispatch. Missouri should act in concert with Tennessee and Kentucky. They are all bound to go out, and should go together, if possible. My judgment is that North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas will all be out in a few days, and when they go Missouri should follow. Let us, then, prepare to make our exit. We should keep our own counsels. Every man in the State is in favor of arming the State. Then let it be done. All are opposed to furnishing Mr. Lincoln with soldiers. Time will settle the balance.

Nothing should be said about the time or the manner in which Missouri should go out. That she ought to go, and will go at the proper time, I have no doubt. She ought to have gone out last Winter, when she could have seized the public arms and public property, and defended herself. That she has failed to do, and must wait a little while. Paschall is a base submissionist, and desires to remain with the North, if every Slave State should go out. Call on every country paper to defend me, and assure them I am fighting under the true flag. Who does not know that every sympathy of my heart is with the South? The Legislature, in my view, should sit in secret session, and touch nothing but the measures of defense.

Though in point of fighting and losses this initial campaign ending with the skirmish at Boonville had been insignificant, its results far surpassed those of many of the bloodiest battles of the rebellion. The Governor of the State was in flight from his Capital; his troops had been scattered in the first collision; control had been gained of the Missouri River, cutting the enemy's line in two; and above all, there was the immense moral effect of the defeat in action of the boastful Secessionists by the much denounced "St. Louis Dutch." This alone accounted for the ac-

quisition of many thousand wavering men to the side of the Union. Missourians were not different from the rest of mankind, and every community had its large proportion of those who, when the Secessionists seemed to have everything their own way, inclined to that side, but came back to their true allegiance at the first sign of the Government being able to assert its supremacy. The Government was now aroused and striking—and striking successfully. Its enemies were immensely depressed, and its friends correspondingly elated.


Gen. Lyon's next thought was to drive Gov. Jackson and his Secession clique out of Missouri into Arkansas, free the people from their pernicious influence, protect the Union people, especially in the southwestern part of the State, and keep tens of thousands of young men from being persuaded or dragged into the rebel army.

He would demonstrate the Government's power so convincingly that there would be no longer any doubt of Missouri's remaining in the Union.



THE ST. LOUIS LEVEE BEFORE THE WAR.

CHAPTER VIII.



LINE OF THE OSAGE.

THE Osage River enters Missouri from Kansas about 60 miles south of the Missouri River, and flowing a little south of east empties into that river a few miles below Jefferson City. It thus forms a natural line of defense across the State, which Gen. Price's soldierly eye had noted, and he

advised the Governor to order his troops to take up their position behind it, gain time for organization, and prepare for battle for possession of the State.

Gen. Lyon had also noticed the strategic advantages of the Osage River, and did not propose to allow his enemies to have the benefit of them. He did not intend to permit them to concentrate there, and be joined in time by heavy forces already coming up from Arkansas, Indian Territory, and Texas. While he was collecting farm wagons around Boonville to move his own columns forward, laboring to gather a sufficient stock of ammunition and supplies, and planning to make secure his holding of the important points already gained, he began moving other columns under Gen. Sweeny and Maj. Sturgis directly upon Springfield, the central point of the southwestern part of the State, which would take the Osage line in the rear, and compel Jackson and

Price to retreat with their forces across the Missouri line into Arkansas. This would clear the State of the whole congerie of Secession leaders, remove the young men from their influence, stop the persecutions of the Union men in that section, and cement Missouri solidly in the Union line. He also wrote Gen. B. M. Prentiss, in command of the troops at Cairo, asking co-operation by clearing out the rebels from the southeastern portion of the State. Lyon's far-reaching plans did not stop with Missouri. He also contemplated pushing his advance directly upon Little Rock, through the Union-loving region in northwestern Arkansas, and clinching that State as firmly as Missouri.

The next day after the decisive little victory at Boonville occurred an event which greatly raised the drooping spirits of the Secessionists, and was much exaggerated by them in order to offset their defeat at Boonville by Lyon.

Benton is one of the interior Counties of the State, lying on both sides of the Osage River. In 1860 its people had cast 74 votes for Lincoln, 306 for Bell and Everett, 100 for Breckinridge, and 574 for Stephen A. Douglas. All the County officials and leading men were Secessionists, and doing their utmost to aid the rebellion; still, the Union people, under the leadership of A. H. W. Cook and Alex. Mackey, were undaunted and earnestly desirous of doing effective service for the United States. Cook and Mackey had been warned to leave the State, and Cook had done so, but returned to take part in the capture of Camp Jackson, and afterward went back to his home to organize the Germans and Americans

there for their own defense. A meeting was held at which the Stars and Stripes were raised, and nine companies of Home Guards organized, sworn into service, and given arms. These companies went into camp in a couple of barns some three miles south of Cole Camp, where their presence and support to the Union sentiment was the source of the greatest irritation to the Secessionists, who attempted to disperse them by legal processes, and failing in this, determined to attack them. In the meanwhile all but about 400 of the men were allowed to return to their homes to put their affairs in order for a prolonged absence.

About 1,000 Secessionists, under the command of Walter S. O'Kane, marched on June 19 to attack them. Col. Cook was informed of the intended attack and prepared for it by throwing out pickets and summoning his absentees.

At 3 o'clock in the morning of June 20 the Secessionists reached the pickets, whom they bayoneted to prevent their giving the alarm, and rushed in upon the sleeping Unionists, pouring volley after volley into the barns. The men in one of the barns had been warned, but were prevented from firing by the Union Flag which the Secessionists carried. Many of them who managed to get out of the barns were rallied behind the corn cribs, and began an obstinate fight which lasted till daylight. The absentees, whom Col. Cook had summoned, came up during the engagement, but not being able to comprehend the situation, rendered no assistance. Finally all the Union men got together and retreated in good order, repulsing their pursuers.

The reports as to this affair are so conflicting that it is difficult to determine the truth. It seems pretty certain that Col. Cook had only about 400 men. He reports that he was attacked by 1,200, but the Secessionists say that O'Kane's force was only 350. Cook reports his loss as 23 killed, 20 wounded, and 30 taken prisoners, while Pollard, the Secessionist historian, insists that we lost 206 killed, a large number wounded, and over 100 taken prisoners, with the Secession loss of 14 killed and 15 or 20 wounded. Probably the truth lies between these two extremes, the only definite thing being that the Secessionists captured 362 muskets.

There were five or six prominent Secessionists among the killed, one of them being Mr. Leach, the editor of the Southwestern Democrat.

Col. Cook gathered up his men, received some additional recruits, some arms and ammunition, and pushed on to Warsaw, on the Osage, one of the points of concentration indicated by Gen. Price, capturing 1,500 pound cans and 1,500 kegs of fine rifle powder, many tons of pig-lead, 70 stand of small-arms, a steamboat-load of tent cloth, a lot of State Guard uniforms, four Confederate flags, and 1,200 false-faces which had been used by the "border ruffians" in their political operations in Kansas. A little further on they surrounded and captured 1,000 Secessionists, and paroled them on the spot.

The Secessionists, on the other hand, took much comfort out of the surprise and defeat and the acquisition of 362 new muskets and 150 more which they had beguiled from a German company in a neighboring County.

In the meanwhile the Conservatives, aided by Lieut.-Gen. Scott, whose distrust of "Capt." Lyon never abated, secured the addition of Missouri to the Department commanded by McClellan, whom it was thought would hold the "audacious" officer in check. Lyon, though he felt that McClellan, then far distant in West Virginia, could not give matters in the State the attention they needed, yet loyally accepted the assignment, wrote at once to McClellan cordially welcoming him as his commander, and giving full information as to the conditions, with suggestions as to what should be done. Col. Blair and the Radicals were much displeased at this move, and began efforts to have Missouri erected into a separate Department and placed under the command of John C. Fremont, lately appointed a Major-General, and from whose military talents there were the greatest expectations.

As the first Presidential candidate of the Republican Party Fremont had a strong hold upon the hearts of the Northern people. During the campaign of 1856 there had been the customary partisan eulogies of the candidates, which placed "the Great Pathfinder" and all he had done in the most favorable light before the American people. Above all he was thought to be thoroughly in sympathy with the policy which Blair and his following desired to pursue.

In reality Fremont was a man of somewhat more than moderate ability, but boundless aspirations. He was the son-in-law of Senator Benton, and his wife, the queenly, ambitious, handsome Jessie Benton Fremont, was naturally eager for her husband to be as prominent in the National councils as had

been her father. What Fremont was equal to is one of the many unsolved problems of the war, but certainly he was not to the command of the great Western Department, including the State of Illinois and all the States and Territories west of the Mississippi River and east of the Rocky Mountains, to which he was assigned by General Orders, No. 40, issued July 3, 1861.

Fremont's father was a Frenchman, who had married a Virginia woman, and followed the occupation of a teacher of French at Norfolk, Va., but died at an early age, leaving the members of his family to struggle for themselves. Fremont became a teacher of mathematics on a sloop of war, then Professor of Mathematics for the Navy, and later a surveyor and engineer for railroad lines, and was commissioned by President Van Buren a Second Lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers. Owing to the opposition of Senator Benton, his daughter had to be secretly married to Lieut. Fremont in 1841, but soon after the Senator gave his son-in-law the benefit of his great influence.

Fremont was designated to conduct surveys across the continent into the unknown region lying between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific, and made several very important explorations. He was in California prior to the outbreak of the Mexican War, and became involved in hostilities with the Mexicans. When the war did break out he assumed command of the country around under authority from Commodore Stockton, and proceeded to declare the independence of California. A quarrel between him and Stockton followed, and later another

quarrel ensued with Gen. Kearny, who had been sent into this country in command of an expedition. He was court-martialed by Gen. Kearny's orders and found guilty of mutiny, disobedience, and conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline. He was sentenced to be dismissed, but the majority of the court recommended him to the clemency of President Polk, who refused to approve the verdict of mutiny, but did approve the rest, though he remitted the penalty. Fremont, refusing to accept the President's pardon, then resigned from the Army, settled in California, and bought the famous Mariposa estate, containing rich gold mines. He became a leader of the Free-Soil Party in California, and was elected to the Senate for a brief term of three weeks. He was nominated by the first Republican Convention in Philadelphia, June 17, 1856, and in his letter of acceptance expressed himself strongly against the extension of Slavery, and in favor of free labor. The hot campaign of 1856 resulted in a surprising showing of strength by the new party. Fremont received 114 electoral votes from 11 States to 174 from 19 States for Buchanan and eight votes from Maryland for Fillmore. The popular vote was 874,000 for Fillmore, 1,341,000 for Fremont, and 1,838,000 for Buchanan.

Lyon welcomed the appointment of Fremont to command, because he felt the need of having a superior officer at hand who would appreciate the urgency of the situation, and stand between him and the authorities at Washington, who apparently did not understand the emergency, were not honoring his requisitions for money, arms, and supplies, and

who were drawing to the eastward the troops that Lyon felt ought to be sent to him. It was also satisfactory to him that the State of Illinois was in the Department, since the important point of Cairo should be administered with reference to controlling the situation in southeastern Missouri.

The first distrust of Fremont came from his deliberation in repairing to his command. The people of Missouri felt very keenly that no time should be lost in the General arriving on the spot and getting the situation in hand, but in spite of all importunities, Fremont lingered for weeks in New York, and it required a rather sharp admonition from the War Department to start him for St. Louis, where he arrived as late as July 25.

Lyon's prompt advance upon Jefferson City now bore fruit in another direction. The Union people of Missouri decided that as Gov. Jackson, Lieut.-Gov. Reynolds and other State officials had abandoned the State Capital to engage in active rebellion against the United States, the State Convention, which had been called to carry the State out of the Union, but which had so signally disappointed the expectations of its originators, should reconvene, declare the State offices vacant, and instate a loyal Government. A strong party desired that a Military Governor should be appointed, and urged Col. Frank P. Blair for that place, but he refused to countenance the project. The Convention, by a vote of 56 to 25, declared the offices of Governor, Lieutenant-Governor and Secretary of State vacant, and elected Hamilton R. Gamble Governor, Willard P. Hall Lieutenant-Governor, Mordecai Oliver Secretary of State, and

George A. Bingham Treasurer. An oath of loyalty was adopted to be required of all citizens before being allowed to vote, and to be taken by all incumbents of office and all who should be qualified for office thereafter.

Gov. Jackson established his Capital at Lamar, in Barton County, about 30 miles south of the Osage, and the men who had been appointed to command the Militia Districts began to come in with their contingents. None seemed to know about the flanking columns which had been sent out toward Springfield, to take the line of the Osage in the rear, and they were astounded when forces under Sweeny and Sigel, which had dispersed the gathering Militia before them at Rolla, Lebanon, and other intervening points, reached Springfield, and began sending out from there expeditions to Neosho, Ozark, Sarcoxie and other towns in the southwestern corner. Col. Franz Sigel, who had shown much activity and enterprise, learned at Sarcoxie that several divisions of State Guards under Gens. Rains, Parsons, Slack and Clark were to the north of him, and the Governor and Gen. Price were endeavoring to bring them together in order to turn upon and crush Gen. Lyon in his advance from Boonville. Sigel's men, who were anxious to accomplish something decisive before the expiration of their three months' term, brought about a decision in their commander's mind to march upon the force encamped upon Pool's Prairie, whip and scatter it, and then attack the other forces in turn.

After making the necessary detachments to guard his flanks and rear, Col. Sigel had under his com-

mand nine companies of the 3d Mo., 550 men under Lieut.-Col. Hassendeubel; seven companies of the 5th Mo., under Col. Charles E. Salomon, 400 men, and two batteries of light artillery, four guns each, under Maj. Backof.

After a hard day's march of 22 miles in very hot weather, Col. Sigel came, on the evening of July 4, about one mile southeast of Carthage, on the south side of Spring River. He made preparations to attack the enemy, reported to be from 10 to 15 miles in his front.

That night Gov. Jackson received news of Sigel's advance, and gathered his forces to resist him. He had already concentrated many more men than Sigel had expected, and had with him seven pieces of artillery. Most of his men carried the arms which they had brought from home, and were arranged, according to the provisions in the Military Bill, into divisions, of which there were no less than four present. The Second Division, commanded by Brig.-Gen. James S. Rains, who afterward attained much reputation in the Confederate army, had present 1,203 infantry and artillery and 608 cavalry. The Third Division, commanded by Gen. John B. Clark, also to attain eminence in the Confederate army, had 365 present. The Fourth Division, commanded by Gen. Wm. Y. Slack, later a Brigadier-General in the Confederate army, had 500 cavalry and 700 infantry. The Sixth Division, commanded by Gen. Monroe M. Parsons, who served with distinction throughout the war, had altogether about 1,000 men and four pieces of artillery. The official returns show that Gov. Jackson had thus 4,375 men with seven guns to op-

pose something over 1,000 men with eight guns under Col. Sigel. The Union force was strong in artillery, while the Confederates were powerful in cavalry, of which the Unionists had none. Both sides were poorly supplied with ammunition, especially for the cannon, and loaded these with railroad spikes, bits of trace chains, etc.

Early on the morning of July 5 Sigel marched out of camp, crossing the Spring River about one mile north of Carthage, and soon came upon an open prairie. He advanced slowly and cautiously along the Lamar Road, with his wagons under a small escort following a mile or so in the rear. Nine miles north of Carthage and three miles north of Coon Creek he came in sight of the Governor's troops drawn up in line of battle on a slight rise of the prairie, and about one mile and a half away. The enemy's skirmish line, which was under the command of Capt. J. O. Shelby, of whom we shall hear much more later, opened fire on Sigel's advance, but was soon driven across the creek and through the narrow strip of timber less than one-half mile wide, followed by Sigel's men in line of battle. They came out on the smooth prairie, covered with a fine growth of grass, and offering unequalled facilities for maneuvering, except that from the ridge Sigel's line could be accurately observed and its numbers known.


Sigel formed his line of battle within a half mile of the enemy's position, distributed his artillery along it, then ordered an advance and opened the battle with a fire from his guns, which was promptly responded to by the enemy's pieces. The distance was so close that the Union guns could fire canister and

shell very effectively; but the enemy, perceiving that Sigel had no cavalry, sent out their numerous mounted force on a flank movement, which soon compelled the retirement of the line across the creek, where the battle was renewed and maintained for two hours, during which time the enemy suffered some loss from the artillery fire. Again the enemy made a flank movement with their cavalry, reaching this time back toward the baggage-train, to which Sigel retreated. The Union men broke up the cavalry formation, and Sigel followed this with a charge which scattered his enemies and enabled him to continue his retreat unmolested across the prairie in full sight of his foes. Sigel could also see the rallied cavalry making a wide circuit over the prairie to gain the heights of Spring River and cut off his retreat. Gen. Rains, who led this movement, succeeded in reaching the road at Spring River, but in coming up Sigel at once attacked with his artillery, and after a brisk little engagement of half an hour drove the enemy out of the woods, and marched on to Carthage, which he reached about 5 o'clock, and there prepared to give a short rest to his men, who were worn out by 18 miles of marching under a hot sun and almost continual fighting and manuvering. The Secessionists renewed their attack, but were again driven off by the infantry and artillery, and the march was resumed.

Again Gens. Slack, Parsons, and Clark pushed their men forward on the Union flank, while Rains renewed his attack, and again they were all repulsed, largely by the skillful handling of the artillery. As darkness came on the Secessionists disap-

peared, but Sigel moved on to Sarcxie, 12 miles distant, and went into camp.

Gov. Jackson's forces camped in and around Carthage, and the next day marched to Neosho, where they met Gen. Ben McCulloch coming up from Arkansas with a force of Arkansans and Texans and also 1,700 of the State Guards, which Gen. Price had brought forward. In the fighting the Union side had lost 13 killed and 21 wounded. The Confederates



SIGEL CROSSING THE OSAGE.

report 74 killed and wounded in the four divisions under the command of Gov. Jackson.

The battle of Carthage produced a great sensation over the country, the Confederates rejoicing that they had cut through the Union line and forced it to retreat, while Sigel received unstinted praise for his skillful retreat and the masterly handling of his artillery. While one battery would hold the enemy in check, another would be placed at the most advan-

tageous position in the rear, where it would withdraw behind it to repeat the manuver. Several times during the day the batteries were cunningly masked, and the enemy rushed up to the muzzle, to receive the death-dealing discharge full in the faces of the compact mass.

This brings Gen. Sigel prominently before us. Of the many highly-educated Germans who had migrated to this country in consequence of their connection with the Revolution of 1848, Franz Sigel had, far and away, the most brilliant reputation as a soldier. A slight, dark, nervous man, with a rather saturnine countenance, he was born at Zinsheim, Baden, Nov. 18, 1824, and was therefore in his 37th year. He graduated from the Military School at Karlsruhe with high promise, which he filled by becoming one of the Chief Adjutants in the Grand Duke's army. He ardently shared the aspirations of the young Germans for German Unity, and resigned his commission in 1847 to become one of the leaders in the revolutionary forces. He was appointed to chief command of the army sent from the Grand-Duchy to the assistance of the revolutionists in Hesse-Darmstadt, but a disagreement arose, another was appointed to the command, and Sigel assumed the position of Minister of War. Upon the defeat of the expedition by the Prussian forces, he resumed the chief command of the demoralized men, and conducted a brilliantly successful retreat to a place of safety in the fortress of Rastadt. This achievement at the age of 24 seemed to stamp the character of his military career.

At the collapse of the revolution he escaped to

Switzerland, which expelled him, and he then came to New York, where he supported himself as a teacher of mathematics, later engaging in the same occupation in St. Louis, where he was living when the war broke out, and rendered invaluable service in organizing and leading the Germans in support of Blair and Lyon.


Unfortunately for his reputation, the war upon which he had now entered was to be carried on by stern aggressiveness, to which he seemed unsuited. He had a strong hold on the affections of the Germans, whose support of the Union was exceedingly valuable, and in spite of repeated failures to satisfy the expectations of his superior officers, he was promoted and given high commands, in all of which his misfortune was the same. After Rastadt he seemed bent only upon conducting brilliant retreats, and that from Carthage greatly helped to confirm this tendency. He was finally relegated to the shelf, which contained so many men who had started out with brilliant promise, and died in New York in 1902, supported during his later years by a pension of \$100 a month granted him by Congress.

After resting his men a few hours at Sarcoxie, Sigel marched on to Springfield, where Gen. Sweeny was, and to which point Gen. Lyon hurried with all the force he could gather, to forestall the junction of Gen. Ben McCulloch's Arkansas column with the force that Price and Jackson would bring to him.

There was strong need of his presence there and of his utmost efforts. He had rolled back the Secession tide only to have it gather volume enough to completely submerge him. Not only had Gov. Jack-

son and Sterling Price concentrated many more men than he had, but a still stronger column composed of Arkansans and Texans under the noted Gen. Ben. McCulloch was near at hand and pushing forward with all speed.

Benjamin McCulloch, a tall, bony, sinewy man of iron will and dauntless courage, was easily a leader and master of the bold, aggressive spirits who had wrested Texas away from Mexico and erected her into a great State. He had achieved much reputation in the command of the Texan Rangers during the Mexican War and in the Indian fights which succeeded that struggle. As a soldier and a fighter he had the highest fame of any living Texan, except Sam Houston, and when he espoused the cause of Secession he drew after him many thousands of the adventurous, daring young men of the State. The Confederate army had immediately commissioned him a Brigadier-General, and he had set about organizing, with his accustomed energy and enterprise, a strong column for aggressive service west of the Mississippi. Warlike young leaders, ambitious for distinction, hastened to join him with whatever men they could raise, for such was their confidence that they felt his banner would point to the most direct road to fame and glory. Many of these, then Captains and Colonels, afterward rose to be Generals in the Confederate army. He had proposed to the Confederate Government to aid the situation in Virginia by active operations in Missouri, and to this plan the Governors of Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas gave their hearty consent and co-operation. McCulloch had another motive for aggres-



GEN. HENRY W. HALLECK

sive action, as it would determine the position of the Indians. The wisest among the Chiefs of the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Creeks and Seminoles desired to remain neutral in the struggle, since they did not wish to bring down upon them the wrath of the Kansas people, who were within easy striking distance. By prompt action these wavering aborigines could be brought into the Confederate ranks and be made to render important assistance.

He had already crossed the Missouri line with 3,000 mounted men, and on the night of the 4th of July came to Buffalo Creek, 12 miles southwest of Neosho, where he was joined by Gen. Price with 1,700 mounted men, and he sent urgent messages back to the rest of his men to hurry forward to him. These were so well obeyed that he shortly had, independent of Price's men, fully 5,000 men from Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana, who were better equipt and organized than the Missourians.

Gov. Jackson and Gen. Price also sent urgent messages for concentration, which were as promptly responded to. The result was that there were shortly assembled Confederates under Gen. McCulloch and "State Guards" under Gov. Jackson and Gen. Price, a total estimated by Maj. Sturgis and others at 23,000 men. For lack of proper arms and organization, many of these were not very effective. McCulloch says that the great horde of mounted men "were much in the way," and hindered rather than helped. But they were certainly very effective in harrying the Union people; in impressing recruits; in embarrassing Lyon's gathering of supplies; in driving in

the small parties he sent out, and confining his operations to the neighborhood of Springfield.

In the meanwhile the great disaster of Bull Run had occurred to depress the Union people and fill the Secessionists with unbounded enthusiasm and confidence. The thoughts of the Government and of the loyal people of the country became concentrated upon securing the safety of Washington. Troops were being rushed from every part of the country to the National Capital. Lyon's forces were constantly dwindling, from the expiration of the three months for which the regiments had been enlisted. The men felt the need of their presence at home, to attend to their hastily-left affairs, and could see no prospect of a decisive battle as a reason for remaining. Gen. Lyon importuned Gen. Fremont and the War Department for some regiments, for adequate supplies for those he had, and money with which to pay them. The War Department, however, could apparently think of nothing else than making Washington safe, while Gen. Fremont, deeming St. Louis and Cairo all-important, gathered in what troops he could save from the eastward rush, for holding those places. Gen. Scott even proposed to deprive Gen. Lyon of his little squad of Regulars, and sent orders for seven companies to be forwarded East.

Laboring with all these embarrassments, Gen. Lyon confronted the storm rising before him with a firm countenance.

CHAPTER IX.

MOUNTAINOUS perplexities and burdens weighed upon Gen. Lyon during the last days of July.

The country was hysterical over the safety of the National Capital, and it seemed that the Administration was equally emotional. Every regiment and gun was being rushed to the heights in front of Washington, and all eyes were fixed on the line of the Potomac.

The perennial adventurer in Gen. Fremont did not fail to suggest to him that the greatest of opportunities might develop in Washington, and he lingered in New York until peremptorily ordered by Gen. Scott to his command. He did not arrive in St. Louis until July 25.

Like Seward, Chase, McClellan, and many other aspiring men, Fremont had little confidence that the untrained Illinois Rail Splitter in the Presidential chair would be able to keep his head above the waves in the sea of troubles the country had entered. The disaster at Bull Run was but the beginning of a series of catastrophes which would soon call for a stronger brain and a more experienced hand at the helm.

Then?

Mrs. Jessie Benton Fremont was not the only one to suggest that the man for the hour would be found

to be the first Republican candidate for President—the Great Pathfinder of the Rocky Mountains!

Upon his arrival at St. Louis Gen. Fremont was immediately waited upon by the faithful Chester Harding and others who had been awaiting his coming with painful anxiety. They represented most energetically Gen. Lyon's predicament, without money, clothing or rations, and with a force even more rapidly diminishing than that of the enemy was augmenting. They revealed Gen. Lyon's far-reaching plans of making Springfield a base from which to carry the war into Arkansas, and begged for men, money, arms, food, shoes and clothing for him.

Fremont was too much engrossed in forming in the Brant Mansion that vice-regal court of his—the main requirement for which seemed to be inability to speak English—to feel the urgency of these importunities.

The country was swarming with military adventurers from Europe, men with more or less shadow on their connection with the foreign armies, and eager to sell their swords to the highest advantage. They swarmed around Fremont like bees around a sugar barrel, much to the detriment of the honest and earnest men of foreign birth who were rallying to the support of the Union.

Next to his satrapal court of exotic manners and speech, Fremont was most concerned about the safety of Cairo, Ill., a most important point, then noisily threatened by Maj.-Gen. Leonidas Polk, the militant Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Louisiana, and his

subordinate, the blatant Gen. Gideon J. Pillow, of Mexican War notoriety.

Gen. Fremont made quite a show of reinforcing Cairo, sending a most imposing fleet of steamboats to carry the 4,000 troops sent thither.

Pretense still counted for much in the war. Later it burnt up like dry straw in the fierce blaze of actualities.

Not being Fremont's own, nor contributing particularly to his aggrandizement, Gen. Lyon's plans and aims had little importance to his Commanding General.

Gen. Lyon saw clearly that the place to fight for St. Louis and Missouri was in the neighborhood of Springfield, and by messenger and letter he impertuned that St. Louis be left to the care of the loyal Germans of the Home Guards, who had shown their ability to handle the city, and that all the other troops there and elsewhere in the State be rushed forward to him, with shoes and clothing for his unshod, ragged soldiers, and sufficient rations for the army, which had well-nigh exhausted the country upon which it had been living for so long.

But Fremont frittered away his strength in sending regiments to chase guerrilla bands which dissolved as soon as the trail became too hot.

Two regiments were ordered to Lyon from points so distant that they could not make the march in less than 10 days or a fortnight, and some scanty supplies sent to Rolla remained there because of lack of wagons to carry them forward to Springfield, 120 miles away.

Later Gen. Fremont testified before the Commit-

tee on the Conduct of the War that he had ordered Gen. Lyon, if he could not maintain himself at Springfield, to fall back to Rolla, but singularly he did not produce this order.

Though Gen. Lyon had marched his men 50 miles in one day to prevent the junction of Gen. Ben McCulloch's Arkansas column with the hosts Gen. Sterling Price was gathering from Missouri, he was not able to interpose between them.

On Saturday, Aug. 3, the Confederates had all gotten together on the banks of Crane Creek, 55 miles southwest of Springfield, with general headquarters in and around the village of Cassville.

How many were concentrated is subject to the same obscurity which usually envelops Confederate numbers. Lyon estimated there were 30,000. Later estimates by competent men put the number at 23,000. Gen. Snead, Price's Adjutant-General, put the number at 11,000, which would be a severe reflection on the loyalty of the Missouri Secessionists to their Governor, since Gen. McCulloch certainly brought up about 5,000 from Arkansas, which would leave only 6,000 to respond to Gov. Jackson's proclamation, and gather under the standards set up by his seven Brigadier-Generals—Parsons, Rains, Slack, J. B. Clark, M. L. Clark, Watkins and Randolph.

While Lyon had incomparable troubles, there was far from concord in the camp of his opponents. Like thousands of other men, McCulloch's ambition far transcended his abilities. He at once assumed the attitude that as a Brigadier-General in the Confederate army he out-ranked Sterling Price, who was a Major-General of State troops. This, at that early

period of the war, was a humorous reversal of the State Sovereignty idea, so flagrant in the minds of those precipitating Secession. Jefferson Davis and his school of thought had been fierce in their contention that the part was greater than the whole, and that the States were greater than the General Government. Yet Gen. McCulloch was unflinching in his insistence that a Confederate Brigadier-General outranked a State Major-General. The dispute became quite acrimonious, but was at last settled by Price's yielding to McCulloch, so anxious was he that something decisive should be done toward driving back Lyon and "redeeming the State of Missouri." According to Gen. Thomas L. Snead, his Chief of Staff, he went to Gen. McCulloch's quarters on Sunday morning, Aug. 4, and after vainly trying to persuade McCulloch to attack Lyon, he said:

"I am an older man than you, Gen. McCulloch, and I am not only your senior in rank now, but I was a Brigadier-General in the Mexican War, with an independent command, when you were only a Captain; I have fought and won more battles than you have ever witnessed; my force is twice as great as yours; and some of my officers rank, and have seen more service than you, and we are also upon the soil of our own State; but, Gen. McCulloch, if you will consent to help us to whip Lyon and to repossess Missouri, I will put myself and all my forces under your command, and we will obey you as faithfully as the humblest of your own men. We can whip Lyon, and we will whip him and drive the enemy out of Missouri, and all the honor and all the glory shall be yours. All that we want is to regain our homes and

to establish the independence of Missouri and the South. If you refuse to accept this offer, I will move with the Missourians alone against Lyon; for it is better that they and I should all perish than Missouri be abandoned without a struggle. You must either fight beside us or look on at a safe distance and see us fight all alone the army which you dare not attack even with our aid. I must have your answer before dark, for I intend to attack Lyon tomorrow."

Gen. McCulloch replied that he was expecting dispatches from the East, but would make known his determination before sundown. At that time, accompanied by Gen. McIntosh, in whose abilities Gen. McCulloch had the highest confidence, and was largely influenced by him, he went to Price's headquarters and informed him that he had just received dispatches that Gen. Pillow was advancing into the southeastern part of the State from New Madrid with 12,000 men, and that he would accept the command of the united forces and attack Lyon. Price at once published an order that he had turned over the command of the Missouri troops to Gen. McCulloch, but reserved the right to resume command at any time he might see fit.

Their friends in Springfield kept Price and McCulloch well-informed as to Lyon's diminishing force and perplexities.

Brilliant as McCulloch may have been in command of 100 or so men, he was clearly unequal to the leadership of such a host. He was as much feebler in temper to Lyon as he was inferior in force and grasp to Sterling Price.

An audacious stroke by Lyon on Friday, Aug. 2,

quite unsettled his nerves. Getting information that his enemies were moving on him by three different roads, Lyon formed the soldierly determination to move out swiftly and attack one of the columns and crush it before the other could come to its assistance.

Putting Capt. D. S. Stanley—of whom we shall hear much hereafter—at the head with his troop of Regular cavalry, and following him with a battalion of Regulars under Capt. Frederick Steele—of whom we shall also hear a great deal hereafter—and a section of Totten's Regular Battery, he marched out the Cassville Road with his whole force and at Dug Springs, 20 miles away, came up with McCulloch's advance, commanded by Brig.-Gen. J. S. Rains, of the Missouri State Guards, of whom, too, we shall hear much. Col. McIntosh, McCulloch's adviser, was also on the ground with 150 men.

Rains attempted to put into operation the tactics employed against Sigel at Carthage, but Steele and Stanley were men of different temper, and attacked him so savagely as to scatter his force in wild confusion.

Lyon marched forward to within six miles of the main Confederate position, and lay there 24 hours, when, not deeming it wise to attack so far from his base, retired unmolested to Springfield.

This startling aggressiveness quite overcame Gen. McCulloch, and the conduct of the Missourians disgusted him. He was strong in his denunciation of them and quite frank in his reluctance to attack Gen. Lyon without further information as to "his position and fortifications," and complained bitterly that he could get no information as to the "barricades"

in Springfield and other positions he might encounter. He said that "he would not make a blind attack on Springfield," and "would order the whole army back to Cassville rather than bring on an engagement with an unknown enemy."

Gen. Price was strenuous in his insistence upon attack, and finally McCulloch consented to meet all the general officers at his headquarters. In the council McCulloch was plain in his unwillingness to engage Lyon or to enter on any aggressive campaign, but Price, seconded by Gens. Parsons, Rains, Slack and McBride, were most determined that Lyon should be attacked at once, and declared that if McCulloch would not do it he would resume command and fight the battle himself. McCulloch finally yielded, and ordered a forward movement, and on the morning of Aug. 6 the entire force was in camp along the bank of Wilson's Creek, about six miles south of Springfield. This position was taken largely because of its proximity to immense cornfields, which would supply the troops and animals with food.

Wilson's Creek, rising in the neighborhood of Springfield, flows west some five miles, and then runs south nine or 10 miles in order to empty into the James River, a tributary of White River. Tyrel's Creek and Skegg's Branch, which have considerable valleys, are tributaries of Wilson's Creek. Above Skegg's Branch rises a hill, since known as Bloody Hill, nearly 100 feet high. Its sides are scored with ravines, the rock comes to the surface in many places, and the hight was thickly covered with an overgrowth of scrub-oak. There are other emin-

ences and ravines, generally covered with scrub-oak and undergrowth, and the Confederates were camped in an irregular line along these for a distance of about three miles up and down Wilson's Creek, from the extreme right to the extreme left. Here they remained three days, with the much-disturbed McCulloch riding out every day with his Maynard rifle slung over his shoulder for a personal reconnoissance, which, as far as could be judged from his conversation on his return, was quite unsatisfactory.

He had little stomach for the attack, and naturally found reasons against it.

Price and his Generals, on the other hand, were fretting over the delay. Price's accurate information of Lyon's condition made him sure that Lyon would do the obvious thing—retreat. It was the warlike thing to do to attack at once, which had every chance of success. Success meant as telling a stroke for Secession in the West as Bull Run had been in the East. It would be quite as sensational, for there was no refuge or rallying point for the beaten Union army short of Rolla, 120 miles away, and the rough country, cut by innumerable valleys, gorges and streams, would enable the swarming mounted force to get in its wild work, and not permit the escape of a man, a gun or a wagon.

McCulloch, yielding to Price's importunities, ordered the army forward, and at dawn of Aug. 19 he and McIntosh were sitting down to breakfast with Price and Snead, preparatory to leading their forces forward, when they were startled by their pickets being driven in. McCulloch, who had hated Rains

from Old Army days, and despised him and his Missourians since the Dug Springs affair, remarked contemptuously, "O, it's only one of Rains's scares," and turned to his meal. But the matter instantly became more pressing than breakfast.

Gen. Lyon had returned to Springfield Monday, Aug. 5, to meet an intense disappointment. Not a thing had been sent to meet his desperate needs. Fremont had ordered one regiment from Kansas and from the Missouri River to go forward to him, but they could hardly reach him in less than a fortnight. There were at that time some 44 regiments in Missouri—regiments commanded by men whose names afterward shine in history—U. S. Grant, John Pope, S. A. Hurlbut, John M. Palmer, John B. Turchin, S. B. Curtis, Morgan L. Smith, O. E. Salomon, John McNeil, etc.,—but they were kept garrisoning posts, chasing guerrillas, and at almost everything else than hurrying forward toward him, as they should have been.

Two of his regiments—the 3d and 4th Mo.—took their discharge and started for St. Louis. The 1st Iowa's time was out, but Lyon asked the men to stay with him a few days longer, and they did to a man.

Aside from the military reasons for holding Springfield there were others which appealed to Lyon's mind with equal power. His heart had bled over the outrages committed by the Secessionists upon the Union people in that section of the State. The presence of his army was the only security that the loyal people had that their farms would not be robbed and themselves murdered. Hundreds of them had gone into Springfield to be under his pro-

tection. How they could be ever gotten back to a place of safety in retreat was the gravest of problems. Gen. Schofield, at that time his Adjutant-General, and who disapproved of fighting the battle of Wilson's Creek, thinks that this consideration had more weight with him than the military reasons, and induced him to fight where the judgment of the soldier was against it.

Four anxious days longer Lyon remained at Springfield. He called a council of his principal officers, and the unanimous decision was that the army should retreat.

On Aug. 9 he sent the following letter to Gen. Fremont, the last he ever wrote:

General: I retired to this place, as I before informed you, reaching here on the 5th. The enemy followed to within 10 miles of here. He has taken a strong position, and is recruiting his supply of horses, mules, and provisions by foraging into the surrounding country, his large force of mounted men enabling him to do this without much annoyance from me. I find my position extremely embarrassing, and am at present unable to determine whether I shall be able to maintain my ground or be forced to retire. I can resist any attack from the front, but if the enemy move to surround me I must retire. I shall hold my ground as long as possible, though I may, without knowing how far, endanger the safety of my entire force, with its valuable material, being induced by the valuable considerations involved to take the step. The enemy showed himself in considerable force yesterday five miles from here, and has doubtless a full purpose of attacking me.

N. LYON, Commanding.

The simple, soldierly dignity of this is pathetic. There is no murmur of complaint, such as a man treated as he had been was eminently justified in making. After sending this note, Gen. Lyon received intelligence that one of his cavalry parties had been attacked by rebel cavalry, but after a brief fight had beaten them off. He thereupon sent out a reconnoitering party to learn if the Secessionists had

moved forward, and the party presently returned with two Texan and two Tennessean prisoners, from whom Lyon learned for the first time of the junction of McCulloch's forces and Price's. He at once decided upon a bold stroke. Everything was prepared as if in readiness for retreat, with the tents struck and the Quartermaster's and Commissary's stores in the wagons. Quartermaster Alexis Mudd went to headquarters and asked Gen. Lyon:

"When do we start back?"

The General fixed his keen blue eyes upon the Quartermaster and said, clearly and firmly:

"When we are whipped back, and not until then."

An order was at once issued for every man to be prepared to march at 6 o'clock that evening, without any luggage, and with all the ammunition he could carry.

Calling a council of officers, Gen. Lyon announced his intention to move out and attack the enemy in his chosen position. Gen. Sigel proposed that he be allowed to take his regiment and Col. Salomon's to move independently and take the enemy in flank and rear. The other officers strongly opposed this, while Gen. Lyon withheld his consent, but finally yielded to Sigel's entreaties and authorized the movement, giving Sigel 1,400 infantry, two companies of cavalry and six pieces of artillery, to move along the Fayetteville Road until he should reach the right flank and rear of the enemy, and at daybreak attack them vigorously.

Lyon was to retain 3,700 men and 10 pieces of artillery and move down the Mount Vernon Road and

attack in the morning on the left front and flank simultaneously with Sigel's attack on the right.

A force of 250 Home Guards with two pieces of artillery was left at Springfield to guard the trains and public property. Col. Sigel's column moved out at 6:30 o'clock in the evening by the left and arrived at daybreak of the 10th within two miles of the extreme right and rear of the enemy's camp, where they proceeded to cut off and bring into camp some 40 stragglers who were out foraging. This was done to prevent their carrying intelligence into camp.

Gen. Lyon, with the First, Second and Third Brigades, set out about the same hour, and by 1 o'clock in the morning came within sight of the enemy's camp-fires, where they halted until morning. Capt. Plummer was ordered to deploy his battalion to act as skirmishers on the left, while Maj. Osterhaus did the same on the right with his battalion of the 2d Mo.

CHAPTER X.

IF the idea of an attack by Gen. Lyon was remote from Gen. McCulloch's thoughts, it was entirely absent from those of Gen. Sterling Price. Gen. Price's mind was concentrated upon the plan to which he had wrung McCulloch's reluctant consent of advancing that morning upon Lyon in four columns, and thereby crushing him, probably capturing his army entire or driving him into a ruinous retreat. The first messengers bringing the news of Lyon's close proximity were received with contemptuous disbelief by McCulloch, but on their heels came an Aid from Gen. Rains with the announcement that the fields in front of Rains were "covered with Yankees, infantry and artillery." This roused all to soldierly activity. Neither Price nor McCulloch lacked anything of the full measure of martial courage, and both at once sped to their respective commands to lead them into action.


After breaking up the council of war, the previous afternoon, Gen. Lyon said very little beyond giving from time to time, as circumstances called, sharp, precise, practical orders. Naturally talkative and disputatious, he was, when action was demanded, brief, sententious, and sparing of any words but what the occasion demanded. He had carefully thought out his plan of march and battle to the last detail—determined exactly what he and every subordinate, every regiment and battery should do,

MAP
OF THE
BATTLE-FIELD
OF
WILSON'S CREEK, MO.,
Aug. 10, 1861

Scale:



— Union
— Confederate



and his directions to them were clear, concise, prompt and unmistakable.

He rode with Maj. Schofield, his Chief of Staff, to the place where they halted about midnight in sight of the rebel campfires and slept with him in the brief bivouac under the same blanket. To Schofield he seemed unusually depressed. The only words he said, beyond necessary orders, were—almost as if talking to himself:

“I would give my life for a victory.”

Again, in response to Schofield's discreet criticism of the wisdom of dividing his forces and giving Sigel an independent command, he said briefly:

“It is Sigel's plan.”

Sigel's theoretical knowledge of war and his experience were then felt to be so overshadowing to everybody else's as to estop criticism.

The men of Lyon's little army lay down on their grassy bivouac with feelings of tensest expectation. With the exception of the few of the Regulars who had been in the Mexican and Indian wars, not one of them had ever heard a gun fired in anger. They had been talking battle for three months. Now it was upon them, but none of them could realize how sharp would be the combat, nor how exceedingly well they were going to acquit themselves.

At the first streak of dawn Lyon was up—all activity and anticipation—to open the battle. He had wisely selected the two men who were to strike the first blows.

Capt. Jos. B. Plummer, who commanded the Regulars deployed as skirmishers on the left, and who was to make a splendid record before the now-rising

sun should set, was a man after Lyon's own heart. He was strongly in favor of the battle, and afterward defended it as the wisest thing to do under the circumstances. He was born in Massachusetts, and had graduated in 1841 in the same class with Lyon and Totten, whose battery was to do magnificent service, and avenge the insults and humiliations of Little Rock. Plummer's standing in his class was 22, where Lyon's was 11 and Totten's 25. He had been in garrison in Vera Cruz during the Mexican War, and so had escaped getting the brevets "for gallant and meritorious conduct" which had been so freely bestowed on all who had been "present" at any engagement, but had reached the rank of Captain in 1852, a year later than Capt. Lyon. He was to rise to Colonel of the 11th Mo. and Brigadier-General of Volunteers, and everywhere display vigor and capacity in important commands, but to have his career cut short by his untimely death near Corinth, Miss., Aug. 9, 1862, at the age of 43 years.

Maj. Peter Joseph Osterhaus, who commanded the two companies of his regiment—the 2d Mo.—deployed on the right, was the best soldier in that wonderful immigration of bright, educated, enthusiastic young Germans who took refuge in this country after the failure of the Revolution of 1848. At least, he was tried longer in large commands, and rose to a higher rank than any of them. Sigel and Carl Schurz became, like him, Major-Generals of Volunteers, but his service was regarded as much higher than theirs, and he was esteemed as one of the best division and corps commanders in the Army of the Tennessee. After long service as a division

commander he commanded the Fifteenth Corps on the March to the Sea. He was born in Prussia, educated as a soldier, took part in the Revolution, migrated to this country, and was invaluable to Lyon in organizing the Home Guards among the Germans to save the Arsenal. He still lives, a specially honored veteran, at Mannheim, in Prussia.

Capt. Jas. Totten, whose battery was placed in the center, was to win a Lieutenant-Colonel's brevet for his splendid service during the day, but got few honors during the rest of the war. He became a Brigadier-General of Missouri Militia, and received the complimentary brevets of Colonel and Brigadier-General when they were generally handed round on March 13, 1865, but his unfortunate habits caused his dismissal from the Army in 1870. He was then Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Inspector-General.

There were many men among Lyon's subordinates whose conduct during the day brought them prominence and started them on the way to distinction.

Maj. Samuel D. Sturgis, of the 4th U. S. Cav., a Pennsylvanian, who was that day to win the star of a Brigadier-General of Volunteers, and who commanded the First Brigade, afterward rose to the command of a division, fought with credit at Second Manassas, South Mountain and Fredericksburg, for which he received brevets, and was overwhelmingly defeated, while in command of an independent expedition, by Forrest, at Guntown, Miss., June 10, 1864, and passed into retirement. He became Colonel of the 7th U. S. Cav. after the war. He was a graduate of West Point in 1832.

Lieut.-Col. I. F. Shepard, who was Lyon's Aid, became a Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

Maj. John M. Schofield, Lyon's Adjutant-General, has been spoken of elsewhere.

Capt. Gordon Granger, 3d U. S. Cav., a New Yorker and a graduate of the class of 1841, was Lyon's Assistant Adjutant-General, and won a brevet for his conduct that day. He was a man of far more than ordinary abilities—many pronounced him a great soldier, and said that only his unbridled tongue prevented him rising higher than he did. He became a Major-General and a Corps Commander, led the troops to Thomas's assistance at the critical moment at Chickamauga, but fell under the displeasure of Sherman, who relieved him. He afterward commanded the army which captured Forts Gaines and Morgan, and received the surrender of Mobile.

Capt. Frederick Steele, 2d U. S., Gen. Grant's classmate and lifelong friend, who had won brevets in Mexico, commanded a battalion of two companies. He was to become Colonel of the 8th Iowa, Brigadier and Major-General, and render brilliant service at Vicksburg and in Arkansas.

Maj. John A. Halderman, 1st Kan., who succeeded to the command of the regiment when Col. Deitzler was wounded, was commended by all his superior officers for his handsome conduct. He had been appointed by Gen. Lyon Provost Marshal-General of the Western Army, and was afterwards commissioned a Major-General. He entered the diplomatic service under President Grant; became Minister to Siam, and was praised all over the world for his success in bringing that country into touch with civilization.

Lieut.-Col. G. L. Andrews, who in the absence of Col. F. P. Blair, commanded the 1st Mo., was a Rhode Island man, who afterward entered the Regular Army, fought creditably through the war, and in 1892 was retired as a Colonel.

In the 1st Mo. was Capt. Nelson Cole, who was severely wounded. He served through the war, rose to be a Colonel, became Senior Vice Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Army of the Republic, and was a Brigadier-General of Volunteers in the war with Spain.

In the 1st Kan. were Col. Geo. W. Detzler, who later became a Brigadier-General; Capt. Powell Clayton, who was to become a Colonel, Brigadier-General, Governor of Arkansas, Senator, and Ambassador to Mexico, and Capt. Daniel McCook, who was to become Brigadier-General, and fall at Kennesaw.

In the 2d Kan. were Col. Robert B. Mitchell, of Ohio, who rose to be Brigadier-General and did gallant service in the Army of the Cumberland; Maj. Charles W. Blair, who became a Brigadier-General, and Capt. Samuel J. Crawford, who became a Colonel, a brevet Brigadier-General, and Governor of Kansas.

In the 1st Iowa were Lieut.-Col. W. H. Merritt, a New Yorker, who commanded the regiment and afterwards became a Colonel on the staff, and Capt. Francis J. Herron, who became a Major-General of Volunteers and commanded a division at Prairie Grove, Vicksburg, and in Texas.

There were very many in these regiments serving as privates and non-commissioned officers who after-

wards made fine records as commanders of companies and regiments and became distinguished in civil life. Taken altogether, Lyon's army was an unusually fine body of fighting men. The Iowa and Kansas men were ardent, enthusiastic youths, accustomed to the use of the gun, and who hunted their enemies as they did the wild beasts they had to encounter. They were free from the superstition inculcated in the Eastern armies that the soldier's duty was to stand up in the open and be shot at. When it was necessary to stand up they stood up gallantly, but at other times they took advantage of every protection and lay behind any rock or trunk of tree in wait for the enemy to come within easy range, and then fired with fatal effect.

The older Regulars trained to Indian fighting were equally effective, and speedily brought the mass of recruits associated with them into similar efficiency.

Nowhere else at that early period of the war was the fire of the Union soldiers so deliberate and deadly as at Wilson's Creek.

The Confederates had no pickets out—not even camp-guards. They had been marched and counter-marched severely for days, and were resting preparatory to advancing that morning on Springfield. Many were at breakfast, many others starting out to get material for breakfast in the neighboring fields. Rains's Division was the most advanced, and Rains reports that he discovered the enemy when about three miles from camp, and that he put his Second Brigade—mounted men commanded by Col. Cawthorn, of the 4th Mo.—into line to resist the advance. He says that the brigade maintained its position all

day, which does not agree with the other accounts of the battle.

Before Gen. Lyon—a mile and a half away—rose the eminence, afterward known as “Bloody Hill,” which overlooked the encampment of the Confederates along Wilson’s Creek, and on which substantially all the fighting was to take place. From it the Confederate trains were in short reach, and the rout of the enemy could be secured. Its central position, however, made it easy to concentrate troops for its defense and bring up reinforcements.

Capt. Plummer sent forward Capt. C. C. Gilbert, 1st U. S., with his company to guard the left of the advance, cross Wilson’s Creek, and engage the right of the enemy. Capt. Gilbert was a soldier of fine reputation, who was to win much credit on subsequent fields; to rise to the rank of Brigadier-General and the brief command of a corps, and then to fall under the displeasure of his commanding officers. Capt. Gilbert moved forward rapidly until he came to Wilson’s Creek, where his skirmishers were stopped by swamps and jungles of brushwood, when Capt. Plummer caught up with him, and the whole battalion finally crossed the creek and advanced into a cornfield, easily driving away the first slight force that attempted to arrest them.

In the meanwhile quite a number of the enemy was discovered assembling on the crest of the ridge, and Gen. Lyon forming the 1st Mo. into line sent them forward on the right to engage these, while the 1st Kan. came up on the left and opened a brisk fire, with Totten’s battery in the center, which also opened fire.

This was about 10 minutes past 5, when the battle may be said to have fairly opened. The 1st Iowa and the 2d Kan., with Capt. Steele's battalion of Regulars, were held in reserve. Rains's Missourians responded pluckily to the fire, and Gen. Price began rushing up assistance to them until he says that he had over 2,000 men on the ridge. The 1st Kan. and the 1st Mo. pressed resolutely forward, delivering their fire at short range, and after a sharp contest of 20 minutes the Missourians gave way and fled down the hill.

There was a brief lull, in which the Union men were encouraged by hearing Sigel's artillery open two miles away, on the other flank of the enemy, and Lyon found his line preparatory to pushing forward and striking the trains. Already there were symptoms of panic there, and some of the wagons were actually in flames.

Gen. Rains soon succeeded in rallying his men,

Gens. Slack, McBride, Parsons and Clark rushed to his assistance with what men they could hastily assemble, and Gen. Price led them forward in a line covering Gen. Lyon's entire front. Both sides showed an earnest disposition to come to close quarters, and a fierce fight lasting for perhaps half an hour followed. Sometimes portions of the Union troops were thrown into temporary disorder, but they only fell back a few yards, when they would rally and return to the field. The enemy strove to reach the crest of the ridge and drive the Union troops back, but were repulsed, while the Union troops, following them to the foot of the ridge, were driven back to the crest.

The Confederates brought up a battery, which,

however, was soon silenced by the fire concentrated upon it from Totten's battery and that of Lieut. Du Bois. In the meanwhile Capt. Plummer had been pushing his Regulars thru the corn and oat fields toward the battery which he wanted to take, and was within 200 yards of it when Capt. McIntosh, an officer of the Old Army, and now Adjutant-General for McCulloch, saw the danger and rushed up the 3d La. and the 2d Ark. against Plummer's left. The Regulars made a stubborn resistance for a few minutes, but their line was enveloped by the long line of the two regiments, and they fell back with considerable haste across the creek toward Totten's battery.

McIntosh saw his advantage and pursued it to the utmost, sending his Louisianians and Arkansans forward on the double-quick to prevent Plummer from rallying. The watchful DuBois saw the trouble the Regulars were in, and turning his guns upon his pursuers enfiladed them with canister and shell with such effect that they in turn ran, and were rallied by McIntosh behind a little log house, into which DuBois put a couple of shells and sent them further back.

By this time the battle was two hours old and the roar of the conflict died down, except on the extreme right, where the 1st Mo. was still having a bitter struggle with a superior force of fresh troops with which Price was endeavoring to turn the Union right flank.

Gen. Lyon, who had watched every phase of the battle closely, ordered Capt. Totten to move part of his battery to the support of the 1st Mo., but as the Captain was about to open he was restrained by see-

ing a regiment advancing to within a distance of about 200 yards, carrying both a Federal and a Confederate flag. It was the direction from which Sigel had been anxiously expected, and as the uniform of the advancing regiment was similar to that of Sigel's men, both the infantry and the artillery withheld their fire until the enemy revealed his character by a volley, when Capt. Totten opened all his guns upon them with canister and inflicted great slaughter.

Capt. Cary Gratz, of the 1st Mo., was so indignant at this treachery that he dashed out and shot down the man who was carrying the Union flag, only to be shot down himself almost immediately afterwards by several bullets from the Confederates. The 2d Kan. was also hurried forward to support the 1st Mo. Capt. Steele's battalion was brought up and the 1st Iowa was sent in to relieve the 1st Kan., which had suffered quite severely and was nearly out of ammunition.

The battle was renewed with much greater fierceness than ever, the Confederates advancing in three or four ranks, lying down, kneeling, standing, sometimes getting within 30 or 40 yards of the Union line before they were forced back.

Gen. Lyon was everywhere where his presence was needed to encourage the troops, rally them, and bring them back into line. His horse was shot, and he received a wound in the head and one on the ankle. He continued to walk along the line, but he was evidently much depressed by the way in which Price and McCulloch succeeded in bringing forward fresh troops to replace those which had been driven from the field. He said to Maj. Schofield

sadly, "I fear the day is lost." Schofield replied encouragingly, dismounted one of his orderlies and gave the horse to Lyon, when they separated, each to lead a regiment. It was now 9 o'clock, or little after, and there was a lull in the fight, during which time the enemy seemed to be reorganizing his force, and Lyon began concentrating his into a more compact form on the crest of the ridge.

Capt. Sweeny called Lyon's attention to his wounds, but Lyon answered briefly, "It is nothing."

Schofield moved off to rally a portion of the 1st Iowa, which showed a disposition to break under the terrific fire, and lead it back into action. Gen. Lyon rode for a moment or two with the file closers on the right of the 1st Iowa, and then turned toward the 2d Kan., which was moved forward under the lead of Col. Mitchell. In a few moments the Colonel fell, wounded, and Gen. Lyon shouted to the regiment to come on, that he would lead them. The next instant, almost, a bullet pierced his breast and he fell dead. Lehman, his faithful orderly, was near him when he fell, and rushed to his assistance, raising a terrible outcry, which some of the officers near promptly quieted lest it discourage the troops.

After a bitter struggle of fully half an hour the Confederates were driven back all along the line, and the battle ceased for a little while. The Confederates retired so completely that it looked as if the battle was won, and Maj. Schofield, finding Maj. Sturgis, informed him that he was in command, and the principal officers were hastily gathered together for a consultation. The first and most anxious inquiry of all was as to what had become of Sigel. It was all-important to know that. If a junction could

be formed with him the army could advance and drive the enemy completely from the field.

Sigel had crossed Wilson's Creek and come into line within easy range of McCulloch's headquarters, where Capt. Shaeffer opened with his battery upon a large force of Arkansan, Texan and Missourian troops who were engaged in getting breakfast. They were so demoralized by the awful storm of shells that at least one regiment—Col. Greer's of Texas—did not recover its composure during the day, and took little if any part in the rest of the engagement.

Col. Churchill succeeded in rallying his Arkansas regiment, but before he could return and engage Sigel he received urgent orders to hurry over to the right and help drive back Lyon. Sigel's men moved forward into the deserted camp, but unfortunately broke ranks and began plundering it.

McCulloch had rushed over to his headquarters in time to meet the fugitives, and by great exertions succeeded in rallying about 2,000 men, with whom he attacked Sigel's disorganized men in the camps, and drove them out. Sigel succeeded in rallying a portion of his men, when McCulloch advanced upon them with a regiment the uniforms of which were so like that of the volunteers under Lyon that his men could not be persuaded that it was not a portion of Lyon's troops advancing to their assistance, and they withheld their fire until the Confederates were within 10 paces, when the latter poured in such a destructive volley that men and horses went down before it, and Sigel's Brigade was utterly routed, with a loss of some 250 prisoners and a regimental flag, which was afterwards used to deceive the Union troops.

With the exception of the two troops of Regular cavalry under Capt. E. A. Carr, which seem to have done nothing during this time, Sigel's Brigade disappeared completely from the action, and Sigel and Salomon, with a few men, rode back to Springfield, where it is said that they went to bed. This inexplicable action by Sigel bitterly prejudiced the other officers against him, and was continually coming up in judgment against him.

There is no doubt of Sigel's personal courage, but why, with the sound of Lyon's cannon in his ears, and knowing full well the desperate struggle his superior officer was engaged in, he made no effort to rally his troops or to take any further part in the battle, is beyond comprehension. Col. Salomon, who accompanied him in his flight to Springfield, afterward became Colonel of a Wisconsin regiment, and made a brilliant record.

It was yet but little after 9 o'clock, and despite the stubbornness of the fighting no decisive advantage had been gained on either side.

The Union troops were masters of the savagely contested hill, but all their previous efforts to advance beyond, pierce the main Confederate line, and reach the trains below had been repulsed. Had they better make another attempt?

The hasty council of war decided that it would be unsafe to do so until Col. Sigel was heard from. The army was already badly crippled, for the 1st Kan. and the 1st Mo. had lost one-third of their men and half their officers, the others had suffered nearly as severely, and everybody was running short of ammunition. They had marched all night, and gone into battle without breakfast, had been fighting five

hours, and were suffering terribly from heat, thirst and exhaustion.

The council was suddenly brought to an end by seeing a large force which Price and McCulloch had rallied come over the hill directly in the Union front. A battery which Gen. Price had established on the crest of the hill somewhat to the left opened a fire of canister and shrapnel, but the Union troops showed the firmest front of any time during the day, and Totten's and DuBois's batteries hurled a storm of canister into the advancing infantry. Gen. Price had brought up fresh regiments to replace those which had been fought out, and it seemed as if the Union line would be overwhelmed. But the officers brought up every man they could reach. Capt. Gordon Granger threw three companies of the 1st Mo., three companies of the 1st Kan., and two companies of the 1st Iowa, which had been supporting DuBois's battery, against the right flank of the enemy and by their terrible enfilade fire sent it back in great disorder. On the right Lieut.-Col. Blair, with the 2d Kan., was having an obstinate fight, but with the assistance of a section of Totten's battery under Lieut. Sokalski the enemy was at last driven back clear out of sight.

The battle had now raged bitterly for six hours, with every attempt of the enemy to drive the stubborn defenders from the crest of the hill repulsed. The slope on the eminence was thickly strewn with the dead and wounded. The Confederates had suffered fearfully. Cols. Weightman and Brown, who commanded brigades, had been killed, and Gens. Price, Slack and Clark wounded. The loss of subordinate officers had been very heavy. They had been

clearly fought to a finish, and an attempt of their cavalry to turn the Union right flank had been repulsed with great loss by Totten's battery and several companies of the 1st Mo. and the 1st Kan. The shells produced the greatest consternation among the horses and men, as they were delivered at short range with unerring aim. The entire Confederate line left the field, disappearing thru the thick woods in the valley to their camp on Wilson's Creek, somewhat to the right of the Union center.

Another brief council of war resulted in an order from Maj. Sturgis to fall back. Nothing could be heard from Sigel, the men were exhausted, the ammunition nearly gone, and it seemed best to retire while there was an opportunity left. As subsequently learned this was a great mistake, because the Confederate army was in full retreat, and an advance from the Union army would have sent them off the field for good.

The Union officers did the best they could according to their light, and their retirement was in the best order and absolutely unmolested.

The retreat began about 11:30 and continued two miles to a prairie northeast of the battleground, where a halt was made to enable the Surgeons to collect the wounded in ambulances. Gen. Lyon's body had been placed in an ambulance, but by someone's order was taken out again and left on the prairie with the rest of the dead.

About 5 o'clock in the afternoon the army reached Springfield, and there found Sigel and Salomon and most of their brigade, with the others coming in from all directions.

In spite of his conduct on the battlefield, Sigel's great theoretical knowledge and experience in European wars decided that the command should be turned over to him, and he was formally placed at the head.

According to official reports the casualties in the Union army were as follows:

COMMAND	Officers			Enlisted Men			Aggregate
	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Killed	Wounded	Missing	
Staff	1	1
1st Mo. Vols., Col. Andrews...	1	12	2	76	210	8	309
1st Kan. Vols., Col. Deitzler...	4	8	..	73	187	20	292
1st Iowa Vols., Col. Merritt....	1	5	..	11	133	4	154
2d Kan. Vols., Col. Mitchell...	..	1	..	4	59	6	70
Sigel's Brigade, 3d and 5th Mo. Vols.	3	2	15	31	231	282
2d Mo. Vols., Osterhaus's battalion	2	24	..	26
Plummer's battalion, Regular Inf.	1	..	19	51	9	80
Steele's battalion, Regular Inf.	1	..	15	43	2	61
Totten's battery.....	4	7	..	11
Du Bois's battery.....	2	2	1	5
1st U. S. Cav., Co. D.....	1	3	4
Carr's Squadron, Regular Cav.	4	4
Maj. Clark Wright's Home Guards	2	..	2
Kansas Rangers.....	1	..	1
Total	7	31	4	221	751	288	1,302

The official reports give the casualties in the Confederate army as follows:

COMMAND	Officers			Enlisted Men			Aggregate
	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Killed	Wounded	Missing	
Army of Missouri, under Gen. Price:							
Gen. Price's Staff.....	..	1	1
Gen. Slack's Division.....	5	1	..	35	84	30	155
Gen. John B. Clark's Division.	3	2	..	23	75	..	103
Gen. McBride's Division.....	..	5	..	22	119	..	146
Gen. Parsons's Division.....	1	1	..	15	47	..	64
Gen. Rains's Division.....	3	2	..	59	195	11	270
Confederate Army, under Gen. McCulloch:							
1st Reg't Ark. M't'd Rifles....	3	11	..	39	144	..	197
2d Reg't Ark. M't'd Rifles....	..	3	..	10	51	..	64
McRae's battalion, Ark. Vols..	2	7	..	9
3d La. Vols.....	1	3	..	8	45	3	60
Reid's Battery.....	1	..	1
1st Ark. Cav.....	1	1	..	5	22	19	48
3d Ark. Vols.....	2	23	81	1	110
5th Ark. Inf.....	3	11	..	14
4th Ark. Inf.....
Total	19	30	..	244	885	64	1,242

CHAPTER XI.

AN analytical study of the losses in the preceding chapter will aid in a more thoro appreciation of the most bitter battle fought on the American Continent up to that time, and by far the severest which had ever been waged west of the Allegheny Mountains. It will be perceived that the loss in the Union army was almost wholly in Gen. Lyon's column of 4,000 men, or less, which suffered to the extent of almost one-third of its number. In the 1,300 men in Gen. Sigel's command the loss was insignificant, except in prisoners.

Both sides fought with a stubbornness absolutely unknown in European wars, but the regiments of the Union army seemed to be inspired with that higher invincibility of purpose which characterized their great leader.

Judged by the simple equation of losses, the Union regiments displayed a far greater tenacity of purpose than the Confederates. We have no exact figures as to the number in each Union regiment, as there were constant changes taking place; a great many men had served their time out and more were claiming and receiving their discharges.

Aug. 4, 1861, six days before the battle, Gen. Lyon gave from "recollection" the following estimate of the strength of his command, which must have been considerably reduced in the seven days between that and the battle, and from which must be deducted

some 250 men left to guard the trains and property in Springfield:

FIRST BRIGADE—MAJ. STURGIS.

Four companies cavalry.....	250
Four companies 1st U. S. Inf. (Plummer's).....	350
Two companies 2d Mo. Vols.....	200
One company artillery (Capt. Totten's Battery)....	84
	— 884

SECOND BRIGADE—COL. FRANZ SIGEL.

3d Mo. Vols.....	700
5th Mo. Vols.....	600
2d Art. (battery).....	120
	— 1,420

THIRD BRIGADE—LIEUT.-COL. ANDREWS.

1st Mo. Vols.....	900
Four companies infantry (Regulars).....	300
One battery artillery.....	64
	— 1,264

FOURTH BRIGADE—COL. DEITZLER.

Two Kansas regiments.....	1,400
1st Iowa (Col. Bates).....	900
	— 2,300

Grand Total.....5,868

It is altogether unlikely that the 1st Mo., for example, took into battle within 100 or more of the 900 men assigned to it, and the same thing is true of the 900 men given for the 1st Iowa, and the 700 each for the two Kansas regiments.

If we assume that the 1st Mo. and the 1st Iowa had 800 men each and the Kansas regiments 600 each, we find that the loss of 295 for the 1st Mo., 284 for the 1st Kan., and 154 for the 1st Iowa to be appalling. The Regulars suffered severely, but not so badly as the volunteers.

Among those who were noted for gallant conduct in the battle of Wilson's Creek was Eugene F. Ware, then a private in the 1st Iowa, and who afterward became a Captain in the 7th Iowa Cav. In civil life

he attained a leading place at the Kansas bar, and was appointed Commissioner of Pensions by President Roosevelt.

None of the Confederate regiments engaged suffered to anything like the same extent, and as they were driven from the field, while the Union regiments maintained their position and were even ready for further aggression, the palm of higher purposes and more desperate fighting must be unhesitatingly conceded to the Union volunteers. Few of the Confederate commanders give reports of the number they carried into action, but many of their regiments must have been approximately as strong as those of the Union, and they had many more of them.

The moral effect of the battle was prodigious on both sides. The Union troops were conscious of having met overwhelming forces and fought them to a stand-still, if not actual defeat. Every man felt himself a victor as he left the field, and only retreated because the exigencies of the situation rendered that the most politic move.

It was consequently a great encouragement to the Union sentiment everywhere, and did much to retrieve the humiliation of Bull Run. The Confederates naturally made the very most of the fact that they had been left masters of the field, and they dilated extensively upon the killing of Gen. Lyon and the crushing defeat they had administered upon Sigel, with capture of prisoners, guns and flags. They used this to so good purpose as to greatly stimulate the Secession spirit thruout the State.

Gen. McCulloch's dispatches to the Confederate War Department are, to say the least, disingenuous. His first dispatch that evening stated that the enemy

was 12,000 strong, but had "fled" after eight hours' hard fighting. His second official report, dated two days after the battle, gave his "effective" forces at 5,300 infantry, 15 pieces of artillery and 6,000 horsemen, armed with flintlock muskets, rifles and shot-guns. He says: "There were other horsemen with the army, but they were entirely unarmed, and instead of being a help they were continually in the way." He repeatedly pronounces the collisions at the different periods of the battle as "terrific," and says: "The incessant roar of musketry was deafening, and the balls fell as thick as hailstones." His next sentences are at surprising variance with the concurrent testimony on the Union side; for he says: "Nothing could withstand the impetuosity of our final charge. The enemy fell back and could not again be rallied, and they were seen at 12 m. fast retreating among the hills in the distance. This ended the battle. It lasted six hours and a half."

By this time Gen. McCulloch had reduced the Union force to between 9,000 and 10,000, and he claims the Union loss to have been 800 killed, 1,000 wounded and 300 prisoners. He gave his own loss at 265 killed, 800 wounded and 30 missing. His colleague, Gen. Price, he curtly dismisses with this brief laudation: "To Gen. Price I am under many obligations for assistance on the battlefield. He was at the head of his force, leading them on and sustaining them by his gallant bearing."

Gen. Price's report is more accurate and soldier-like, but he says that after several "severe and bloody conflicts" had ensued, and the battle had been conducted with the "greatest gallantry and vigor on both sides for more than five hours, the enemy re-

treated in great confusion, leaving their Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Lyon, dead upon the battlefield, over 500 killed and a great number wounded." He claims that his forces numbered 5,221 officers and men, of whom 156 were killed and 517 wounded. This would make the loss of his whole division of 5,000 men 673, or about the same lost by the 1st Mo. and the 1st Kan., with these two regiments still maintaining their position, while the enemy retired.

It seems difficult to understand why, if the enemy "retreated in great confusion," as reported by McCulloch and Price, the several thousand horsemen who did little or nothing during the battle were not let loose to complete the ruin of the Union forces. No matter how poorly armed or disciplined these might have been, their appearance on the flank of the retiring column would have been fatal to any orderly retreat such as was conducted. The universal testimony of the Union officers and soldiers is that there was no enemy in sight when they started to leave the field, and that they suffered no molestation whatever, though they halted two miles from the field and in plain sight for some time.

It also passes comprehension that this horde of irregular horsemen were not employed during the long hours of the battle in making some diversion in the rear of the Union army.

Both Price and McCulloch seem to have had their attention so fully engrossed in bringing up new regiments to keep Lyon from breaking thru their lines and reaching their trains that they had no opportunity to give orders or organize manuevers by the horsemen, and nobody seems to have suggested to the mounted men that they could employ their time

better than by standing back and watching the progress of the terrible conflict between the two opposing lines of infantry.

It appears that the Union officers in the council called by Gen. Sturgis were not at all unanimous for retreat. Capt. Sweeny, altho severely wounded, vehemently insisted upon pursuing the enemy, and Capt. Gordon Granger, also severely wounded, rode up to Sturgis, pointed out that there was not a man in sight and that the fire could be seen from where the retreating foe was burning his wagons, and he urged the pursuit so vigorously that Sturgis had to repeat his order for him to leave the field.

Col. Sigel, in his report made at Rolla eight days after the battle, made a long and labored explanation of his operations during the day. He thus explained his failure to do more:

In order to understand clearly our actions and our fate, you will allow me to state the following facts:

1st. According to orders, it was the duty of this brigade to attack the enemy in the rear and to cut off his retreat, which order I tried to execute, whatever the consequences might be.

2d. The time of service of the 5th Regiment Mo. Volunteers had expired before the battle. I had induced them, company by company, not to leave us in the most critical and dangerous moment, and had engaged them for the time of eight days, this term ending on Friday, the 9th, the day before the battle.

3d. The 3d Regiment, of which 400 three-months men had been dismissed, was composed for the greatest part of recruits, who had not seen the enemy before and were only insufficiently drilled.

4th. The men serving the pieces and the drivers consisted of infantry taken from the 3d Regiment and were mostly recruits, who had had only a few days' instruction.

5th. About two-thirds of our officers had left us. Some companies had no officers at all; a great pity, but a consequence of the system of the three months' service.

Later, when Gen. Sigel was seeking promotion, Maj. Schofield, then a Brigadier-General, sent the following communication to Gen. Halleck:

St. Louis, Mo., Feb. 13, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. Halleck, Commanding Department of the Missouri.

General: The question of the merits of Brig.-Gen. Franz Sigel as a commander having assumed such shape as to deeply involve the interests of the service, I deem it my duty to make a statement of facts which came to my knowledge during the campaign of last Summer in the Southwest, ending in the death of Gen. Lyon and the retreat of his army from Springfield.

Soon after the capture of Camp Jackson, in May, Gen. Lyon sent Col. Sigel, with his two regiments of infantry and two batteries of artillery, to the southwestern part of the State, by way of Rolla, to cut off the retreat of Price's force which he (Lyon) was about to drive from Boonville. Col. Sigel passed beyond Springfield, reaching a point not far from the Kansas line, and on the main road used by Price's men in their movement south to join him. Here he left a single company of infantry in a small town, with no apparent object, unless that it might fall in the hands of the enemy, which it did the next day (5th of July). Sigel met Price the next day, and fought the celebrated "battle of Carthage." Sigel had about two regiments of infantry, well armed and equipped, most of the men old German soldiers, and two good batteries of artillery. Price had about twice Sigel's number of men, but most of them mounted, armed with shotguns and common rifles, and entirely without organization and discipline, and a few pieces of almost worthless artillery. Sigel retreated all day before this miserable rabble, contenting himself with repelling their irregular attacks, which he did with perfect ease whenever they ventured to make them. The loss on either side was quite insignificant. Price and McCulloch were thus permitted to join each other absolutely without opposition; Sigel, who had been sent there to prevent their junction, making a "masterly retreat."

Several days before the battle of Wilson's Creek it was ascertained beyond a doubt that the enemy's strength was about 22,000 men, with at least 20 pieces of artillery, while our force was only about 5,000. About the 7th of August the main body of the enemy reached Wilson's Creek, and Gen. Lyon decided to attack him. The plan of attack was freely discussed between Gen. Lyon, the members of his staff, Col. Sigel, and several officers of the Regular Army. Col. Sigel, apparently anxious for a separate command, advocated the plan of a divided attack. All others, I believe, opposed it.

On the 8th of August the plan of a single attack was adopted, to be carried out on the 9th. This had to be postponed on account of the exhaustion of part of our troops. During the morning of the 9th Col. Sigel had a long interview with Gen. Lyon, and prevailed upon him to adopt his plan, which led to the mixture of glory, disgrace and disaster of the ever-memorable 10th of August. Sigel, in attempting to perform the part assigned to himself, lost his artillery, lost his infantry, and fled alone, or nearly so, to Springfield, arriving there long before the battle was ended. Yet he had almost nobody killed or wounded. One piece of his artillery and 500 or 600 infantry were picked up and brought in by a company of Regular cavalry. No effort was made by Sigel or

any of his officers to rally their men and join Lyon's Division, altho the battle raged furiously for hours after Sigel's rout, and most of his men in their retreat passed in rear of Lyon's line of battle.

On our return to Springfield, at about 5 o'clock p. m., Maj. Sturgis yielded the command to Col. Sigel, and the latter, after consultation with many of the officers of the army, decided to retreat toward Rolla; starting at 2 o'clock a. m. in order that the column might be in favorable position for defense before daylight. At the hour appointed for the troops to move I found Col. Sigel asleep in bed, and his own brigade, which was to be the advance guard, making preparations to cook their breakfast. It was 4 o'clock before I could get them started. Sigel remained in command three days, kept his two regiments in front all the time, made little more than ordinary day's marches, but yet did not get in camp until 10, and on one occasion 12 o'clock at night. On the second day he kept the main column waiting, exposed to the sun on a dry prairie, while his own men killed beef and cooked their breakfast. They finished their breakfast at about noon, and then began their day's march.

The fatigue and annoyance to the troops soon became so intolerable that discipline was impossible. The officers, therefore, almost unanimously demanded a change. Maj. Sturgis, in compliance with the demand, assumed the command.

My position as Gen. Lyon's principal staff officer gave me very favorable opportunities for judging of Gen. Sigel's merits as an officer, and hence I appreciate his good as well as his bad qualities more accurately than most of those who presume to judge him. Gen. Sigel, in point of theoretical education, is far above the average of commanders in this country. He has studied with great care the science of strategy, and seems thoroly conversant with the campaigns of all the great captains, so far as covers their main strategic features, and also seems familiar with the duties of the staff; but in tactics, great and small logistics, and discipline he is greatly deficient. These defects are so apparent as to make it absolutely impossible for him to gain the confidence of American officers and men, and entirely unfit him for a high command in our army. While I do not condemn Gen. Sigel in the unmeasured terms so common among many, but on the contrary see in him many fine qualities, I would do less than my duty did I not enter my protest against the appointment to a high command in the army of a man who, whatever may be his merits, I know cannot have the confidence of the troops he is to command.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 J. M. SCHOFIELD,
 Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.

This was accompanied by a statement embodying the same facts and signed by substantially all the higher officers who had been with Lyon.

At the first halt of the army, about two miles from the battlefield, while the dead and wounded were

being gathered up, it was discovered that Gen. Lyon's body had been left behind. The Surgeon and another officer volunteered to take an ambulance and return to the battlefield for it. They were received graciously by Gen. McCulloch; the body was delivered to them and they reached Springfield with it shortly after dark. The Surgeon made an attempt to embalm it by injecting arsenic into the veins, but decomposition, owing to exposure to the hot sun, had progressed too far to render it practicable, and they were compelled to leave it when the army moved off.

Mrs. Phelps, wife of the member of Congress from that District, and a true Union woman, obtained it and had it placed in a wooden coffin, which was hermetically sealed in another one of zinc. Fearing that it might be molested by the Confederate troops when they entered the city, Mrs. Phelps had the coffin placed in an out-door cellar and covered with straw. Later she took an opportunity of having it secretly buried at night.

Thinking that the remains had been brought on, Mr. Danford Knowlton, of New York, a cousin, and Mr. John B. Hasler, of Webster, Mass., a brother-in-law of Gen. Lyon, came on at the instance of the Connecticut relatives to obtain the remains. Not finding them at St. Louis, they went forward to Rolla, where Col. Wyman furnished them with an ambulance, with which they proceeded to Springfield under a flag of truce. They were kindly received by Gen. Price, and also by Gen. Parsons, whose brigade was encamped on the ground where the body was buried, and exhuming it, brought it to St. Louis. The city went into mourning, and the remains were conducted by a military and civic procession to the

depot, where they were delivered to the Adams Express Company to be conveyed East under an escort of officers and enlisted men. At every station on the road crowds gathered to pay their tribute of respect to the deceased hero, and distinguished honors were paid at Cincinnati, Pittsburg, New York, and Hartford. The body was taken to Eastford, Conn., where the General was born, and in the presence of a large assemblage was interred in a grave beside his parents, in accordance with the desire the General expressed while in life.

Upon opening Lyons' will it was found that he had bequeathed all his savings, prudent investments and property, amounting to about \$50,000, to the Government to aid it in the prosecution of the war for its existence.

Aug. 25, Gen. Fremont issued congratulatory orders, in which he said:

The General Commanding laments, in sympathy with the country, the loss of the indomitable Gen. Nathaniel Lyon. His fame cannot be better eulogized than in these words in the official report of his gallant successor, Maj. Sturgis, U. S. Cavalry: "Thus gallantly fell as true a soldier as ever drew a sword; a man whose honesty of purpose was proverbial; a noble patriot, and one who held his life as nothing where his country demanded it of him. Let us emulate his prowess and undying devotion to his duty!"

The order also permitted the regiments and other organizations engaged to put "Springfield" on their colors, and directed that the order should be read at the head of every company in the Department of Missouri.

Dec. 30, 1861, Congress passed a joint resolution, in which it said:

That Congress deems it just and proper to enter upon its records a recognition of the eminent and patriotic services of the late Brig.-Gen. Nathaniel Lyon. The country to whose

service he devoted his life will guard and preserve his fame as a part of its own glory.

2. That the thanks of Congress are hereby given to the brave officers and soldiers who, under the command of the late Gen. Lyon, sustained the honor of the flag, and achieved victory against overwhelming numbers at the battle of Springfield, in Missouri, and that, in order to commemorate an event so honorable to the country and to themselves, it is ordered that each regiment engaged shall be authorized to bear upon its colors the word "Springfield," embroidered in letters of gold. And the President of the United States is hereby requested to cause these resolutions to be read at the head of every regiment in the Army of the United States.

CHAPTER XII.

THE Union commanders were naturally very apprehensive that as soon as Price and McCulloch realized that the field had been abandoned they would precipitate upon them their immense horde of vengeful horsemen. Such was not the case. Nothing tells so eloquently of the severity of the blow which Lyon had dealt his enemies than that it was two whole days before Price and McCulloch were in a frame of mind to move forward 10 miles and occupy Springfield, the goal of their campaign. This delay was golden to the Union commanders, hampered as they were by hosts of Union refugees fleeing from the rebel wrath, and incumbering the column with all manner of vehicles and great droves of stock. Considering the activity of the Missourians in guerrilla warfare, and the vicious way they usually harried the Union forces, it is incomprehensible, except on the theory that the Confederate forces had been stunned into torpor by the blow. The Union column was able to make its long retreat of 125 miles from Springfield to Rolla and traverse an exceedingly rough country cut up every few miles by ravines, gorges and creeks, without the slightest molestation from the six or eight thousand horsemen whom McCulloch had complained were so much in the way during the battle on the banks of Wilson's Creek.

Gen. McCulloch made a number of lengthy and labored explanations to the Confederate War De-

partment of his failure to make any pursuit, but in the light of facts that then should have been attainable none of these was at all satisfactory. He admits that he did not enter Springfield until after his scouts had brought him satisfactory assurances that the Union army had abandoned the town. Aug. 12 he advanced to Springfield, and issued proclamations to the people announcing himself as their deliverer, and that his army "by great gallantry and determined courage" had entirely "routed the enemy with great slaughter."

If he expected to be received and feted as a liberator he was sorely disappointed, and in one of his letters he says in connection with his customary uncomplimentary allusions to Gen. Price's army, "and from all I can see we had as well be in Boston as far as the friendly feelings of the inhabitants are concerned."

The truth was that the advance of the Confederates had had a blighting effect upon that large portion of the people which had hoped to remain neutral in the struggle.

Gen. Lyon, with all his intensity of purpose, had kept uppermost in mind that he was an agent of the law, and his mission was to enforce the law. He had kept his troops under excellent discipline, had permitted no outrages upon citizens, and had either paid for or given vouchers for anything his men needed, and had generally conducted himself in strict obedience of the law. His course was a crushing refutation of the inflammatory proclamations of Gov. Jackson and others about the Union soldiers being robbers, thieves, ravishers and outragers. Quite different was the course of the twenty or more

thousand men whom Price and McCulloch led into Springfield. They were under very little discipline of any kind, and were burning with a desire to punish and drive out of the country not merely those who were outspoken Unionists, but all who were not radical Secessionists. They knew that the sentiment in Springfield and the country of which it was the center was in favor of the Union, and they wanted to stamp this out by terror.

While this brought to their ranks a great many of the more pliant neutrals, it drove away from them a great number, and put into the ranks of the Union many who had been more or less inclined to the pro-slavery element.

The soreness between Price and McCulloch which had been filmed over before the battle by Price subordinating himself and his troops to McCulloch, became more inflamed during the stay at Springfield. In spite of the fact that the Missouri troops had done much better fighting, and suffered severer losses in the battle than McCulloch, he persisted in denouncing them as cowards, stragglers and mobites, without soldierly qualities.

The following extracts from a report to J. P. Benjamin, Confederate Secretary of War, will show the temper which pervaded all his correspondence, and was probably still more manifest in his personal relations with the Missourians:


It was at this point that I first saw the total inefficiency of the Missouri mounted men under Brig.-Gen. Rains. A thousand, more or less, of them composed the advance guard, and whilst reconnoitering the enemy's position, some eight miles distant from our camp, were put to flight by a single cannon-shot, running in the greatest confusion, without the loss of a single man except one who died of overheat or sunstroke, and bringing no reliable information as to the position or force of the enemy; nor were they of the slightest service as

scouts or spies afterwards. As evidence of this I will mention here the fact of the enemy being allowed to leave his position, six miles distant from us, 20 hours before we knew it, thus causing us to make a night march to surprise the enemy, who was at that time entirely out of our reach. A day or two previous to this march the Generals of the Missouri forces, by common consent on their part and unasked on mine, tendered me the command of their troops, which I at first declined, saying to them it was done to throw the responsibility of ordering a retreat upon me if one had to be ordered for the want of supplies, their breadstuffs giving out about this time; and, in truth, we would have been in a starving condition had it not been for the young corn, which was just in condition to be used. * * *

The battle over, it was ascertained that the camp followers, whose presence I had so strongly objected to, had robbed our dead and wounded on the battlefield of their arms, and at the same time had taken those left by the enemy. I tried to recover the arms thus lost by my men, and also a portion of those taken from the enemy, but in vain. Gen. Pearce made an effort to get back those muskets loaned to Gen. Price before we entered Missouri the first time. I was informed he recovered only 10 out of 615. I then asked that the battery be given me, which was one taken by the Louisiana regiment at the point of the bayonet. The guns were turned over by the order of Gen. Price, minus the horses and most of the harness. I would not have demanded these guns had Gen. Price done the Louisiana regiment justice in his official report. The language used by him was calculated to make the impression that the battery was captured by his men instead of that regiment. * * *

McCulloch was a voluminous writer, both to the Confederate War Department and to personal and official friends, and few of these communications are without some complaint about the Missouri troops. Everything that he had failed to do was due to their inefficiency, their lack of soldierly perceptions, and conduct. They would give him no information, would not scout nor reconnoiter, and he was continually left in the dark as to the movements of the enemy. When they were attacked he claimed that they would run away in a shameful manner. His dislike of Gen. Rains seemed to grow more bitter continually.

Gen. Price saw a great opportunity and was anxious to improve it. The retreat of the Union



GEN. SAMUEL R. CURTIS

forces from Springfield opened up the whole western part of the State, and a prompt movement would carry the army forward to the Missouri River again, where it could control the navigation of that great stream, receive thousands of recruits now being assembled at places north of the river, separate the Unionists of Missouri from the loyal people in Kansas and Nebraska, and hearten up the Secessionists everywhere as much as it disheartened the Union people, and possibly recover St. Louis.

He pressed this with all earnestness upon Gen. McCulloch, only to have it received with cold indifference or strong objections. He proposed that if McCulloch would undertake the movement, that he, Price, would continue in subordination to him and give him all the assistance that his troops could give.

There is no doubt that Price was entirely right in his views, and that a prompt forward movement with such forces as he and McCulloch commanded would have been a very serious matter for the Union cause and carry discouragement everywhere to add to that which had been caused by the disaster of Bull Run.

The relations between the two Generals constantly became more strained, and for the latter part of the two weeks which McCulloch remained at Springfield there was little communication between them. Gen. Price made good use of the time to bring in recruits from every part of the State which was accessible and to organize and discipline them for further service.

At the end of a fortnight Gen. McCulloch suffered Gen. Pearce to return to Arkansas with his Arkansas Division, while Gen. McCulloch retired with his

brigade of Louisianians and Texans, and Price was left free to do as he pleased.

The death of Gen. Lyon at last aroused Gen. Fremont to a fever of energy to do the things that he should have done weeks before. He began a bombardment of Washington with telegrams asking for men, money and supplies, and sent dispatches of the most urgent nature to everybody from whom he could expect the least help. He called on the Governors of the loyal Western States to hurry to him all the troops that they could raise, and asked from Washington Regular troops, artillery, \$3,000,000 for the Quartermaster's Department, and other requirements in proportion. He made a requisition on the St. Louis banks for money, and showed a great deal of fertility of resource.

Aug. 15, five days after the battle, President Lincoln, stirred up by his fusillade of telegrams, dispatched him the following:

Washington, Aug. 15, 1861.

To Gen. Fremont:

Been answering your messages ever since day before yesterday. Do you receive the answers? The War Department has notified all the Governors you designate to forward all available force. So telegraphed you. Have you received these messages? Answer immediately.

A. LINCOLN.

With relation to his conduct toward Gen. Lyon, Gen. Fremont afterward testified to this effect before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

A glance at the map will make it apparent that Cairo was the point which first demanded immediate attention. The force under Gen. Lyon could retreat, but the position at Cairo could not be abandoned; the question of holding Cairo was one which involved the safety of the whole Northwest. Had the taking of St. Louis followed the defeat of Manassas, the disaster might have been irretrievable; while the loss of Springfield, should our army be compelled to fall back upon Rolla, would only carry with it the loss of a part of Missouri—a loss greatly to be regretted, but not irretrievable.

Having reinforced Cape Girardeau and Ironton, by the ut-

most exertions, I succeeded in getting together and embarking with a force of 3,800 men, five days after my arrival in St. Louis.

From St. Louis to Cairo was an easy day's journey by water, and transportation abundant. To Springfield was a week's march; and before I could have reached it, Cairo would have been taken and with it, I believe, St. Louis.

On my arrival at Cairo I found the force under Gen. Prentiss reduced to 1,200 men, consisting mainly of a regiment which had agreed to await my arrival. A few miles below, at New Madrid, Gen. Pillow had landed a force estimated at 20,000, which subsequent events showed was not exaggerated. Our force, greatly increased to the enemy by rumor, drove him to a hasty retreat and permanently secured the position.

I returned to St. Louis on the 4th, having in the meantime ordered Col. Stephenson's regiment from Boonville, and Col. Montgomery's from Kansas, to march to the relief of Gen. Lyon.

Immediately upon my arrival from Cairo, I set myself at work, amid incessant demands upon my time from every quarter, principally to provide reinforcements for Gen. Lyon.

I do not accept Springfield as a disaster belonging to my administration. Causes wholly out of my jurisdiction had already prepared the defeat of Gen. Lyon before my arrival at St. Louis.

The ebullition of the Secession sentiment in Missouri following the news of the battle of Wilson's Creek made Gen. Fremont feel that the most extraordinary measures were necessary in order to hold the State. He had reasons for this alarm, for the greatest activity was manifested in every County in enrolling young men in Secession companies and regiments. Heavy columns were threatening invasion from various points. One of these was led by Gen. Hardee, a Regular officer of much ability, who had acquired considerable fame by his translation of the tactics in use in the Army. He had been appointed to the command of North Arkansas, and had collected considerable force at Pocahontas, at the head of navigation on the White River, where he was within easy striking distance of the State and Lyon's line of retreat, and was threatening numberless direful things.

McCulloch and Price had sent special messengers

to him to urge him to join his force with theirs to crush Lyon, or at least to move forward and cut off Lyon's communications with Rolla. They found Hardee within 400 yards of the Missouri State line. He had every disposition to do as desired, but had too much of the Regular officer in him to be willing to move until his forces were thoroly organized and equipped. There was little in him of the spirit of Lyon or Price, who improvised means for doing what they wanted to do, no matter whether regulations permitted it or not.

Hardee complained that though he had then 2,300 men and expected to shortly raise this force to 5,000, one of his batteries had no horses and no harness, and none of his regiments had transportation enough for field service, and that all regiments were badly equipped and needed discipline and instruction.

Later, Hardee repaired many of these deficiencies, and was in shape to do a great deal of damage to the Union cause, and of this Fremont and his subordinates were well aware. Gens. Polk and Pillow, with quite strong forces at Columbus, were threatening Cairo and southeast Missouri, and an advance was made into the State by their picturesque subordinate, Gen. M. Jeff Thompson, the poet laureate of the New Madrid marshes and the "Swamp Fox," who was to emulate the exploits of Francis Marion. Thompson moved forward with a considerable force of irregular mounted men, the number of which was greatly exaggerated, and it was reported that behind him was a column commanded by Pillow, ranging all the way from 8,000 to 25,000.

Gen. Fremont set an immense force of laborers to

work on an elaborate system of fortification for the city of St. Louis, and also began the construction of fortifications at Cape Girardeau, Ironton, Rolla and Jefferson City. He employed laborers instead of using his troops, in order to give the latter opportunity to be drilled and equipped. He issued the following startling General Order, which produced the greatest commotion in the State and outside of it:

Headquarters of the Western Department,
St. Louis, Aug. 31, 1861.

Circumstances in my judgment of sufficient urgency render it necessary that the Commanding General of this Department should assume the administrative power of the State. Its disorganized condition, the devastation of property by bands of murderers and marauders who infest nearly every County in the State, and avail themselves of the public misfortunes and the vicinity of a hostile force to gratify private and neighborhood vengeance, and who find an enemy wherever they find plunder, finally demand the severest measures to repress the daily increasing crimes and outrages which are driving off the inhabitants and ruining the State. In this condition the public safety and the success of our arms require unity of purpose, without let or hindrance to the prompt administration of affairs.

In order, therefore, to suppress disorders, to maintain, as far as now practicable, the public peace, and to give security and protection to the persons and property of loyal citizens, I do hereby extend and declare established martial law throughout the State of Missouri. The lines of the army of occupation in this State are, for the present, declared to extend from Leavenworth, by way of the posts of Jefferson City, Rolla and Ironton to Cape Girardeau, on the Mississippi River. All persons who shall be taken with arms in their hands within these lines shall be tried by court-martial, and, if found guilty, will be shot. The property, real and personal, of all persons in the State of Missouri who shall take up arms against the United States, or shall be directly proven to have taken active part with their enemies in the field, is declared to be confiscated to the public use; and their slaves, if any they have, are hereby declared free men.

All persons who shall be proven to have destroyed, after the publication of this order, railroad tracks, bridges or telegraphs, shall suffer the extreme penalty of the law.

All persons engaged in treasonable correspondence, in giving or procuring aid to the enemies of the United States, in disturbing the public tranquility by creating and circulating false reports or incendiary documents, are in their own interest warned that they are exposing themselves.

All persons who have been led away from their allegiance are required to return to their homes forthwith; any such absence, without sufficient cause, will be held to be presumptive evidence against them.

The object of this declaration is to place in the hands of the military authorities the power to give instantaneous effect to existing laws, and to supply such deficiencies as the conditions of war demand. But it is not intended to suspend the ordinary tribunals of the country, where the law will be administered by the civil officers in the usual manner and with their customary authority, while the same can be peaceably exercised.

The Commanding General will labor vigilantly for the public welfare, and, in his efforts for their safety, hopes to obtain not only the acquiescence, but the active support, of the people of the country.

J. C. FREMONT,

Major-General Commanding.

Another man who appeared on the scene as Colonel of the 2d Iowa was Samuel R. Curtis, an Ohio man, who graduated from West Point in 1831, in the same class with Gens. Ammen, Humphreys and W. H. Emory. He resigned the next year and became a prominent civil engineer in Ohio. He served in the Mexican War as Colonel of the 2d Ohio, and at the close of that struggle returned to his profession of engineering, removed to Iowa, and at the outbreak of the war was a member of Congress from that State. He was a man of decided military ability, and the victory won at Pea Ridge was his personal triumph. He was to rise to the rank of Major-General and command an independent army, but become involved in the factional fights in Missouri and have his further career curtailed.

Still another name which appears with increased frequency about this time is that of U. S. Grant, an Ohio man, who had graduated from West Point in 1843, and had shown much real enterprise and soldiership in Mexico, but had fallen under the disfavor of his commanding officers; had been compelled to resign while holding the rank of Captain in the 4th U. S., and for eight years had had a losing struggle in trying to make a living in civil pursuits. A happy accident put him at the head of the 21st Ill., with

which he had entered Missouri to guard the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad, and incidentally to dispose of one Thomas A. Harris, a very energetic and able man who held a Brigadier-Generalship from Gov. Jackson, and who was making himself particularly active in the neighborhood of that railroad. Grant showed much energy in chasing around for Harris, but had never succeeded in bringing him into battle, though when he left for other scenes Harris was hiding among the knobs of Salt River, with his command reduced to three enlisted men and his staff.

Though he was out of favor with Gen. McClellan and many others who were directing military operations, in some way a Brigadier-General's commission came to U. S. Grant, and he was assigned to the District of Southeastern Missouri, with headquarters at Cape Girardeau, where his duty was to hold in check the poetical M. Jeff Thompson, the noisy Gideon J. Pillow and the prelatie Leonidas J. Polk in their efforts to get control of the southeastern corner of the State and menace Cairo and St. Louis.

Maj. Sturgis was promptly made a Brigadier-General to date from Wilson's Creek, and assigned to the command of Northeast Missouri, where he had five or six thousand men under him.

Capt. Fred Steele had accepted a commission as Colonel of the 8th Iowa; Capt. Jos. B. Plummer shortly took the Colonelcy of a new regiment, the 11th Mo.; Capt. Totten became Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel of the 1st Mo. Art., of which Schofield was Major.

Notwithstanding the feeling of the officers and soldiers who had participated in the battle of Wil-

son's Creek against Sigel, it was found so necessary to "recognize the Germans" and hold them strongly for the Union cause that he was made a Brigadier-General to date from May 17, 1861, which put him in the same class of Volunteer Brigadier-Generals as Hunter, Heintzelman, Fitz John Porter, Wm. B. Franklin, Wm. T. Sherman, C. P. Stone, Don Carlos Buell, John Pope, Philip Kearny, Joseph Hooker, U. S. Grant, John A. McClernand and A. S. Williams, all of whose volunteer commissions bore the date of May 17. This was subsequently a cause of trouble.

There appeared also another of those figures so common among the State builders of this country, and upholding to the fullest the character of a leader of pioneers. James H. Lane was an Indiana man, son of a preacher; had served with credit as Colonel of Indiana troops in Mexico, and had been Lieutenant-Governor of Indiana and Member of Congress, but getting at odds with his party had migrated to Kansas, where his natural talents and fiery, aggressive courage speedily brought him to the front as the leader of the warlike Free State men, who resisted with force and arms the attempts of the Pro-slavery men to dominate the Territory. His instant readiness for battle and the unsparing energy with which he prosecuted his enterprises so endeared him to the Free State men that when the State was admitted there was no question about his election as her first United States Senator.

Kansas had promptly raised two regiments, which had fought superbly at Wilson's Creek and afterwards joined in the retrograde movement to Rolla. This left Kansas without any protection, and the people naturally reasoned that in the advance upon

the territory left unguarded by the retirement of the Union army, Gen. Price and his Missourians would embrace the opportunity to pay back with interest the debt of vengeance which had been running since the wars of '56 and '57. Therefore Lane received the authority to recruit five regiments in Kansas, and went about his work with his characteristic energy.

The 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Kan. at once began organizing, receiving many recruits from the young Union men who had been forced to leave Missouri, and within a week or more after the battle of Wilson's Creek Gen. Lane had mustered an effective force of about 2,500 men, who had received some clothing and equipment and much instruction from the Regular officers and men at Forts Scott, Riley and Leavenworth.

With these forces in hand under a man of Lane's well-known character, neither Gen. Price nor his men had much disposition to meddle with Kansas, even if the General had not other and more comprehensive views.

Gen. Price was not waiting for Fremont's plans to develop before executing his own. He employed the two weeks after the battle in diligently organizing his men, and Aug. 26 left Springfield at the head of a column of about 10,000 enthusiastic young Missourians, who had in that brief time made great progress in soldiership. He caused great alarm at Fort Scott, by pointing the head of his column toward that place, and arriving within 10 miles of it on the night of the 1st of September, sent Rains's Division, which was made up of men from southwest Missouri, forward to reconnoiter. Rains's

advance of 30 mounted men under Capt. Rector Johnson pushed forward to within sight of Fort Scott, on the morning of Sept. 1, and captured a drove of 80 Government mules which had been sent out to graze on the prairies. They also carried off all the able-bodied men that they could find on their line of march. Two companies of the newly-raised Kansas cavalry promptly attacked Johnson's command, which fell back across the line toward the main body, encamped at Dry Wood. Gen. Lane gathered up such of his volunteers as were in reach, and moved to Dry Wood, where he offered Gen. Rains battle, but the latter declined to be drawn from the shelter in the woods in which he had formed his lines, and Lane did not think it was prudent to attack a force the strength of which he could not ascertain.

A noisy, long-range skirmish ensued, which terminated at nightfall by Lane withdrawing his forces to Fort Scott. The next day, leaving Col. Jennison with 400 cavalry in Fort Scott, Lane crossed the Little Osage and threw up fortifications on its banks to oppose Price's further advance and give him battle should he attempt to move into Kansas.

Gen. Price declined to fight him in his chosen position, but drew his forces together and started to execute his cherished plan of advancing to the Missouri River and forming connection there with the troops which Gens. Harris and Green had been raising in northern Missouri, not seriously molested in their work by the Union forces under Gens. Pope and Sturgis. The action at Dry Wood was made the most of by the Secessionists, who claimed a defeat for the terror-striking "Jim" Lane. The casualties

were insignificant for the forces engaged, as there were but five killed and 12 wounded on the Union side, and four killed and 16 wounded on the Confederate.

It was feared that after Gen. Price had moved forward to the Missouri River McCulloch would come up from Arkansas and take Fort Scott, which he had been authorized to do by the Confederate Secretary of War; but McCulloch seems to have had other ideas, and spent the weeks in inaction.

The situation of the Union men of southwest Missouri became gloomy in the extreme. The whole country was overrun with guerrilla bands hunting down the Union men, and not infrequently shooting them on sight.

Gen. Fremont had seriously alarmed Polk, Pillow and Thompson by his showy reinforcement of Cairo with 3,800 men. Though Pillow was reputed to have about 20,000 troops at his disposal, he was seized with a great fear, wrote to Hardee at Pocahontas urging him to come to his help, and limited the sphere of the operations of his dashing lieutenant, M. Jeff Thompson. Maj.-Gen. Polk seems to have also been deeply impressed, for he wrote to Pillow urging him to put his troops in trenches in the neighborhood of New Madrid, strongly fortify that place and stretch a chain across the river to prevent the passage of gunboats.

Then Polk had another tremor, and ordered Pillow to evacuate New Madrid at once, taking his men and heavy guns across the river to the strong works of Fort Pillow. Pillow, however, as insubordinate and self-seeking as he had been in the Mexican War, and thirsting for the distinction of taking Cape Gi-

rardeau, did not obey his superior's orders, but retained his forces at New Madrid. He had the audacity to write to his superior, "Withdraw your control over me for a few hours."

Pillow, merely hanging on to the remotest fringe of the State, assumed the title of "Liberator of Missouri," and his correspondence, orders and proclamations were headed, "Headquarters Army of Liberation."

About the same time an old acquaintance, Lieut-Gov. Thos. C. Reynolds, he of the ready pen and fluent phrases, taking advantage of a hasty journey of Gov. Jackson to Richmond, assumed full gubernatorial powers, set up his capital in Pillow's camp at New Madrid, and proceeded to clothe him with the most extraordinary prerogatives. He made himself the whole of the "Sovereign people of Missouri," and issued a proclamation withdrawing the State from the Union. He said that "disregarding the forms and considering only realities, I view an ordinance for the separation from the North and union with the Confederate States as a mere outward expression giving notice to others of an act already consummated in the hearts of the people." He then proceeded to establish a military despotism which made the worst of what had been said of Fremont pale before it. He clothed all the military commanders—not merely those of Missouri provided by the odious Military Act, but such Confederate commanders as Pillow and Hardee, who should enter the State—with a most absolute power over the lives and property of the people of Missouri.

The following oath was prescribed which all citizens were to be compelled to take by any officer of

the Missouri State Guards or Confederate army who might come upon them :

Know all men, that I _____, of the County of _____, State of Missouri, do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the State of Missouri, and support the Constitution of the State, and that I will not give aid, comfort, information, protection or encouragement to the enemies or opposers of the Missouri State Guards, or their allies, the armies of the Confederate States, upon the penalty of death for treason.

In the meanwhile Gen. Price, more practical and capable than any of them, with true military foresight was rushing his troops toward the Missouri River, gaining recruits and arousing enthusiasm with every day's march. Leading his own advance he hurried towards Warrensburg, the County seat of Johnson County, about 30 miles south of Lexington, where he hoped to seize about \$100,000 deposited in the State banks. He arrived too late for this, however, because the Union troops had the same object in view, and had anticipated him, carrying the money off with them and leaving behind some very clever caricatures, drawn by the skillful artists among the Germans, which irritated Price and his men more than it was reasonable they should.

The Union commander at Warrensburg, Col. Everett Peabody, of the 13th Mo., had kept himself well informed as to Price's movements, and retreated from Warrensburg to Lexington, burning the bridges after he had crossed them. He sent notice to Fremont of Price's movements.

Col. James A. Mulligan, with the 23d Ill., an Irish regiment, was ordered forward to Lexington to Col. Peabody's assistance, and to hold the place to the last.

The 1st Ill. Cav., Col. Thos. A. Marshall, and fragments of Home Guard regiments in process of organization, were drawn back to Lexington, in face of the advance of Price's columns. There was also a mongrel field battery, consisting of one 4-pounder, three 6-pounders, one 12-pounder and two little 4-inch howitzers, the latter being useless on account of having no shells.

The cavalry was only armed with pistols and sabers.

No official Union reports are on file as to the affair, but the total strength of the garrison is given unofficially at from 2,640 to 3,300. The correspondent of the Missouri Republican gives these figures:

23d Ill., Col. Mulligan.....	800
Home Guards, Col. White.....	500
13th Mo., Col. Peabody.....	840
1st Ill. Cav., Col. Marshall.....	500
Total.....	<u>2,640</u>

Col. Mulligan assumed command of the whole by seniority of commission. He was an Irishman with all his race's pugnacity, and also its effervescence. He was born in Utica, N. Y., in 1830, had graduated from a Roman Catholic college, studied law, and edited the principal Roman Catholic paper in the West, "The Tablet."

Lexington, which is the County seat of Lafayette County, was a very important place in frontier times, and the center of the great hemp-growing region of Missouri. It is situated on the south bank of the Missouri River, about 300 miles by its course above St. Louis, and about 84 miles below Kansas City by water, or 42 miles by rail. It consisted of two towns, Old and New Lexington, about a mile apart,

having altogether about 5,000 people. It had some manufactories and two or three colleges, one of which, the Masonic College, situated on high ground between Old and New Lexington, a half mile from the river, was taken by Col. Mulligan for his position, which he proceeded to fortify with high, substantial works to accommodate 10,000 men, inclosing about 15 acres on the summit of the bluffs. Between 2,000 and 3,000 horses and other animals of the trains were gathered inside this inclosure.

A week before Col. Mulligan's arrival, on Sept. 9, Gov. Jackson had briefly set up his Capital there, and held a session of that portion of the Legislature which adhered to him. The approach of Col. Peabody caused a precipitate adjournment, and there was left behind \$800,000 in coin, which was buried in the cellar of the college, with the great seal of the State of Missouri.

At dawn on Sept. 12 Gen. Price, riding with his advance, Rains's Division, struck the Union pickets stretching through the cornfields outside of Lexington, but though he brought up all his infantry within reach, and McDonald's, Guibor's, and Clark's batteries, his heads of columns were beaten back everywhere by the stubborn Union soldiers, who had been waiting three days for him, and he wisely decided to withdraw two or three miles and wait for the rest of his forces and ammunition wagons to come up.

Col. Mulligan telegraphed to Col. Jeff C. Davis, at Jefferson City—120 miles away—the fact of Price's advance and his need for help, and Davis sent the news to Fremont, who ordered forward three regiments and two batteries to Davis, and directed him

to reinforce Mulligan, which he could do by rail and river. Fremont also sent orders to Pope and Sturgis to help Mulligan out, but there was not much urgency in the orders, and each of his subordinates seems to have taken his own time and way of obeying or not obeying.

Jeff C. Davis had at that time something over 5,000 men at Jefferson City, and subsequent reinforcements raised this number, it was claimed, to 11,000—certainly to 8,000. Davis afterward became a valuable division and corps commander, but he certainly did not show up well in this transaction. He, also, had too much of the "Regular" in him. He complained of a lack of wagons and harness, commissary supplies and ammunition, to enable him to make a forward movement. He had none of the spirit of Lyon and Price, to impress teams and supplies and make means to do what ought to be done.

It was harvest time in that fertile part of Missouri, and his army need not have suffered for food, wherever he went. But all that he did was to send forward a couple of regiments to occupy points and prevent the Secessionists from crossing the river at those places. They had all either crossed or found other unguarded places.

Pope showed similar incapacity. He had 5,000 men in easy reach of Lexington, but he was more engrossed in the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad and in matters in Keokuk and Canton than in Lexington. He telegraphed to Gen. Fremont that he would move forward 4,000 men to Lexington, and actually did send forward Lieut.-Col. Scott with the 3d Iowa and Robt. F. Smith with the 16th Ill., with instructions to form a junction at Liberty, in Clay County,

and then proceed to Lexington. Lieut.-Col. Scott pushed on to the Blue Mills Landing on the Missouri River, where he came in contact with a large Secession force. Six regiments of the Missouri State Guard were there, making their way to Lexington.

D. R. Atchison, former Senator from Missouri, President of the United States Senate, and of much notoriety during the Kansas and Nebraska troubles, took command of this force and attacked Col. Scott, compelling rapid retreat. Atchison reported to Price the usual story about the small number under his command and the large force of the Yankees routed, but this does not harmonize with his praises to Cols. Sanders, Patten, Childs, Cundliff, Wilfley, and Maj. Gause, each of whom he says handled his "regiment" with great gallantry.

Col. Smith met Col. Scott in his retreat, learned from him the overwhelming force in front, and retreated with him, so that portion of the relief came to naught.

Gen. Sturgis moved forward from Mexico with about 4,000 men and reached the Missouri River, but finding no means for crossing, and surveying the host that was gathered around the city, retired with such haste as to leave his tents and camp equipage.

Gen. Price proceeded with astonishing deliberation, when we consider that he must have known that Fremont had something over 20,000 men within striking distance.

Retreat was still open for Col. Mulligan, as he had two steamboats at his command, but he felt that his orders obliged him to remain in Lexington for the protection of much public property which had

been gathered there, and that as his situation was known to Gen. Fremont, relief would be speedily sent to him.

In the meantime, every hour had swelled Gen. Price's forces. Some of the Secession writers have claimed that there were actually as many as 38,000 men gathered in his camps. Of course, a large proportion of his force was useless unless to help beat off a relieving column, because, owing to the small extent of the position occupied by Col. Mulligan, only a limited number of men could be employed against it, and 10,000 were as effective as 100,000. A very large portion of Gen. Price's forces were men who flocked to his camp as to a picnic or a barbecue, because something was going on, and they fell away from him again when he began a backward movement, as rapidly as they came.

Then ensued for six days a very strange battle. Swarms of Missourians crowded the ravines in the bluffs, behind trees, stones, the walls, fences and chimneys of the houses, and whatever else would afford adequate protection, and kept up an incessant fusillade upon the garrison safely ensconced behind thick banks of earth. When a squad occupying a secure shelter grew tired, or had fired away all its ammunition, it would go back to camp for dinner, when their places would be taken by others eager to share in the noise and excitement and have a story to take back home of the number of Yankees who had fallen under their deadly aim. If all these stories of the men "who had been at Lexington" could have been true, more men would have been sent to the grave than answered Lincoln's call for 500,000 volunteers. The artillerists were as enthusiastic and industrious

as the men with "Yager" rifles and shotguns, and banged away with unflagging zeal and corresponding lack of mortality. The walls of the college were badly scarred, but the worst effect was that an occasional shell would take effect among the horses, and drop on the ground carcasses which speedily putrified under the hot sun, and added an unbearable stench to the other hardships of the garrison.

This went on day and night, for the moon was bright, and there was no reason why a man who had powder and shot, and could not get an opportunity at any of the coverts during the day, should not put in pleasantly a few hours at night.

Naturally a rain of bullets, even though they might hit rarer than lightning strokes, had a wearing effect on the garrison.

While this noisy fusillade by the mob of truculent bushwhackers was going on, there were much more soldierly occurrences by the more soldierly men on both sides.

There were sorties and counter-sorties in which the greatest gallantry was displayed on both sides, and in which substantially all the losses occurred. The Secessionists captured a Union flag in one of these, which was balanced by a Secession flag captured by the 1st Ill. Cav. Owing to the great superiority of the enemy in numbers, the finality of all these was against the garrison, which was everywhere pushed back from the edges of the bluff, and also from some buildings on the bluffs overlooking the works.

Gen. Rains's Division invested the eastern and northeastern position of Mulligan's works; Gen. Parsons the southwestern, with Clark's Division,

commanded by Col. Congreve Jackson, and Steen's Division as reserves.

Col. Rives, commanding Gen. Slack's Division, occupied the west along the river bank and captured the steamboats by which Mulligan could escape or receive reinforcements; Gens. Harris and McBride extended this line along the north, cutting off the garrison from all access to the river and water. This became very effective in forcing surrender, as not only the men but the animals suffered terribly from thirst.

By the morning of Sept. 18, six days after the first encounter with the pickets, Gen. Price had all his forces up and properly disposed about the garrison. He and his principal subordinates were very weary of the noisy and fruitless bushwhacking, and eager for something more conclusive.

Orders were issued for the whole line to close in upon the Union works, and they were gallantly responded to and met as gallant resistance from the beleaguered garrison in the 52 hours of stubborn fighting which ensued. Col. Congreve Jackson, commanding Gen. John B. Clark's Third Division, reported that he succeeded in getting to within 450 yards of the College.

Col. Benj. A. Rives, commanding Gen. Slack's Fourth Division, says that after having been driven back by a gallant counter-assault, he got within 100 yards of the College.

Gen. Steen lays claim for his division of having defeated Lieut.-Col. Scott, after which he passed back into the reserve.

Gen. Mosby M. Parsons, commanding the Sixth Division, says that he reached to within 500 yards

of the College, and also crossed the river with 3,000 men, to repel Sturgis, who "retired in confusion, leaving 200 of their tents."

Gen. J. H. McBride, commanding the Seventh Division, says that he succeeded in forming a breastwork with hemp bales "100 yards from the enemy's works."

Gen. Jas. S. Rains says that with the Second Division, numbering 3,025 rank and file, he succeeded in gaining a position 350 yards north and 500 yards east of the College.

Gen. Thos. A. Harris does not give the point he reached, but the concurrent testimony is that he was the closest of all, and is supported by the fact that his division sustained the heaviest loss. To his division is due the credit of the famous device of hemp bales as advancing breastworks.

Gen. Price quietly appropriates the credit for the device to himself, saying in his report :

On the morning of the 20th inst. I caused a number of hemp bales to be transported to the river hights, where moveable breastworks were speedily constructed out of them by Cols. Harris, McBride, Rives and Maj. Winston, and their respective commands. Capt. Kelly's battery was ordered at the same time to the position occupied by Gen. Harris's force, and quickly opened an effective fire under the direction of its gallant Captain. * * *

These demonstrations, particularly the continued advance of the hemp breastworks, which were as efficient as the cotton bales at New Orleans, quickly attracted attention and excited and alarmed the enemy. They were, however, repulsed in every instance by the unflinching courage and fixed determination of the men.

Gen. Harris says in his report to Gen. Price: "I then directed Capt. Geo. A. Turner, of my staff, to request of you 132 bales of hemp, which you promptly credited.

"I directed the bales to be wet in the river to protect them against the casualties of fire of our troops

and the enemy's, and soon discovered that the wetting was so materially increasing the weight as to prevent our men in their exhausted condition from rolling them to the crest of the hill. I then adopted the idea of wetting the hemp after it had been transported to this position."

The credit has also been stoutly claimed for Col. Thomas Hinkle, of Wellington County, Mo., who two years later was killed in command of a guerrilla organization. No matter whose, the idea was singularly effective, and despite the most gallant efforts of the garrison, the hemp bales were steadily rolled nearer, until by 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th they were in places as close as from 50 to 75 yards of the Union works. At this distance it would be easy to mass an overpowering force behind their cover to rush upon and instantly overwhelm the garrison.

The garrison, which had now been fighting for eight long days; which was so short of ammunition that most of the cartridge boxes were empty, and there was no supply from which to refill them; which was tortured with thirst, surrounded with hundreds of animals dying from lack of water, at last raised the white flag.

After eight days of waiting there was no more sign of rescue than there was on the first, and everywhere they could look their enemies swarmed in apparently limitless numbers. Gen. Price granted the garrison honorable terms. The officers were to remain as prisoners of war, the men to lay down their arms, take the oath not to fight any more against Missouri, and to be sent across the river and allowed to go whither they would.

With shrewd policy he allowed Col. Mulligan to retain his sword and showed him a great many civilities. Mulligan was a representative Irishman, and this would bear fruit in the attitude of the Irish toward the war. In his report to Gov. Jackson Gen. Price sums up the fruits of his victory as follows:

Our entire loss in this series of engagements amounts to 25 killed and 72 wounded. The enemy's loss was much greater.

The visible fruits of this almost bloodless victory are very great—about 3,500 prisoners, among whom are Col. Mulligan, Marshall, Peabody, White, and Grover, Maj. Van Horn, and 118 other commissioned officers, five pieces of artillery and two mortars, over 3,000 stands of infantry arms, a large number of sabers, about 750 horses, many sets of cavalry equipments, wagons, teams and ammunition, more than \$100,000 worth of commissary stores, and a large amount of other property. In addition to all this, I obtained the restoration of the great seal of the State and the public records, which had been stolen from their proper custodian, and about \$900,000 in money, of which the bank at this place had been robbed, and which I have caused to be returned to it."

Of Gen. Price's characteristics that of under-statement was certainly not one; but there is no use caviling about this, since the disaster was in all conscience bad enough for the Union side.

Col. Mulligan's official report is not included in the **Rebellion Records**. It was quite a rhetorical statement of the affair, with unstinted praise for his own regiment and Irish valor generally, much condemnation for the Germans, between whom and the Irish there was at that time a great deal of feeling, and absolutely ignoring all the rest who participated in the defense. This was particularly unjust to the 1st Ill. Cav. While the 23d Ill. had taken the best and strongest part of the line, the 1st Ill. Cav. had defended the weakest and most exposed part, that, too, with only pistols and sabers, and had captured the only flag taken during the siege.

The total loss of the garrison is usually given as 39 killed and 120 wounded.

Probably Gen. Price in his report only mentioned the losses in his organized forces. If his wounded did not exceed 72, his men showed unusual ability in keeping under cover.

While the loss did not approach that of the desperate fight at Wilson's Creek, yet it was respectably large according to European standards, the garrison having lost about six per cent before surrendering.

Gen. Fremont announced this calamity to Washington in the following telegrams:

Headquarters Western Department, St. Louis, Sept. 23, 1861.

I have a telegram from Brookfield that Lexington has fallen into Price's hands, he having cut off Mulligan's supply of water. Reinforcements 4,000 strong, under Sturgis, by capture of ferryboats, had no means of crossing the river in time. Lane's force from the southwest and Davis's from the southeast, upwards of 11,000, could not get there in time. I am taking the field myself, and hope to destroy the enemy either before or after the junction of forces under McCulloch. Please notify the President immediately.

J. C. FREMONT,

Major-General Commanding.

Col. E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.

Headquarters Western Department, Sept. 23, 1861.

Nothing since my dispatch of this morning. Our loss 39 killed, 120 wounded. Loss of enemy, 1,400 killed and wounded. Our non-commissioned officers and privates sworn and released. Commissioned officers held as prisoners. Our troops are gathering around the enemy. I will send you from the field more details in a few days.

JOHN C. FREMONT,

Major-General Commanding.

Hon. S. Cameron, Secretary of War.

The patient and much enduring President answered as follows:

Headquarters of the Army, Washington, Sept. 23, 1861.

John C. Fremont, Major-General Commanding, St. Louis, Mo.:

Your dispatch of this day is received. The President is glad that you are hastening to the scene of action. His words are "He expects you to repair the disaster at Lexington without loss of time."

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Fremont began to topple to his fall.

CHAPTER XIII.

FREMONT'S MARVELOUS INEFFECTIVENESS.

GEN. STERLING PRICE had scored a victory which gave him an enduring hold upon the confidence and esteem of the Missourians. With the least means he had achieved the most success of any Confederate General so far. His conduct at the battle of Wilson's Creek had endeared him to the men he commanded. He exposed himself with utmost indifference to the fiercest firing, showed good judgment as to movements, was not discouraged after repeated repulses, and was everywhere animating and encouraging the men and bringing them forward into line of battle.

He sympathized with those who were wounded, and had them cared for, and immediately returned to the fighting with fresh troops.

It is true, however, that he had shown no generalship, but merely demonstrated himself a good Colonel, in leading up one regiment after another and putting them into the fight.

Lexington brought an immensity of prestige to Price and encouragement to the Seccessionists and did a corresponding injury to the Union cause. It added immeasurably to the burdens which President Lincoln had to bear. He could make Brigadier- and Major-Generals, but he could not endow them with generalship.

The Senate could confirm them, but they were still more confirmed in the dull, unenterprising routine of camp and administrative regulations.

The modest bars of a Captain on their shoulder straps had been, as it were, changed in the twinkling of an eye into the refulgent stars of a General, but they seemed to take this as a deserved tribute to their personal worth, rather than as an incentive and opportunity for the greater things which had made their predecessors illustrious.

Fremont, in the palatial Brandt Mansion, for which the Government was paying the very unusual rent of \$6,000 per year, was maintaining a vice regal court as difficultly accessible as that of any crowned head of Europe. His uncounted and glittering staff, which seemed to have received the Pentecostal gift of tongues—in which English was not included—was headed by a mysterious “Adlatus,”—a title before unknown in America or to the dictionaries, and since retired to oblivion. Naturally, the Adlatus’s command of English was limited. His knowledge of Missouri was even more so. Though commanding Missouri and dealing intensely with Missouri affairs, the men surrounding Fremont were everything but Missourians or those acquainted with Missouri affairs. It would have been surprising to find one of them who could bound the State and name its principal rivers.

This, too, in the midst of a multitude of able, educated, influential Missourians who were ardent Unionists and were burning with zeal to serve the cause. Not one of them appears in the Fremont entourage.

Gens. Pope, Sturgis, Jeff C. Davis, Hunter,—all Regulars and trained to war; Sigel, with his profound theoretical knowledge and his large experience; Curtis, lately returned to the Army with his

military training supplemented by wide experience in civil life; Hurlbut, the brilliant orator and politician, were all busily engaged in something or other that kept them from interfering with Price while he lingered on the Missouri River gathering up recruits and stripping the Union farmers of that rich agricultural region of cattle and grain sufficient to feed his army during the coming Winter, and of horses and wagons to haul off his spoils and thoroly equip his army with transportation.

The only really soldierly thing done at this time was by the "political General,"—the erratic, demagogic, trumpet-sounding "Jim" Lane. He was commanding men who had come out from home to do something toward fighting the war and not to stay in camp and be drilled into automatons. He could only maintain his hold on them and his ascendancy in Kansas politics by action.

Learning that Price had left a large stock of ammunition at the important little town of Osceola, the head of navigation on the Osage River, under strong guard, Lane led his brigade a swift march from Kansas upon the town, and succeeded in surprising the garrison, which, after a brief resistance, retreated and left it to Lane's mercy, whereupon he proceeded to not only destroy the very considerable quantity of stores which Price had accumulated there, but to burn down the town. This was an exceedingly ill-advised ending to a piece of brilliant soldiership, because not only was it injustice to an enemy, but it was a severe blow upon Union men who owned full one-third of the property destroyed.

A large number of these were engaged in the trade of the Southwest, for which Osceola was a dis-

tributing center. Goods were brought up the river during the high water and then shipped through the country by wagons. The town was also the County seat of St. Clair County, and contained the public records, etc.

Still more unfortunate was it that Lane's act was taken as an excuse for the Missouri guerrillas to retaliate upon Kansas towns and the property of the Union people in their own State. Lane says in his report: "The enemy ambushed the approaches to the town, and after being driven from them by the advance under Cols. Montgomery and Weer, they took refuge in the buildings of the town to annoy us. We were compelled to shell them out, and in doing so the place was burned to ashes, with an immense amount of stores of all descriptions. There were 15 or 20 of them killed and wounded; we lost none. Full particulars will be furnished you hereafter."

This shows that even he felt the necessity of apologizing for the act, but the apology is too transparent. The fact was that the Kansas men saw an opportunity to pay back some of their old scores against the Missourians and did not fail to improve it.

In spite of Gen. Fremont's promise to the President to "take the field himself and attempt to destroy the enemy," he moved with exceeding deliberation. It is true that he left St. Louis for Jefferson City, Sept. 27, a week after Mulligan's surrender, but that week had been well employed by Price in gathering up all that he could carry away and making ready to avoid the blow which he knew must fall. After arriving at Jefferson City, Fremont, instead of taking the troops which were near at hand

and making a swift rush upon his enemy, the only way in which he could hope to hurt him, began the organization of a "grande armee" upon the European model, and that which McClellan was deliberately organizing in front of Washington.

The impatient people, who were paying the \$3,000,000 a day which the war was now beginning to cost, and who had begun to murmur for results, were amused by stories of plans of sweeping down the Mississippi clear to New Orleans, taking Memphis, Vicksburg and other strongholds on the way, severing the Southern Confederacy in twain, so that it would fall into hopeless ruin.

This was entirely possible at that time with the army that had been given Fremont, had it been handled with the ability and boldness of Sherman's March to the Sea.

Two weeks after Mulligan's surrender Fremont announced the formation of this grand "Army of the West," containing approximately 50,000 men. This was grouped as follows:

The First Division, to which Gen. David Hunter was assigned, consisted of 9,750 men, and was ordered to take position at Versailles, about 40 miles southwest of Jefferson City, and became the Left Wing of the Army.

Gen. John Pope was given command of the Second Division of 9,220 men and ordered to take station at Boonville, 50 miles northwest of Jefferson City. His position was to be the Right Wing of the army.

The Third Division, 7,980 strong, was put under command of Gen. Franz Sigel, and made the advance of the army, with its station at Sedalia and Georgetown, 64 miles west of Jefferson City.

The Fifth Division, commanded by Gen. Asboth, had 6,451 men, and constituted the reserve at Tipton, on the railroad, 38 miles west of Jefferson City.

The Fifth Division, 5,388 men, under Gen. Justus McKinstry, formed the center and was posted at Syracuse, five miles west of Tipton.

Beside these, Gen. Sturgis held Kansas City with 3,000 men and Gen. Jas. H. Lane, with 2,500 men, was to move in Kansas down the State line, between Fort Scott and Kansas City, to protect Kansas from an incursion in that direction, and as opportunity offered attack Price's flank.

Thus, there were 38,789 effectives in the five divisions, which with Sturgis's and Lane's forces made a total force of 44,289, not including garrisons which swell the total of the army to over 90,000.

Among these Division Commanders were two whom Fremont had discovered and created Brigadier-Generals out of his own volition, without consultation at Washington.

These were Gens. Asboth and McKinstry. Gen. Alexander (Sandor) Asboth, born in 1811, was a Hungarian and an educated engineer, with considerable experience in and against the Austrian army. He had entered ardently into the Revolution of 1848, and built a bridge in a single night by which the Revolutionary army crossed and won the brilliant victory of Nagy Salo. He became Adjutant-General of the Hungarian army, and when the Revolution was crushed by Russian troops, escaped with Kosuth into Turkey, came to this country, and became a naturalized citizen. He was by turns farmer, teacher, engineer, and manufacturer of galvanized articles. He sided with the Union Germans, went on

Fremont's staff, and was appointed a Brigadier-General. The Senate refused to recognize the appointment, but in consideration of his good service he was re-appointed, served creditably through the war, was brevetted a Major-General, and after the war sent as Minister to the Argentine Confederation, where he died in 1868.

The other, Justus McKinstry, was born in New York and appointed to the Military Academy from Michigan, where he graduated 40th in the class of 1838, of which Beauregard, Barry, Irvin McDowell, W. J. Hardee, R. S. Granger, Henry H. Sibley, Edward Johnson and A. J. Smith were members. He had served creditably in the Mexican War, receiving a brevet for gallantry at Contreras and Churubusco, and at the outbreak of the war was a Major and Quartermaster at St. Louis, where he did very much to frustrate Lyon's plans and was regarded by him as a Secessionist at heart. He continued to hold his position, however, as Chief Quartermaster of the Department of the West until Fremont appointed him Brigadier-General.

Shortly after Fremont's removal he was placed under arrest at St. Louis and ordered before a court-martial, which did not convene, and he was at last summarily dismissed for "neglect and violation of duty, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline." He became a stock broker in New York City, and afterwards a land agent at Rolla, Mo.

It will be seen by the map that the disposition of the troops was good, and that Fremont had the advantage of short lines from Sedalia and Rolla to cut Price's line of retreat, recapture the spoils he was

hastening to a place of safety, and destroy, or at least disperse, his army.

Fremont, however, made no use of this advantage, and Price seems to have had no apprehension that he would. Price remained in Lexington until Oct. 1, serenely contemplating the gigantic preparations made for his destruction, and then having gathered up all that he could readily get, and reading Fremont's order for a forward movement of the Army of the West, thought, like the prudent meadow lark, that probably something would be now done, and the time had come for moving. He began a deliberate retreat, crossing the Osage River at Osceola, and reaching Greenfield, 150 miles away, at the very comfortable pace of 15 miles a day.

Gen. Fremont ordered the Army of the West forward, but the so-called pursuit was very much like hunting a fox on a dray. He was encumbered with immense trains, for which bridges had to be built over numerous streams and roads made thru the rough country. The trains seemed to contain a world of unnecessary things and an astonishing lack of those necessary. Apparently almost anybody who had anything to sell could find purchasers among the numerous men about Fremont's headquarters who had authority to buy, or assumed it.

One astonishing item in the purchases was a great number of half barrels for holding water, rather an extraordinary provision in a country like Missouri, where in the month of October water is disposed to be in excessive quantities.

Notwithstanding the astonishing purchase of mules by everybody and anybody, none of the Division Commanders seem to have had mules enough to pull their wagons.

The division started out like the horses of a balky team. Gen. Pope, of the Right Wing, left Jefferson City Oct. 11, Sigel got away from Sedalia with the Third Division Oct. 13, the same day Hunter left Tipton with the Left Wing, and Asboth followed on Oct. 14. Even when they started their progress was very slow, for the columns were halted at streams to build bridges and in the rough countries to wait for the sappers and miners to make passable roads.

When one column was halted, all the rest had to do likewise, for though Price kept the safe distance of 100 miles away, Fremont was in constant apprehension of battle, and held his columns in close supporting distance. He did not get across the Osage River until Oct. 25, or nine days after Price's leisurely crossing that important stream, on the banks of which it was confidently expected that he would give battle.

Price, with his diminishing forces, had no such intention, but fell back toward Neosho, to cover as long as possible the Granby Mines, seven miles from that place, which were the most important source of lead for the Southern Confederacy, to which they supplied 200,000 pounds per month.

Gov. Jackson took advantage of this breathing spell to call the Legislature together at Neosho, where it held a two weeks' "rump" session of the small minority of that body which favored Secession. They passed an ordinance of Secession and elected Senators and Representatives to the Confederate Congress, adjourning when they heard that Fremont had at last passed the Osage.

Then Price took up his line of retreat toward the southern boundary of the State to get near Gen. Ben

McCulloch, who had posted his forces at Cross Hollow, in Benton County, northwest Arkansas. Gen. Price took up his position at Pineville, in the extreme southwestern corner of Missouri, where the rough, hilly country offered great chances to the defense, and again began communication with Gen. McCulloch to induce him to unite his force with his own and attack the Union army.

He had correctly estimated Fremont's generalship, and thought there was a possibility of massing his and McCulloch's forces, to attack a portion of Fremont's army, drive it back and defeat him in detail. McCulloch, in spite of his ranger reputation, entirely lacked Price's aggressive spirit, and thought that it would be much better to fall back to the Boston Mountain, about 50 miles farther south, and make a stand there. He so informed Gen. Price.

While McCulloch had no disposition to enter Missouri and defend it against the Union troops, he had no hesitation about treating it as part of Confederate territory. Desiring to embarrass and delay Fremont's advance as much as possible, he sent forward his Texas cavalry to burn the mills, forage and grain as far in the direction of Springfield as they could safely go, and urged Price to do the same. McCulloch's Texans soon lighted up the southwest country with burning mills, barns and stacks.

To this Gen. Price was bitterly opposed. The mills and grain were in many instances the property of the Secessionists, and to destroy them would be to inflict worse punishment on his own people than the Union commanders had ever done, and would embitter them against his cause. Price repeatedly represented to McCulloch that altogether they would have

25,000 men, and if McCulloch did not desire to go forward they could make a good defensive battle inside the State on the hills around Pineville. To leave it would cause the loss of very many Missourians who had enlisted in the State Guard to defend Missouri, and who would feel that they had no cause to fight outside of the State.

After crossing the Osage Fremont halted near Connersville, about 25 miles south of Warsaw, where he crossed the river, and then advanced with Sigel to Bolivar, on the Springfield road, and sent forward Maj. Charles Zagonyi with 150 of his famous Body Guard and Maj. F. J. White with 180 men of the 1st Mo. Cav., to make a reconnoissance in the direction of Springfield.

Fremont's Body Guard had played a large part in the pomp and circumstance of his administration. Maj. Chas. Zagonyi was a picturesque and effervescent Hungarian, who recounted fascinating stories of his experience as a subordinate to Gen. Bem during the Hungarian Revolution. Fremont had authorized him to raise a body guard, in imitation of the famous troops of Europe, and the novelty of the organization attracted to it a great number of quite fine young men, most of whom were from the country around Cincinnati—one company being from Kentucky. They were formed into three companies, mounted on fine blooded bay horses, showily uniformed and each armed with two navy revolvers, a five-barreled rifle and a saber.

All the officers were Americans except three—one Hollander and two Hungarians. The members of the Guard, in addition to their expensive and showy outfit, did not conceal from the other soldiers that

they were picked men and considered themselves superior to the ordinary run, which did not enhance their popularity with their comrades.

Majs. Zagonyi and White marched all that night, and the next day, about noon, when about eight miles north of Springfield, learned that there was a force of at least 1,500 Confederates in the town.

One of the rebel pickets who had not been captured hastened back to Springfield and gave the alarm, so that the Confederates were in readiness for them. Feeling that this would be so, Majs. Zagonyi and White determined to move around the town and approach it from the west on the Mt. Vernon road. In this movement White became separated from Zagonyi, who, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, came most unexpectedly upon the Secessionists drawn up in line at the end of a long lane.

A heavy rail fence intervened between Zagonyi and the head of the lane, and an opening had to be made through this under a heavy fire from the enemy. The moment a gap was made, Zagonyi shouted to his men to follow him, and do as he did, raising the battle cry, "Fremont and the Union." He dashed gallantly forward, straight for the center of the rebel line, followed at a gallop by his command. The Confederate fire did fearful execution upon the Guard as it was crowded in the lane, but in a few seconds the lane was passed and the cavalry saber began doing its wild work.

The center of the enemy's lines was at once broken by the terrible impact of galloping horses and the Confederates began a panicky retreat, followed by the vengeful horsemen shooting and sabering them as they ran. The infantry ran through the town

to the shelter of the woods, and the Confederate cavalry fell back down the road, pursued by the Guard until it was getting nightfall, when Zagonyi recalled them and returned to the Court House, raised the Union flag from it, released the Union prisoners confined in the jail, gathered up his dead and wounded, and after dark decided to fall back until he met the advance of the army.

He had lost 15 men killed and 26 wounded, and reported that he had found 23 Confederates dead after the charge was over. This brilliant action, which was then compared with the Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava, redeemed the soldiers of the Guards in the eyes of their comrades, and it became an honor to belong to that organization.

The next morning Maj. White reached Springfield with a few Home Guards, where he found the Confederates still dazed by the occurrences of the day before, and he was careful not to undeceive them as to his strength. He solemnly received the flag of truce, said that he would have to refer the matter to Gen. Sigel, threw out his men as pickets, permitted the people to bury their dead, and then prudently fell back to meet the advance of the army.

Fremont took up his quarters in Springfield, and began ostentatious preparations for an immediate decisive battle, though Price was then more than 50 miles away from him. This Fremont should have known, for in some mysterious manner he was within ready communication with him, so much so as to be able to conclude the following remarkable convention which was duly published in a joint proclamation:

To All Peaceably-Disposed Citizens of the State of Missouri,
Greeting:

Whereas a solemn agreement has been entered into by and between Maj.-Gens. Fremont and Price, respectively, commanding antagonistic forces in the State of Missouri, to the effect that in the future arrests or forcible interference by armed or unarmed parties of citizens within the limits of said State for the mere entertainment or expression of political opinions shall hereafter cease; that families now broken up for such causes may be reunited, and that the war now progressing shall be exclusively confined to armies in the field:

Therefore, be it known to all whom it may concern:

1. No arrests whatever on account of political opinions, or for the merely private expression of the same, shall hereafter be made within the limits of the State of Missouri, and all persons who may have been arrested and are now held to answer upon such charges only shall be forthwith released; but it is expressly declared that nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to bar or interfere with any of the usual and regular proceedings of the established courts under statutes and orders made and provided for such offenses.

2. All peaceably disposed citizens who may have been driven from their homes because of their political opinions, or who may have left them from fear of force and violence, are hereby advised and permitted to return, upon the faith of our positive assurances that while so returning they shall receive protection from both the armies in the field wherever it can be given.

3. All bodies of armed men acting without the authority or recognition of the Major-Generals before named, and not legitimately connected with the armies in the field, are hereby ordered at once to disband.

4. Any violation of either of the foregoing articles shall subject the offender to the penalty of military law, according to the nature of the offense.

In testimony whereof the aforesaid Maj.-Gen. John Charles Fremont, at Springfield, Mo., on this 1st day of November, A. D. 1861, and Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price, at Cassville, Mo., on this 5th day of November, A. D. 1861, have hereunto set their hands, and hereby mutually pledge their earnest efforts to the enforcement of the above articles of agreement according to their full tenor and effect, to the best of their ability.

J. C. FREMONT, Major-General Commanding.

STERLING PRICE, Major-General Commanding.

The practical effect of this was that Price was allowed to send such of his men as he wished home for the Winter, with a safeguard against their being molested by the Union troops, but it had no effect in protecting Union men from being harassed by guerilla tormentors, who cared as little for conventions and proclamations as for the Sermon on the Mount.

In the meanwhile Fremont's astonishing ill success in purely military matters, the freely expressed opinion of all who came in contact with him as to his glaring incompetence, added to the fearful stories of the corruption of the men immediately surrounding him, were making his position very insecure. President Lincoln sent his intimate and life-long friend, David Davis, whom he was about to elevate to the Supreme Bench, to St. Louis with a commission to investigate the rank-smelling contracts and disbursements. No report was ever made public, but it was generally known that they found even worse than they feared.

The Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, undertook a tour of investigation on his own account, accompanied by Adj't-Gen. Lorenzo Thomas. Some of the things which they found are set forth in the following extracts from the memorandum from Gen. Thomas to his superior officer :

Gen. Curtis said of Gen. Fremont that he found no difficulty in having access to him, and when he presented business connected with his command, it was attended to. Gen. Fremont never consulted him on military matters, nor informed him of his plans. Gen. Curtis remarked that while he would go with freedom to Gen. Scott and express his opinions, he would not dare to do so to Gen. Fremont. He deemed Gen. Fremont unequal to the command of an army, and said that he was no more bound by law than by the winds.

Col. Andrews, Chief Paymaster, called and presented irregularities in the Pay Department, and desired instructions from the Secretary for his government, stating that he was required to make payments and transfers of money contrary to law and regulations. Once, upon objecting to what he conceived an improper payment, he was threatened with confinement by a file of soldiers. He exhibited an order for the transfer of \$100,000 to the Quartermaster's Department, which was irregular. Exhibited abstract of payment by one Paymaster (Maj. Febiger) to 42 persons, appointed by Gen. Fremont, viz: one Colonel, three Majors, eight Captains, 15 First Lieutenants, 11 Second Lieutenants, one Surgeon, three Assistant Surgeons; total 42. Nineteen of these have appointments as engineers, and are entitled to cavalry pay.

Maj. Allen, Principal Quartermaster, had recently taken charge at St. Louis, but reported great irregularities in his

Department, and requested special instructions. These he deemed important, as orders were communicated by a variety of persons, in a very irregular manner, requiring disbursements of money. These orders were often verbally given. He was sending, under Gen. Fremont's orders, large amounts of forage from St. Louis to the army where corn was abundant and very cheap. The distance was 160 miles. He gave the indebtedness of the Quartermaster's Department in St. Louis to be \$4,506,309.73.

By direction of Gen. Meigs, advertisements were made to furnish grain and hay, and contracts made for specific sums—28 cents per bushel for corn, 30 cents for oats, and \$17.95 per ton for hay. In face of this another party at St. Louis—Baird, or Baird & Palmer (Palmer being of the old firm in California of Palmer, Cook & Co.)—were directed to send to Jefferson City (where hay and corn abound) as fast as possible 100,000 bushels of oats, with a corresponding amount of hay, at 33 cents per bushel for grain and \$19 per ton for hay.

Capt. Edward M. Davis, a member of his staff, received a contract by the direct order of Gen. Fremont for blankets. They were examined by a board of army officers consisting of Capt. Hendershott, 4th U. S. Art., Capt. Haines, Commissary of Subsistence, and Capt. Turnley, Assistant Quartermaster. The blankets were found to be made of cotton and were rotten and worthless. Notwithstanding this decision they were purchased, and given to the sick and wounded soldiers in hospitals.

One week after the receipt of the President's order modifying Gen. Fremont's proclamation relative to emancipation of slaves, Gen. Fremont, by note to Capt. McKeever, required him to have 200 copies of the original proclamation and address to the army, of same date, printed and sent immediately to Ironton, for the use of Maj. Gavitt, Indiana Cavalry, for distribution through the country. Capt. McKeever had the copies printed and delivered. The order is as follows:

"Adjutant-General will have 200 copies of proclamation of Commanding General, dated Aug. 30, together with the address to the army of same date, sent immediately to Ironton, for the use of Maj. Gavitt, Indiana Cavalry. Maj. Gavitt will distribute it through the country. J. C. F.,

"Commanding General.

"Sept. 23, 1861."

As soon as I obtained a view of the several encampments at Tipton, I expressed the opinion that the forces there assembled could not be moved, as scarcely any means of transportation were visible. I saw Gen. Hunter, second in command, and conversed freely with him. He stated that there was great confusion, and that Fremont was utterly incompetent; that his own division was greatly scattered, and the force then present defective in many respects; that he required 100 wagons, yet he was ordered to march that day, and some of his troops were already drawn out on the road. His cavalry regiment (Ellis's) had horses, arms (indifferent), but no equipments; had to carry their cartridges in their pockets; consequently, on their first day's march from Jefferson City, in a heavy rain, the cartridges carried about their persons were destroyed. This march to Tipton (35 miles) was made on a miry, heavy earth road parallel to the railroad, and but

a little distance from it. The troops were directed by Gen. Fremont to march without provisions or knapsacks, and without transportation. A violent rainstorm came up, and the troops were exposed to it all night, were without food for 24 hours, and when food was received the beef was found to be spoiled.

* * * * *

Gen. Hunter stated that he had just received a written report from one of his Colonels, informing him that but 20 out of 100 of his guns would go off. These were the guns procured by Gen. Fremont in Europe. I may here state that Gen. Sherman, at Louisville, made a similar complaint of the great inferiority of these European arms. He had given the men orders to file down the nipples. In conversation with Col. Swords, Assistant Quartermaster-General, at Louisville, just from California, he stated that Mr. Selover, who was in Europe with Gen. Fremont, wrote to some friend in San Francisco that his share of the profit of the purchase of these arms was \$30,000.

Gen. Hunter expressed to the Secretary of War his decided opinion that Gen. Fremont was incompetent and unfit for his extensive and important command. This opinion he gave reluctantly, owing to his position as second in command.

President Lincoln sent the following characteristic letter to Gen. S. R. Curtis, who, being in command at St. Louis, was directly accessible, and a man in whose discretion the President felt he might trust :

Washington, Oct. 24, 1861.

Brig.-Gen. S. R. Curtis.

Dear Sir: On receipt of this with the accompanying inclosures, you will take safe, certain and suitable measures to have the inclosure addressed to Maj.-Gen. Fremont delivered to him with all reasonable dispatch, subject to these conditions only, that if, when Gen. Fremont shall be reached by the messenger—yourself or anyone sent by you—he shall then have, in personal command, fought and won a battle, or shall then be actually in battle, or shall then be in the immediate presence of the enemy in expectation of a battle, it is not to be delivered, but held for further orders. After, and not until after, the delivery to Gen. Fremont, let the inclosed addressed to Gen. Hunter be delivered to him.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

The following decisive order was one of the inclosures :

Headquarters of the Army, Washington, Oct. 24, 1861.
General Orders No. 18.

Maj.-Gen. Fremont, of the U. S. Army, the present Commander of the Western Department of the same, will, on the receipt of this order, call Maj.-Gen. Hunter, of the U. S. Volunteers, to relieve him temporarily in that command, when he (Maj.-Gen. Fremont) will report to General Headquarters, by letter, for further orders.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

A special messenger arrived at Springfield, Nov. 2, with the order, which created consternation at Fremont's headquarters. It is more than probable that Fremont felt his elevation to be such that he could try conclusions with the Administration, and refuse to obey the order.

There was considerable talk at that time about military headquarters as to a dictator, and this was so rife about McClellan's that his journal constantly abounds in allusions which indicate that he was putting the crown away from him with increasing gentleness each time. There was much of the same atmosphere about the headquarters of the Army of the West, and it is claimed that Fremont at first decided not to obey the order, but on Sigel's urgent representations finally concluded to do so, and issued the following farewell order to his troops :

Headquarters Western Department,
Springfield, Mo., Nov. 2, 1861.

Soldiers of the Mississippi Army:

Agreeably to orders this day received I take leave of you. Altho our army has been of sudden growth, we have grown up together, and I have become familiar with the brave and generous spirit which you bring to the defense of your country, and which makes me anticipate for you a brilliant career. Continue as you have begun, and give to my successor the same cordial and enthusiastic support with which you have encouraged me. Emulate the splendid example which you have already before you, and let me remain, as I am, proud of the noble army which I had thus far labored to bring together.

Soldiers, I regret to leave you. Most sincerely I thank you for the regard and confidence you have invariably shown me. I deeply regret that I shall not have the honor to lead you to the victory which you are just about to win, but I shall claim to share with you in the joy of every triumph, and trust always to be fraternally remembered by my companions in arms.

J. C. FREMONT,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

He left at once for St. Louis, with his Body Guard for an escort. Though these men had been enlisted

for three years, they were ordered by Gen. McClellan to be mustered out, and Maj. Zagonyi was offered the Colonelcy of a new regiment.

The time and manner of the removal enabled Gen. Fremont's ardent partisans to complain loudly that he was relieved on the eve of a battle in which he would have accomplished great things, and was thus denied an opportunity to achieve lasting fame and render essential service to the country. The evidence, however, is conclusive that at that time Price was at Pineville, fully 50 miles away, and in the midst of a very rough country, instead of being in Fremont's immediate front, as Fremont certainly supposed.

Whether he would have accepted battle after Fremont had reached him at Pineville, is a matter of conjecture. The pressure in favor of Fremont continued strong enough, however, to bring about the offer of a new command to him the following year, but it was grotesquely shrunken from the proud proportions of that from which he had been relieved. It was styled the Mountain Department, and embraced a large portion of West Virginia. Even in this restricted area he again failed to give satisfaction.

June 8, 1862, he fought an indecisive battle against Stonewall Jackson at Cross Keys, took umbrage at being placed under the command of Gen. John Pope, whom he had once commanded, asked to be relieved from command, and joined the ranks of the bitter critics of President Lincoln's Administration, though still retaining his commission and pay as a Major-General.

He still thought his was a name to conjure with, and May 31, 1864, accepted the nomination for Pres-

ident from a convention of dissatisfied Republicans assembled at Cleveland, resigning his commission at last, June 4, 1864.

The chill reception with which the country received his nomination at last disillusionized even him, and in September he withdrew from the field, to clear the way for Lincoln's re-election. He then became connected with the promotion of a Pacific railway over the southern of the routes which he had surveyed, lost his money and property in the course of time, appealed to Congress for relief, and in 1890 was by special act put on the retired list of the Army with the rank of Major-General.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE SAD RETREAT FROM SPRINGFIELD.

THE partisans of Gen. Fremont bitterly blamed Gen. David Hunter for having intrigued to succeed Fremont, and they rejoiced that his tenure of that office proved to be so short-lived. This was both fallacious and unjust.

Gen. David Hunter, while not of the highest type of military ability, was yet far above mediocrity. He was one of the best examples of the Old Regular Army officer—thoroughly devoted to his profession, a master of all its details, incorruptible, inflexible, and intolerant to all whose character and conduct lowered the standard of what Hunter thought an American officer should be.

He was born in the District of Columbia, graduated from West Point in 1822, 25th in a class of 40 members, and had an extensive experience in Indian fighting, commanding for several years a troop of dragoons. He resigned in 1836, but re-entered the Army in 1842 as a Paymaster and served as Chief Paymaster of Gen. Wool's Division in the Mexican War.

At the outbreak of the war of the rebellion he had been made Colonel of the 6th U. S. Cav.—a new regiment—and commanded a division at Bull Run, where he showed great gallantry and was wounded. He had been sent out to Fremont as his second in command and adviser, in the hope that he would control in some measure the commander's erratic course and be instrumental in promoting better methods in his administration.

He was true to his duties in communicating to his superiors just what he found in the Department of the West and properly representing Fremont's incompetence. It was not intended that he should have permanent command of the army, and probably no man was less desirous that he should be than he himself, for he had a modest opinion of his own abilities and never hesitated to subordinate himself when he thought another man would do better in the place.

The command was given him merely as a stop-gap until another commander could be determined upon.

In the same envelope which contained Lincoln's letter to Gen. Curtis inclosing the order for the supersedure of Gen. Fremont, was another reading as follows :

Washington, Oct. 24, 1861.

To the Commander of the Department of the West.

Sir: The command of the Department of the West having devolved upon you, I propose to offer you a few suggestions. Knowing how hazardous it is to bind down a distant commander in the field to specific lines and operations, as so much always depends on a knowledge of localities and passing events, it is intended, therefore, to leave a considerable margin for the exercise of your judgment and discretion.

The main rebel army (Price's) west of the Mississippi is believed to have passed Dade County in full retreat upon northwestern Arkansas, leaving Missouri almost freed from the enemy, excepting in the southeast of the State. Assuming this basis of fact, it seems desirable, as you are not likely to overtake Price, and are in danger of making too long a line from your own base of supplies and reinforcements, that you should give up the pursuit, halt your main army, divide it into two corps of observation, one occupying Sedalia and the other Rolla, the present termini of railroad; then recruit the condition of both corps by reestablishing and improving their discipline and instruction, perfecting their clothing and equipments, and providing less uncomfortable quarters. Of course, both railroads must be guarded and kept open, judiciously employing just so much force as is necessary for this. From these two points, Sedalia and Rolla, and especially in judicious cooperation with Lane on the Kansas border, it would be so easy to concentrate and repel an army of the enemy returning on Missouri from the southwest, that it is not probable any such attempt to return will be made before or during the approaching cold weather. Before Spring the

people of Missouri will probably be in no favorable mood to renew for next year the troubles which have so much afflicted and impoverished them during this. If you adopt this line of policy, and if, as I anticipate, you will see no enemy in great force approaching, you will have a surplus of force, which you can withdraw from these points and direct to others, as may be needed, the railroads furnishing ready means of reinforcing their main points, if occasion requires. Doubtless local uprisings will for a time continue to occur, but these can be met by detachments and local forces of our own, and will ere long tire out of themselves.

While, as stated in the beginning of the letter, a large discretion must be and is left with yourself, I feel sure that an indefinite pursuit of Price or an attempt by this long and circuitous route to reach Memphis will be exhaustive beyond endurance, and will end in the loss of the whole force engaged. Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

This letter, undoubtedly dictated by McClellan, who was then the dominant military influence at Washington, is yet strikingly characteristic of President Lincoln, and abounds in that profound common sense which made him easily the first General of the War.

The army was already 125 miles away from its base of supplies on the railroad, with a terrible rough intervening country. Consequently, the problem of supplying it was of momentous seriousness and the expense appalling.

Though in the midst of a region of wonderful fertility, with its crops gathered in barns, no one seems to have thought of utilizing these. They left them for Price to gather in, while they hauled their supplies from Rolla. Our officers as yet were only in the primer class in war.

The letter also shows the firm hold of the prevailing opinion that Secession was only a temporary madness, from which the people would recover when the Winter gave them time to reflect and reason. Probably this would have been the case had the Gov-

ernment put forth its power with crushing effectiveness. But the first year of the war was to end with the Secessionists successful almost everywhere, and big scores to their credit in Missouri. The fresh disaster at Ball's Bluff on the Potomac unnerved many loyal people.

Possibly President Lincoln did not anticipate that his suggestions would be carried out so literally. His best information was that Price's army had virtually gone to pieces, and that by taking post at Sedalia and Rolla the central and southwestern parts of the State could be effectually controlled by parties sent out from there. He could not have conceived that Price had a strong, compact, aggressive army well in hand, and that the new commander of the Department of the West would march away from it without striking a blow or making a manuver to reduce its capacity for harmfulness.

Certainly some shreds of Lyon's mantle must have fallen on that proud array of new-made Generals, and they would insist on striking a quick, sharp blow, as a return for Lexington, for the honor of the Union army, and to curb Price's rising conviction that he was an irresistible conqueror.

But the next day after receiving his assignment to command, Gen. Hunter made a reconnoissance in force to the battlefield of Wilson's Creek, where Fremont had persisted in believing that Price was waiting to give him battle. He found no enemy on the scene of the terrible battle of two months before. Instead, all his information was to the effect that Price was among the rugged fastnesses about Pineville, 50 miles away, with McCulloch still farther off in the Boston Mountains.

Hunter therefore ordered his columns to counter-march and proceeded to carry out the President's instructions promptly and exactly.

This backward movement, without a blow at Price, abandoned the whole of the Union loving country of southwestern Missouri to the Secessionists, and was a measureless calamity.

The Union people, taking heart from the advance of Fremont with his great army, had returned to their homes and attempted to re-establish themselves upon their farms and in their business. All these hopes were suddenly dashed to the ground by the retirement of the army, and they had to flee again in haste before the immediate advance of Price to occupy the abandoned region.

It was not his army which was so terrible, but the horde of guerrilla bands, which rushed out like venomous serpents after a warm rain, intent upon rapine, outrage and murder. It was the "Poor White Trash" let loose under such leaders as Quantrill, the Youngers, Jameses, Haywards, Freemans, and a thousand others of bandit infamy.

Aside from these calamities, the retreat, added to Price's victory at Lexington, was a most stifling moral depression of the Union sentiment in Missouri.

While the condition of things in the greater central and southwestern parts of Missouri had been grievously unsatisfactory for many weeks, and seemed to be growing steadily more so, it was otherwise in the southeastern section.

The so-called Ozark Mountains, which are really a series of rough, picturesque highlands, separating

the watersheds of the Missouri and the Arkansas Rivers, begin on the Mississippi at the mouth of the Meramec River, 20 miles below St. Louis, and extend along the Mississippi, rising frequently into cliffs of limestone 350 feet high, to Cape Girardeau, 44 miles above Cairo, Ill.

This range, less than 100 miles wide, one of the richest in the world in minerals, sinks away on the north and west to the valleys of the Osage and the Missouri and the prairies which stretch across Kansas and the Indian Territory to the Rocky Mountains. To the southeast it falls into the lowlands and swamps along the Mississippi, making there a separate and distinct section—about the size of Connecticut—and of entirely different character from the rest of the State. Over 3,000 square miles of this—or nearly three times the size of Rhode Island—are swamps thickly wooded with towering cypresses, and covered with jungles impenetrable to man. The principal town in the region was New Madrid, a fever-smitten little village on the banks of the Mississippi, 44 miles below Cairo. It had once much promise, but the terrible earthquakes of 1811-12 had seamed the surrounding country with great crevices and gulches, adding hopelessly to its forbidding character, and giving a mortal blow to New Madrid's expectations.

The region was drained—as far as it was drained—by the St. Francis River, a considerable stream, navigable nearly to the Missouri line, and emptying into the Mississippi nine miles above Helena, Ark.

Besides the Mississippi River there were then two routes of access from St. Louis to this region. One was by the Iron Mountain Railroad, which ran

through the Ozarks to Pilot Knob, 84 miles from the city, and the other by common road through Fredericktown, 105 miles from St. Louis.

Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston—regarded by Jefferson Davis as a great military genius, and appointed to command the entire Confederate army in the West—had some idea of moving an army up through the swamps to these roads, flanking the Union position at Cairo and taking St. Louis. The St. Francis River would aid in supplying the army. His immediate subordinate, Maj.-Gen. Polk, was still more in favor of the plan, and it went in this proportion down through Gen. Gideon Pillow, with his "Army of Liberation," to the most enthusiastic advocate of the scheme, our poetical acquaintance, Gen. M. Jeff Thompson, the "Swamp Fox of Missouri." The idea was to move in concert with Price coming up from the southeast.

Maj.-Gen. Leonidas Polk, C. S. A., who had been placed in command of the Mississippi River, and subsequently had the States of Arkansas and Missouri added to his Department, had gathered about him in the neighborhood of Memphis some 25,000 or 30,000 Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee and other troops, with which, scorning Kentucky's claim of neutrality, he advanced to Columbus, Ky., the terminus of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, and 20 miles from Cairo, Ill. Upon the high bluff there he proceeded to construct one of those "Gibraltars" so numerous in the early history of the war.

With the force at his command and the opposition he was likely to meet from the Union commanders in southeast Missouri, a march on St. Louis by the roads indicated was a promising venture. Besides

the forces immediately around him, he had control of McCulloch's, Pearce's and Hardee's columns in Arkansas, and potential control of Price's and Thompson's Missouri forces, making altogether an aggregate approaching 70,000 men.

But he hesitated, while Pillow fretted and fumed, and wrote that while he honored his superior officer as a prelate and admired him as a patriot, he had small opinion of his military judgment.

M. Jeff Thompson, who had no mean opinion of his own abilities, wrote to Jefferson Davis that what the Southern Confederacy needed in that quarter was "a first-class leader," and he cast a unanimous vote for himself for that position.

In the meantime an event occurred as to the significance of which Polk, Pillow and Thompson were as unappreciative as the country at large.

In August, U. S. Grant, lately commissioned a Brigadier-General, was sent down to Cape Girardeau to look after matters in southeast Missouri, including Cairo, Ill., and he took with him his former regiment, the 21st Ill., to the command of which Col. John W. S. Alexander had succeeded. A peculiarity of Gen. Grant, which President Lincoln speedily noticed, was that wherever he was "things kept moving." There were no grand reviews, no sounding proclamations, no sensational announcements of plans, but somehow everybody about him was found to be speedily employed in an effective way against the enemy. But little clamor ever came from Grant for reinforcements or additional strength. If he was given a thousand men he at once set them to work doing all that 1,000 men were capable of. Given 2,000 men he would do twice as much, and so on. If

supplies were not furnished him, he gathered them from the surrounding country, giving vouchers carefully based on the prevailing market rates. If no wagons or teams were at hand, he impressed them and gave vouchers.

As unassertive and modest as Grant seemed to be, he had a remarkable faculty for bringing in everybody near him and securing from them prompt and energetic obedience to his orders.

Among Gen. Grant's subordinates was our old acquaintance, Capt. J. B. Plummer, who had done such good work at Wilson's Creek and who was now in command of the 11th Mo. There was also Col. W. P. Carlin, a Captain in the Regular Army, whom the Governor of Illinois had wisely made Colonel of the 38th Ill. Carlin, a graduate of West Point in the class of 1850, was a somewhat austere, highstrung man, wrapped up in his profession, an excellent soldier, and feverishly anxious to do his duty and justify his promotion to the important position he held.

Like all Regulars he was jealously sensitive about his rank, and one of his first performances was insistence that he outranked Col. C. E. Hovey, of the 33d Ill., and should therefore have command of the post. Hovey, who had been Principal of the Normal Institute before becoming a Colonel, felt that his position had been quite as high as that of a Captain in the Regular Army, and his men, who entered warmly into the dispute, could hardly understand how the Colonel of the 38th Ill. could outrank the Colonel of the 33d, and though they at last gave way, there was some bitterness of feeling.

Though Gen. Grant had only about 14,000 men all told, he kept Johnston, Polk and Thompson, with

their 30,000, so well employed guarding points that he threatened, or might take without threatening, that their superiority was neutralized and they were kept on the defensive.

Burning with desire to do something, M. Jeff Thompson, who, in spite of his gasconade, was really a brave, enterprising man, and a good deal of a soldier, started out from Columbus early in October with some 2,000 men, expecting to be joined by other forces on the way, capture Ironton and Fredericktown, open up the road for Pillow's columns to St. Louis, and to co-operate with Gen. Price.

He went down the river in boats to New Madrid and there began a march across the country toward Bloomfield, which was to become the base of so many of his subsequent operations. Leaving his infantry under the command of Col. Aden Lowe, of the 3d Mo. State Guards, a prominent young attorney and politician, to follow more slowly, Thompson pushed on with 500 mounted men, whom he calls "dragoons," made a wide circuit, and struck the railroad north of Ironton at Big River Bridge, only about 40 miles from St. Louis. He had made astonishing progress so far, and jubilantly reported to Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, who had come to Columbus to watch the movement, that his men were so anxious to fight that he reached his objective point two days ahead of the appointed time.

At the Big River Bridge he struck a small company of a somewhat noted regiment, the 33d Ill. (the Normal Regiment), largely made up of students and teachers in the Normal Institute of Illinois, who, despite the disparity in numbers, gave him a sharp little fight, in which he lost two killed and quite a

number wounded. He reported having captured 45 prisoners, with a quantity of supplies, and succeeded in burning the bridge across the river. While engaged in distributing the supplies, another company of the 33d Ill., hearing the noise, came up to the assistance of their comrades, and Thompson had another fight on his hands, in which he admits he lost four men killed and quite a number wounded, but insists that he "killed another lot of the enemy and took 10 prisoners." He said he "had the enemy terribly frightened," and that if Albert Sidney Johnston had the rest of his men in striking distance that he could take Ironton, with its 12,000,000 rations stored for the Winter, in an hour.

Johnston transmitted Thompson's report to Richmond with a complimentary indorsement. Thompson also reported having received several hundred recruits and captured about 17,000 pounds of lead. These were destined to be the last of his rejoicings for some time.

Thompson sent word to all the commanders of Confederate forces in the neighborhood to join in his attack on Ironton, promising them victory and unlimited spoils.

Gen. Grant ordered Col. Carlin to move forward with his force from Pilot Knob and attack Thompson's main body, which was then in the neighborhood of Fredericktown. He also ordered Col. J. B. Plummer to march from Cape Girardeau, strike at Thompson's line of retreat, and endeavor to capture his whole force.

Thompson had cunningly magnified the number of his troops, and Plummer and Carlin were both impressed with the idea that he had somewhere in

the neighborhood of 5,000 or 6,000 men and was likely to be joined by Gen. Hardee's column from Pocahontas, Ark., with many more.

Grant, with that accurate knowledge of his enemy which was one of his conspicuous traits and never failed him at any time during the war, informed them that Thompson had only between 2,000 and 3,000 men. As usual in Grant's operations, the columns moved on time and arrived when expected.

Col. Carlin moved Oct. 20 from Pilot Knob with about 3,000 men made up of the 21st Ill., Col. Alexander; 33d Ill., Col. C. E. Hovey; 38th Ill., Maj. Gilman; 8th Wis., Col. Murphy; part of the 1st Ind. Cav., Col. Conrad Baker, and some of the guns of the 1st Mo. Art., under the charge of Maj. Schofield.

Col. Plummer's column, about 1,500 strong, consisted of the 17th Ill., Col. Ross; 20th Ill., Col. Marsh; 11th Mo., Lieut.-Col. Panabaker; Lieut. White's section of Taylor's Illinois Battery, and two companies of cavalry commanded by Capts. Stewart and Langen.

Col. Plummer moved to Dallas, on Johnston's line of retreat, and there sent through a messenger to Col. Carlin, stating where he was and what his intentions were, so that the two forces could cooperate. The messenger was captured by some of the Missourians, and therefore Thompson came into possession of the plans of his enemies. He moved back with his train until he saw it safely on its way to Greenville, and then returned with his command toward Fredericktown to accommodate his opponents with a fight if they desired it and to gain time for his train to get back to Bloomfield and New Madrid.

Not finding Thompson at Dallas, Col. Plummer moved up to Fredericktown, arriving there at noon, Monday, Oct. 21, and found that Col. Carlin had arrived with his forces about 8 o'clock in the morning. There was immediately one of those squabbles over rank which were so frequent on both sides during the early part of the war and not absent from its history at any time.

In spite of being a younger man than Col. Plummer, a younger Captain in the Regular Army, and in spite of Plummer's experience in the Mexican War and at Wilson's Creek, Carlin insisted upon the command of the whole, upon the grounds that he had been commissioned a Colonel Aug. 15, and by the Governor of Illinois; while Plummer's commission was from Fremont. Carlin insisted that he had a plan by which Thompson's whole force could be captured, but was at length induced to yield the command to Plummer, who went ahead with the combined force to attack Thompson, leaving Carlin, who was exhausted and ill, in town with a portion of his command.

Possibly, what helped induce Carlin to yield was the knowledge of an agreement between Col. Plummer and Col. Ross, of the 17th Ill., who outranked both of them, that if Carlin persisted in his claim, Ross should assert his seniority and take command of the whole. Carlin retained the 8th Wis. and two 24-pound howitzers in Fredericktown to hold the place, while Plummer took the rest of the force and started out in search of Thompson.

He did not have to go very far.

A half mile from town shots were heard, and the cavalry came back with the information that the

enemy was just ahead. The leading infantry regiment, the 17th Ill., went into line to the left and moved forward into a cornfield, where the enemy's skirmishers were immediately encountered.

Lieut. White came up with his section of artillery and opened fire upon a hill about 600 yards distant where it was likely that Thompson had his artillery masked. Thompson's guns could not stand the punishment quietly and opened up only to be speedily suppressed by other guns which Maj. Schofield hurried up to join two which had been firing.

Col. Lowe, commanding the Missouri State Guards, first engaged, was soon shot through the head and his regiment began falling back before the steady advance of the 17th Ill., to which was soon added the fire of the 33d Ill. and a part of the 11th Mo.

At first the Missourians fell back steadily, but after the rough handling of the artillery their retreat became a rout and Col. Baker dashed forward with the 1st Ind. Cav. in pursuit. A half mile in the rear Thompson succeeded in rallying his men and also brought one piece of artillery into action, receiving the cavalry with a fierce volley, by which Maj. Gavitt, who had been active and prominent in the operations in that section, and Capt. Highman were killed.

Notwithstanding this, the cavalry rallied, charged, and took the gun, which they had, however, to soon give up under a charge led by Thompson himself.

The 17th Ill. had already secured one gun, and now as the infantry came up Thompson's men broke and retreated rapidly in every direction. Hearing the noise of the fighting, Col. Carlin arose from a

sick-bed, galloped to the battlefield, and took command of a part of the troops. The pursuit was continued by the infantry for 10 miles, and by the cavalry 12 miles farther, when it was decided that Thompson's men had scattered and gained a refuge in the swamps, and that further pursuit would be useless.

Plummer recalled his forces to Fredericktown. He claims that he took 80 prisoners, of whom 38 were wounded, and buried 158 of Thompson's dead, with other bodies being found from time to time in the woods. His own loss he reports as six killed and 16 wounded.

Thompson reported that he had lost 20 killed, 27 wounded, and 15 prisoners, but that he "had mowed down the enemy as with a scythe;" that "they acknowledge a loss of 400 killed and wounded," etc., etc. He admitted he had lost one cannon by its being disabled so that it could not be brought from the field. He said that his "dragoons" had stampeded in a shameful way, but that his infantry had behaved very well. Later, he reported from New Madrid that his command was "very much demoralized."

Gen. Polk seems to have been much depressed by the news of Thompson's defeat, because he ordered an abandonment of the post at New Madrid and the bringing over of the men and guns to his "Gibraltar" at Columbus.

Gen. Grant, though probably disappointed at the failure of his plans to capture Thompson's force, was careful to write complimentary letters to all the commanders, recognizing their good services in the expedition.

The fight at Fredericktown quieted things pretty effectually in southeastern Missouri, and ended for a long while the project of capturing St. Louis by the New Madrid route.

Gen. Grant was preparing some startling things to occupy the attention of Johnston, Polk and Pillow in quite another quarter.

CHAPTER XV.

GEN. H. W. HALLECK IN COMMAND.

HENRY WAGER HALLECK, who succeeded Gen. Fremont in command of the Department of Missouri, Nov. 9, 1861, had been pointed to as a brilliantly shining example of what West Point could produce. He was born in 1819 near Utica, N. Y., of a very good family, and had graduated July 1, 1839, from West Point, third in a class of which Isaac I. Stevens, afterward to conclude a brilliant career by dying a Major-General on the field of battle, was the head. Other conspicuous members of the class were Maj.-Gens. James B. Ricketts, E. O. C. Ord, H. J. Hunt, and E. R. S. Canby, of the Union army, and A. R. Lawton, a Confederate Brigadier-General. Halleck was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers, and during the Mexican War received a couple of the brevets so easily won in that conflict.

With his attainments and cast of mind, he made an admirable staff officer for Commodore Shubrick and Gens. Mason and Riley in their administration of California while the territory was being reduced to an American possession. He became a Captain in his Corps in 1852, but the opportunities in California were so tempting, that he resigned to enter the practice of the law and embark in various business enterprises of railroad building and quicksilver mining. He was unusually successful in all these, becoming Director-General of the New Almaden Quicksilver Mining Company, President of a rail-

road, and a member of a leading law firm. He kept up his military connection by accepting the commission of Major-General commanding the California Militia.

He was a constant student and a ready writer, and during this time published a number of military and scientific books, some of which were original and others translations.

Intellectually, professionally and socially he stood very high, and the bestowal of a Major-General's commission upon him, dating from Aug. 19, 1861, met with universal approval, though it gave him seniority in that coveted rank to many distinguished soldiers. At that time Halleck was in his 46th year and the very prime of his powers. He was tall, spare, and commanding in figure, with a clean-shaven, authoritative, intellectual face in which men read great things. He had large, searching eyes, which seemed to penetrate the one with whom he was talking. As far as education and observation could go, Halleck was as complete a soldier as could be produced. Whatever could be done by calculation and careful operation, he could do on a high plane. He only lacked military instinct and soldierly intuition. Of that moral force which frequently overleaps mere physical limitation he seems to have had little, nor could he understand it in others.

There was in him none of the fiery zeal of Lyon, or the relentless pugnacity of Grant; apparently these qualities were so absent in him that he did not know how to deal with them in others. He never put himself at the head of his troops to lead them in battle.

He could build up, block by block, with patient cal-

ulation, without comprehension that somewhere might be a volcanic energy suddenly unloosed which would scatter his blocks like straws.

If he had political convictions, they were so unobtrusive as to be rarely mentioned in connection with him. Probably his views were the same as generally prevailed among the Regular Army officers of that day which were represented by the attitude of the Douglas Democrats and "Old Line Whigs."

He believed, above all things, in law and system, and wanted all the affairs of this world to go ahead in strict accordance with them. The soldier epithet of "Old Brains" was bestowed upon him, and he seemed to relish the appellation.

In the long and specific letter of instructions accompanying his assignment to command, Gen. McClellan directed him to carefully scrutinize all commissions and appointments, and revoke those not proceeding from the President or Secretary of War; to stop all pay and allowances to them, and if the appointees gave any trouble, send them out of the Department, and if they returned, place them in confinement. He was to examine into the legality of all organizations of troops serving in the Department, and deal with those unauthorized in a similar summary way. All contracts were to be rigidly probed, and payment suspended on those of which there was the slightest doubt. All officers who had in any way violated their duty to the Government were to be arrested and brought to prompt trial.

Halleck began at once to justify the high expectations entertained of him. Order and system followed the erratic administration of his predecessor. Soldiers were subjected to vigorous discipline, but they

were given the supplies to which they were entitled, and they were made to feel that they were being employed to some purpose.

The futile and aggravating marches made in pursuit of the elusive guerrillas and bushwhackers, who were never caught, were replaced by well-directed movements striking at the heart of the trouble.

Acting under Gen. Price's orders sometimes, but frequently under their own impulses to commit outrages, inflict blows, and create excitement, a large part of the State was covered by bands of guerrillas who appeared as citizens, were well armed, rode good horses, and were annoyingly successful in sweeping down on the railroad stations, water tanks, bridges, and settlements of Union people, burning, destroying, and creating havoc generally.

Gen. Halleck proclaimed martial law, and issued an order that any man disguised as a peaceful citizen, if caught in the act of burning bridges, etc., should be immediately shot. The troops proceeded to execute this order with good hearts. A large number of the offenders were shot down in the neighborhoods where they had committed their offenses; others were taken before a military commission and condemned to the same fate.

Gens. Pope, Prentiss, Schofield and Henderson were given sufficient forces and ordered to move directly upon the more important bodies of Secessionists who formed a nucleus and support for these prepredators. They all did so with good effect.

Gen. Prentiss moved against a force about 3,000 strong operating in Howard, Boone and Calloway Counties, and succeeded in striking them very

heavily at Mount Zion Church, where they were dispersed with a loss of 25 killed, 150 wounded, 30 prisoners, 90 horses, and 105 stands of arms.

Gen. Pope operating from Sedalia achieved even better success, capturing Col. Robinson's command of 1,300 men and about 60 officers, 1,000 horses and mules, and 73 wagons loaded with powder, lead and supplies and 1,000 stands of arms.

Gen. Prentiss very effectually cleaned out the State north of the Missouri River, and in conjunction with Gen. Pope's operations south of it, made it so threatening for Gen. Price, who had advanced to the Osage River to support the Secessionists there, that he broke up his camp and rather hurriedly retreated to Springfield.

The year 1861 therefore ended with the Union men again in possession of nearly four-fifths of the State, with their hands full of prisoners and supplies captured from the enemy.

The Secessionists of St. Louis had been encouraged by the untoward course of events in the East. After Bull Run had come the shocking disaster of Ball's Bluff, and with Gen. Price only a short distance away on the Osage threatening Jefferson City and north Missouri, they felt their star in the ascendant, and became unbearably insolent. Gen. Halleck repressed them with a vigorous hand, yet without causing the wild clamor of denunciation which characterized Gen. Butler's Administration of New Orleans.

It will be remembered that at that time it was thought quite the thing for young Secessionist women to show their "spirit" and their devotion to the South by all manner of open insult to the Yankee soldiers. Spitting at them, hurling epithets of abuse,

and contemptuously twitching aside their skirts were regarded as quite the correct thing in the good society of which these young ladies were the ornaments. This had become so intolerable in New Orleans, that Gen. Butler felt constrained to issue his famous order directing that women so offending should be treated as "women of the town plying their vocation." This was made the pretext of "firing the Southern heart" to an unwarranted degree, and Jeff Davis issued a proclamation of outlawry against Ben Butler, with a reward for his head.

Sanguine Secessionists hoped that this "flagrant outrage" by "Beast Butler" would be sufficient cause for the recognition of the Southern Confederacy by France and England.

Gen. Halleck met the same difficulty as Butler very shrewdly. The Chief of Police of St. Louis had some measure of control over the disreputable women of the city, and made law for them. Under Gen. Halleck's order he instructed these women to vie with and exceed their respectable sisters in their manifestations of hostility to the Union cause and of devotion to the South. Where the fair young ladies of the Southern aristocracy were wearing Secession rosettes as big as a rose, the women of the demi-monde sported them as big as a dahlia or sunflower. Where the young belle gave a little graceful twitch to her skirts to prevent any possible contamination by touching a passing Yankee, the other class flirted theirs' aside in the most immodest way. It took but a few days of this to make the exuberant young ladies of uncontrollable rebel proclivities discard their Secession rosettes altogether, and subside into dignified, self-respecting persons, who took no more

notice of a passing Union soldier than they did of a lamp-post or tree-box.

Another of Gen. Halleck's orders did not result so happily. It will be remembered that Gen. Fremont declared free the slaves of men in arms against the Government, and that their freedom would be assured them upon reaching the Union lines.

In the inflamed condition of public sentiment in the Border States on the negro question this was very impolitic, and the President promptly overruled the order.

Gen. Halleck went still further in the issuance of the following order, which created as intense feeling in the North as Gen. Fremont's "Abolition order" had excited in the Border States:

It has been represented that important information respecting the number and condition of our forces is conveyed to the enemy by means of fugitive slaves who are admitted within our lines. In order to remedy this evil, it is directed that no such persons be hereafter permitted to enter the lines of any camp, or of any forces on the march, and that any now within such lines be immediately excluded therefrom.

It was particularly distasteful to the Radicals in Missouri who had been represented by Gen. Fremont. During his administration the Union party in the State had divided into two wings—the Radicals and the Conservatives, who soon came to hate each other almost if not quite as badly as they did the Secessionists. The Radicals, or, as their enemies called them, "the Charcoals," were largely made up, as before stated, of the young, aggressive, idealistic Germans who had poured into Missouri after the suppression of the Rebellion of 1848, and who looked upon slavery as they did on "priest-craft" and "despotism"—all monstrous relics of barbarism. They had abso-

lutely no patience with the "peculiar institution," and could not understand how any rational, right-thinking man could tolerate it or hesitate about sweeping it off the earth at the first opportunity. Those of them who had gone into the army had only done so to fight for freedom, and without freedom the object of their crusade was lost.

The German newspapers attacked Halleck with the greatest bitterness, meetings were held to denounce him and secure his removal, and strong efforts were made to obtain Sigel's promotion to a Major-General and his assignment to the command.

Gen. Halleck, in a letter to F. P. Blair, explained and justified this order, as follows:

Order No. 3 was, in my mind, clearly a military necessity. Unauthorized persons, black or white, free or slave, must be kept out of our camps, unless we are willing to publish to the enemy everything we do or intend to do. It was a military, and not a political order.

I am ready to carry out any lawful instructions in regard to fugitive slaves which my superiors may give me, and to enforce any law which Congress may pass. But I cannot make law, and will not violate it. You know my private opinion on the policy of confiscating the slave property of the rebels in arms. If Congress shall pass it, you may be certain that I shall enforce it.

Among other well-taken measures was the passage of a law by Congress authorizing the enrollment of citizens of Missouri into regiments to be armed, equipped and paid by the United States, but officered by the Governor of Missouri, and employed only in the defense of the State. This had many advantages besides giving the services to the Government of about 13,000 very good soldiers. It brought into the ranks many wavering young men who did not want to fight against the Union, nor did they want to fight against the South. To enlist for the "defense of the State" satisfied all their scruples.

The time had come when every young man in the State had to be lined up somewhere. He could not remain neutral; if he was not for the Union he would inevitably be brought into the Secession ranks.

The law authorized the necessary staff and commanding officers for this force, and prescribed that it should be under the command of a Brigadier-General of the United States selected by the Governor of Missouri.

Our old acquaintance, John M. Schofield, Gen. Lyon's Chief of Staff at the battle of Wilson's Creek, who had since done good work in command of a regiment of Missouri artillery, was commissioned a Brigadier-General to date from Nov. 21, 1861, and put in command of the Missouri Enrolled Militia, beginning thus a career of endless trouble, but of quite extended usefulness.

It will be remembered that Brig.-Gen. U. S. Grant, recently promoted from the Colonelcy of the 21st Ill., had been relieved from his command at Jefferson City, and sent to that of a new district consisting of southeast Missouri and southern Illinois. He had made his headquarters temporarily at Cape Girardeau, to attend to M. Jeff Thompson, who was determined to lead the way for Gens. Leonidas Polk and Gideon Pillow into St. Louis by the Mississippi River route. Grant, as we have seen, organized his movements so well that Thompson was driven back from Fredericktown and Ironton with some loss, and returned to his old stamping-ground at New Madrid, below Columbus, Ky., where Polk had established his headquarters and the fighting center of the Confederacy in the West. Polk was reputed to have at that time some 30,000 men under his command, and

Grant, following his usual practice of getting into proximity to his enemy, transferred his headquarters to Cairo, where, also in accordance with his invariable habit, he began to furnish active employment for those under him in ways unpleasant for his adversary. An enemy in the territory assigned to Gen. Grant was never allowed much opportunity to loll in careless indolence. This idiosyncrasy of Gen. Grant made him rather peculiar among the Union Generals at that stage of the war.

Two days after Grant arrived at Cairo he learned that Gen. Polk was moving to take Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee River, 45 miles above Cairo. This was a most important point, as a lodgment there would have stopped navigation on the Ohio, and absolutely controlled that on the Cumberland and Tennessee. Grant at once decided that he would anticipate him and telegraphed for permission to St. Louis, but his telegram and another one still more urgent received no attention, and he proceeded to act on his own volition, loading his men on the steamers and starting for Paducah in the night, arriving there in the morning, thereby anticipating the rebel advance some six or eight hours. This was characteristic of Grant's other operations around Cairo, and it was not long until he had that point not only free from apprehension as to what Polk might do against it with his mighty army, but he had Polk becoming anxious as to what Grant might do against him at Columbus, which he had proclaimed as the "Gibraltar of the West."

Everywhere in his district Grant had introduced the best discipline into the force of 20,000 men which

he had collected. He had looked out carefully for their wants, and had them well supplied, and he was gaining their confidence as well as his own by well directed movements which always led to considerable results.

Fremont, who had at last started out in his grand movement against Price, was fearful that Price's army might be strongly reinforced by Polk from Columbus, and it was made Grant's duty to prevent this.

Grant with his habitual boldness had been desirous of moving directly against Columbus, but the reputed strength of the works and the force there made the suggestion carry shivers to the minds of his superiors, where the memories of Bull Run and Ball's Bluff were so painfully recent. But if Grant was not allowed to do one thing, he would always do another. He heard of a force under M. J. Thompson, numbering about 3,000, on the St. Francois River, about 50 miles to the southwest of Cairo, and promptly started Col. Richard J. Oglesby with about 3,000 men to beat up Jeff Thompson and destroy him.

Later he ordered Col. W. H. L. Wallace to take the remainder of the 11th Ill., and some other troops to move after Oglesby, to give him help should he need it.

Soon after, believing that Jeff Thompson had gotten out of Col. Oglesby's reach, he sent another order to Oglesby to move directly upon New Madrid and take the place. This was a bold performance, for the capture of New Madrid would have placed him on the Mississippi below Columbus and cut off Polk's principal line of supplies.

Urgent dispatches continued to come from Fre-

mont to prevent any reinforcement of Price from Columbus, and Grant started in to impress Gen. Polk with the idea that he would have quite enough to attend to at home. He sent orders to Gen. C. F. Smith, commanding at Paducah, to send a column out to threaten Columbus from that side, and to Col. Marsh to advance from Mayfield, Ky., and Grant himself, gathering up about 3,000 men from the troops he had around Cairo, embarking them on steamers, and under the convoy of two gunboats (the Lexington and Tyler), steamed down the river directly for Columbus, 20 miles away.

Nov. 6 the flotilla dropped down the river to within six miles and in full view of Columbus, and landed a few men on the Kentucky side. This was to still further confuse the mind of Gen. Polk, and make him believe that he must expect an attack on the land side in co-operation with the forces advancing from Paducah and from Mayfield directly in front of Cairo.

Gen. Grant says that when he started out he had no intention of making a fight, and of course did not contemplate any such thing as a direct attack with the force he had upon the immensely superior numbers at Columbus, but he saw his men were eager to do something, and that they would be greatly discontented if they returned without a fight. Therefore, on learning that the enemy was crossing troops to the little hamlet of Belmont, opposite Columbus, presumably with the intention of cutting off and crushing Oglesby, he resolved to strike a blow, and determined to break up the small camp at Belmont, which would give the enemy something else to think about.

About an hour after daybreak he began landing

his men on the west side of the Mississippi River, while the gunboats moved down a little further and waked up the enemy by throwing shells into the works at Columbus. Grant handled his men with the skill he always displayed on the field of battle, pushing forward the main body through the corn fields and woods, but leaving a regiment in a secure position in a dry slough as a resource for an emergency. They with the gunboats were to protect the transports.

Gen. Polk probably saw all this, but interpreted it as a mere feint to get him to send troops across the river and thus strip his fortifications so as to make easier the work of the columns advancing from Paducah and Mayfield. He therefore held his men with him and did not interfere with Grant's movements.

Grant pushed on through the cornfields and woods for a mile or more, and then rearranged his lines and pushed forward a heavy line of skirmishers. By this time the enemy in camp at Belmont had learned of the movement, and started out to meet it. The two lines of skirmishers soon came in contact, and there was a spiteful, bickering fire opened between them. Both sides were expert woodsmen and riflemen, and thoroly at home at this kind of work. The Union line pressed the Confederates slowly back for four hours, receiving and inflicting considerable losses. Grant's horse was shot under him, but he got another, and kept his place in the advance, directing and encouraging the men, whom he says acted like veterans and behaved as well as any troops in the world could have done.

He pushed the enemy so closely that when the latter reached the abatis they broke into confusion and

rushed over the river bank for shelter, yielding possession of their camp to the victorious Unionists.

This triumph completely intoxicated the victors. They broke ranks, threw down their guns, began rummaging through the camps for trophies, running up and down and cheering wildly. Their officers were no better than they. Many of them had been political "spellbinders" in civil life and very naturally proceeded to "improve the occasion" by getting on stumps and delivering enthusiastic Union speeches and addresses of congratulation over the gallantry of their men and the wonderful victory achieved. In vain did Gen. Grant try to recall them to a sense of soldierly duty and discipline. He alone appeared to comprehend the object of the expedition, and what was necessary to be next done. He could not rally enough men to go down the river bank and capture the garrison which was sheltered there. A number of the men who were attracted by the captured cannon began firing them with great jubilation down the river at steamboats which they saw there, and Grant tried to have them, since they would fire guns, turn them upon the steamers which were coming across from Columbus loaded with troops. Polk had at last waked up to what was being done across the river, and began a fire upon Belmont from his siege guns, while he hurried troops aboard steamers to recover the lost position.

The shells began to startle the exultant soldiers, and Grant took advantage of this to employ them in setting fire to the tents and other camp equipage. Presently the sky of victory was overcast by the sudden announcement that the rebels were in line of battle between them and the transports, and that they

were cut off and surrounded. The exultation of victory was followed by almost a panic, but Grant steadied them with the quiet assurance "We have cut our way in here, and we can cut it out again." This was taken up by the officers as they reformed their men for the battle.

Again the skirmish line was pushed forward in search of the enemy, but he offered only a moderate resistance, and the troops made their way back to the transports with little difficulty, though the excitement was tremendous.

The commanders of the gunboats had kept alert, and came promptly forward to engage the guns on the Columbus bluffs and later to discourage the pursuing rebels with liberal volleys of grape and canister, which, as the bend of the river gave them an enfilade on the river line, were delivered with great effect and considerable slaughter.

The troops were gotten again on board the transports without any particular trouble, though about 25 wounded were left in the hands of the enemy. The Union troops had brought off about 175 prisoners and two guns, besides spiking four other cannon.

While the wounded were being gathered up and brought aboard, Gen. Grant rode out some distance to reconnoiter, and almost rode into a body of the enemy. He turned and made his way back to the transports, which were just starting; the Captain recognized him, and held his boat for a moment while Gen. Grant's horse slipped down the steep bank and then trotted on board over the single gangway. The expedition returned to Cairo immediately.

Gen. Grant officially reported his losses as 485 in killed, wounded and missing.

Gen. Polk officially reported his losses as killed, 105; wounded, 419; missing, 117; total, 641. He estimated the Union losses at 1,500; "fourteen-fifteenths of that number must have been killed, wounded or drowned." He also said that he had a stand of colors, something over 1,000 stand of arms, with knapsacks, ammunition, and other military stores.

Medical Director J. H. Brinton gives the following list of losses by regiments:

Command.	Killed.	Wounded
27th Ill. Vol.....	11	47
30th Ill. Vol.....	9	27
31st Ill. Vol.....	10	70
22d Ill. Vol.....	23	74
7th Iowa Vol.....	26	93
Cavalry and Artillery.....	1	11
	—	—
Total.....	80	322

While Gen. Grant and the officers and men under him regarded the affair as a great victory, and deservedly plumed themselves upon their achievements that day, there was a decidedly different opinion taken in the North, and the matter has been the subject of more or less sharp criticism ever since. It was pronounced by the McClellan-Halleck school of military men as a useless waste of men in gaining no object, and probably the most charitable of Gen. Grant's critics could find no better excuse for him than that he was like the man in the Bible who had bought two yoke of oxen and wanted to go and try them. All this did not disturb the equanimity of Gen. Grant and his men in the least. He knew he had accomplished what he had set out to do, to give Gen. Polk

something else to occupy his mind than capturing Oglesby or reinforcing Thompson and Price.

Col. Oglesby made his way unmolested back to Cairo. Polk was probably beginning to think that he would have quite enough to do to stay in Columbus, and his dreams as to St. Louis were dissipated.

Gen. Grant's men knew that they had met their enemies on equal terms in the open field, and had driven them, whether they were in their front or rear, and so they were content.

The Confederates of course proclaimed a great victory, and made the most of it. Albert Sidney Johnston enthusiastically congratulated Polk, Jefferson Davis did the same, and the Confederate Congress passed a resolution of thanks to Maj.-Gen. Polk and Brig.-Gens. Pillow and Cheatham and the officers and soldiers under their commands.

The battle was the occasion of still further increasing the bitterness between Polk and his insubordinate subordinate, Gideon J. Pillow, who resigned his commission, and sent to the Confederate War Department a long and bitter complaint against Gen. Polk, a large part of which was taken up with charges against his superior for non-support when he, Pillow, was engaged in a terrible struggle on the west side of the river with a force "three times my own." Pillow asserted that he had repeatedly driven back the Unionists at the point of the bayonet, after his ammunition had been exhausted, and no more was furnished him by Gen. Polk. He said that Polk had thus needlessly sacrificed many brave men, and that a like, if not greater, calamity was possible if he were to continue in command. "His retention is the

source of great peril to the country." Pillow said: "As a zealous patriot, I admire him; as an eminent minister of the Gospel, I respect him; but as a Commanding General I cannot agree with him."

Southeastern Missouri had, therefore, a season of rest for some time.

CHAPTER XVI.

HUNTER, LANE, MISSOURI AND KANSAS.

MAJ.-GEN. DAVID HUNTER felt that fortune was not smiling on him according to his deserts. He had graduated from West Point in 1822, and had been in the Army 39 years, or longer than any but few of the officers then in active employment. He was a thorough soldier, devoted to his profession, highly capable, inflexibly upright, strongly loyal, an old-time friend of President Lincoln, and enjoyed his full confidence. He had done a very painful piece of necessary work for the Administration in investigating the conditions in Gen. John C. Fremont's command, faithfully reporting them, and in relieving that officer, thereby incurring the enmity of all his partisans. Then he had handed the command over to Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, who had graduated 17 years later than he, and who had been seven years out of the Army.

Gen. Hunter had been assigned to Kansas, which was created a Department for him, but it had few troops, and was remote from the scene of important operations. He was particularly hurt that Brig.-Gen. Don Carlos Buell, 19 years his junior, should be assigned to the command of a splendid army of 100,000 men in Kentucky; and Brig.-Gen. Thos. W. Sherman, 14 years his junior, should be selected to lead an important expedition to the coast of South Carolina and Georgia.

Like the faithful soldier he was, however, he made little plaint of his own grievances, but addressed

himself earnestly to the work to which he was assigned. He soon had other troubles enough to make him forget his own. His hardest work was to keep the Kansans off the Missourians. In the strained and wavering conditions of public opinion, every effort had to be made to prevent any pretext or incentive to take the young men of Missouri into the ranks of Price's army. Gen. Halleck estimated that indignation at the border raids of Lane, Jennison and Montgomery had given Price fully 20,000 men. The years of strife along the borders had arrayed the people in both States against one another. Every Kansan considered every Missourian the enemy of himself and the State, and the feeling was reciprocated by the Missourians.

For years Kansas had been inflicted with raids by the "Poor White Trash," "Border Ruffians," and "Bald Knobbers," who had, beside committing other outrages, carried off into Missouri horses, cattle, furniture, farm implements, and other portable property.

The Kansans held all Missourians responsible for these crimes by the worsser element, and the war seemed a chance to get even. When opportunity offered, Kansas parties invaded Missouri, bringing back with them everything which they could load on wagons or drive along the road.

The great mass of the Missourians still held aloof from both sides, remaining as neutral as they would be allowed. Douglas Democrats, Bell-and-Everett Old-Line Whigs, two-thirds of the entire population, were yet halting between their attachment for the Union and their political and social affiliations. It was all-important that they should be kept loyal, or

at least out of the Confederate camps, hence the stringency of Halleck's orders against any spoliations or depredations by Union troops, and hence his orders that the negroes should be kept out of the camps, and their ownership settled by the civil courts. Every offense by Union soldiers was made the most of by Price's recruiting agents to bring into their ranks the young men for the "defense of the State."

At the head of the vengeful Kansas element was the meteoric James H. Lane, who had for years ridden the whirlwind in the agitation following the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, and the rush of settlers into those Territories. Volumes have been written about "Jim Lane," but the last definitive word as to his character is yet to be uttered. Arch demagogue he certainly was, but demagogues have their great uses in periods of storm and stress. We usually term "demagogues" those men active against us, while those who are rousing the people on our own side are "patriotic leaders." No man had more enemies nor more enthusiastic friends than "Jim Lane."

As with all real leaders of men, the source of his power was a mystery. Tall, thin, bent, with red hair, a rugged countenance and rasping voice, he had little oratorical attractiveness, and what he said never read convincingly in print. No man, however, ever excelled him before an audience, and he swayed men as the winds do the sea.

Lane was born in Lawrenceburg, Ind., in 1814, and was therefore 47 years of age. His father was Amos Lane, a lawyer of great ability, a member of Congress, and conspicuous in Indiana. James H.

Lane went into politics at an early age, and entered the Mexican War as Colonel of the 3d Ind., distinguishing himself at Buena Vista, where he was wounded. Upon the expiration of the term of service of his regiment he raised the 5th Ind., and became its Colonel. This gave him quite a prestige in politics, and he was elected Lieutenant-Governor, and Representative in Congress. The atmosphere of Indiana was, however, too quiet for his turbulent spirit. He broke with his party, joined in the rush to Kansas, and speedily became the leader of the out-and-out Free State men. On the strength of his Mexican War reputation these elected him Major-General of their troops, in the troubles they were having with the Pro-Slavery men and the United State troops sent to assist in making the Territory a Slave State. When the Free State men gained control of the Territory, he was made Major-General of the Territorial troops. His principal lieutenants were James Montgomery and Dr. Charles R. Jennison, brave, daring men, colleagues of "Old Osawatomie Brown," entertaining the same opinions as he with regard to slavery, and with even fewer scruples than he as to other forms of property.

When the United States troops were assisting the Pro-Slavery men, Montgomery and Jennison went into active rebellion at the head of some hundreds of bold, fighting men—"Jayhawkers"—who carried terror into the ranks of their adversaries. They insisted that they were acting according to the light of their own consciences and the laws of God. So terrible did they become that, Nov. 26, 1860, Geo. M. Beebe, Acting Governor of the Territory, reported to President Buchanan that Montgomery and Jenni-

son, at the head of between 300 and 500 "well-disciplined and desperate Jayhawkers," equipped with "arms of the latest and most deadly character," had hung two citizens of Linn County, and frightened 500 citizens of that County into flight from the Territory. One of their number having been captured, was about to be brought to trial before the United States District Court at Fort Scott, and what they alleged was a packed jury. They had proceeded to so frighten the court that the Judge and Marshals incontinently fled to Missouri, leaving a notice on the door that there would be no session of the court. Therefore Gov. Beebe humanely recommended to the President that Montgomery and Jennison be immediately killed, as there would be no peace in the Territory until they were.

In spite of Lane's constant prominence, there was always a faction in Kansas as bitterly his enemies as his friends were enthusiastic for him, and it was ever a question which of the two were the stronger. It demanded his utmost activity and cunning to keep himself on top. Upon the admission of the State, Lane succeeded in having himself elected Senator, but the legality of the proceeding was questioned and this called for more activity to keep himself at the front.

When the Union army retreated after the battle of Wilson's Creek, Aug. 10, there went back with it the 1st and 2d Kan.—all the organized troops the State had in the field. This left the border exposed to the vengeance of Price's on-sweeping hordes, who made loud threats of what they proposed to do. Lane sounded the trumpet. Wilson's Creek with Bull Run had awakened the people to the stern realities of the

contest, and there speedily gathered into camp the men who formed the 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Kan., Montgomery becoming Colonel of the 3d Kan.; Jennison of the 7th (Jennison's Jayhawkers). Lane took command of the troops assembled at Fort Scott, moved out aggressively on Price's flank, gave Rains, who was in command there, a sharp skirmish at Dry Wood, and his manuevers were so menacing that Price called Rains back when within five miles of the Kansas line, relinquishing his cherished idea of "scourging the Abolitionist nest," and pushed on to Lexington. Lane then made a dash into Missouri in Price's rear, fought a lively skirmish at Papinsville, and followed up the retreating Confederates, capturing Osceola, as has been previously stated.

After Gen. Hunter assumed command Lane reappeared with a commission as Brigadier-General of Volunteers, of which he had beguiled President Lincoln, and began playing a game which gave intense annoyance to the bluff, straightforward old soldier. To Hunter he represented that he was there merely as a Senator and a member of the Senate Military Committee, which latter he was not. To the President and War Department he represented that he and Hunter were in brotherly sympathy and confidence, and planning a movement of mighty importance. The "sympathy" and "confidence" part were believed so completely, that the War Department did not take the trouble to communicate with Hunter in regard to the details of the proposed movement.

To his friends and to the press he talked magniloquently about a grand "Southern expedition" to be made up of 8,000 or 10,000 Kansas troops, 4,000 Indians, seven regiments of cavalry, three batteries of

artillery, and four regiments of infantry from Minnesota and Wisconsin, which he would command. It would move from Kansas down into Texas, and there meet an expedition coming up from the Gulf of Mexico. The War Department seems to have been impressed with the feasibility of this, and began ordering troops, officers and supplies to Fort Leavenworth to report to "Brig.-Gen. James H. Lane."

Lane's enemies as well as his friends in Kansas heartily approved of this, as it would take him away from Kansas, and the Kansas Legislature united in a request to have him appointed a Major-General, as that would vacate his seat in the Senate.

General-in-Chief McClellan "invited" Gen. Hunter's attention to the proposed expedition, and suggested that he prepare for it and report what might be necessary. Gen. Hunter replied that he had had no official information as to the expedition, and gently complained that the War Department seemed entirely unmindful of the Commander of the Department, and had consistently ignored him. As to the expedition, he regarded it as impracticable. It was 440 miles from Leavenworth to the nearest point in Texas, and the road was over a wild, barren country, which would require an immense train of supplies for the troops. He had in the Department only about 3,000 men, entirely too few to successfully defend Fort Leavenworth and its valuable supplies against a raid such as Price and McCulloch were continually threatening. He said he knew no such person as "Brig.-Gen. J. H. Lane," to whom so many came with orders to report. He also said that Lane himself now saw that he had raised expectations which he could not fulfill, and that he was seeking to pick a

quarrel with the Department Commander to give him an excuse for dropping the whole business, and was making himself very annoying in a thousand ways.

Secretary Stanton was profoundly distrustful of Lane, and said that he would leave the Cabinet rather than put him in independent command. Finally the matter came to President Lincoln, who wrote the following characteristic letter :

Executive Mansion, Washington, Feb. 10.

Maj.-Gen. Hunter and Brig.-Gen. Lane, Leavenworth, Kan.:

My wish has been and is to avail the Government of the services of both Gen. Hunter and Gen. Lane, and, so far as possible, to personally oblige both. Gen. Hunter is the senior officer, and must command when they serve together; tho in so far as he can, consistently with the public service and his own honor, oblige Gen. Lane, he will also oblige me. If they cannot come to an amicable understanding, Gen. Lane must report to Gen. Hunter for duty, according to the rules, or decline the service.

A. LINCOLN.

Lane, who then thought his seat in the Senate safe, decided that he would rather serve his country in the forum than in the field, and his commission was cancelled. Five years later, dismayed to find he had lost his hold on the people of Kansas by his support of Andrew Johnson, he ended his strange, eventful history with a pistol-shot from his own hand.

Gen. Hunter having reported that the division of Kansas from Missouri was unwise, the Department was merged into Gen. Halleck's command, and Gen. Hunter assigned to duty in South Carolina.

Gen. Halleck's laboriously elaborate system received a little shock so ludicrous as to be almost incredible were it not solemnly told in an official communication by himself to Gen. Sterling Price :

St. Louis, Jan. 27, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price, Commanding, etc., Springfield, Mo.

General: A man calling himself L. V. Nichols came to my headquarters a day or two since, with a duplicate of your letter of the 12th instant. On being questioned, he admitted that he belonged to your service; that he had come in citizen's dress from Springfield, avoiding some of our military posts and passing through others in disguise, and without reporting himself to the Commander. He said that he had done this by your direction. On being asked for his flag of truce, he pulled from his pocket a dirty pocket-handkerchief, with a short stick tied to one corner.

Gen. Halleck then proceeded to read Gen. Price a lecture on the etiquet of flags of truce.

A feature of peculiar pathos was the war storms' reaching and rending of the haven of refuge which the Government had provided for its wards in the Indian Territory. More than a century of bitter struggling between the Creeks, Seminoles, Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws, and the Carolinians, Georgians, Floridians, Alabamians, and Mississippians, marked by murderous massacres and bloody retaliations, had culminated in the Indians being removed in a body from their tribal domains, and resettled hundreds of miles west of the Mississippi, where it was confidently hoped they would be out of the way of the advancing wave of settlement and out of the reach of the land-hungry whites. Their mills, churches, and school houses were reerected there, and the devoted missionaries, the Congregationalists, Methodists, Baptists, Moravians and Jesuits resumed with increased zeal the work of converting them to Christianity and civilization, which had been so far prosecuted with gratifying success.

In their new home they had prospered wonderfully. Their numbers increased until they were estimated from 100,000 to 120,000. Many of them lived in comfortable houses, wore white men's clothes, and

tilled fields on which were raised in the aggregate great quantities of wheat, corn, cotton and potatoes.

They had herds of horses, cattle, sheep and swine large beyond any precedent among the whites. It was common for an Indian to number his horses and cattle by the thousands, while the poorest of them owned scores which foraged in the plenty of limitless rich prairies and bottom land. Churches, school houses and mills abounded, and they had even a printing press, from which they issued a paper and many religious and educational works in an alphabet invented by a full-blood Cherokee. Each tribe constituted an individual Nation under a written Constitution, with a full set of elective officers. Slavery had been introduced by the half-breeds, and the census of 1860 shows the following number of slaves and slave-owners in the five Nations:

	Owners.	Slaves.
Choctaws	385	2,297
Cherokees	384	2,504
Creeks	267	1,651
Chickasaws	118	917
Seminoles.....	—	—

One Choctaw owned 227 negroes.

Into the Territory the Government also gathered other tribes and remnants of tribes, Quapaws, Kiowas, Senecas, Comanches, etc., mostly in the "blanket" stage of savagery.

The dominant sentiment in the civilized tribes was strongly averse to the war and in favor of peace. The memories and traditions as to the meaning of war were too fresh and grievous. The object lessons as to the advantage of peace were everywhere striking and overwhelming. They hoped to maintain a complete neutrality in the struggle, and pleaded to be allowed to do so. June 17, 1861, John Ross, Prin-

cial Chief of the Cherokees, wrote a long official letter to Gen. Ben. McCulloch, in which he said that his people had done nothing to bring about the war, were friends to both sides, and only desired to live in peace.

As in the rest of the South, the Confederates were not listening to any talk of neutrality, and they proceeded as energetically to stifle it as they had the Union and peace advocates in the several Southern States. All the Indian Agents and officials were ardent Secessionists, and at



GEN. ALBERT PIKE.

the head of them was Superintendent Albert Pike, originally a Massachusetts Yankee, and the son of a poor shoemaker. He had gone South as one of the numerous "Yankee schoolmasters" who invaded that section in search of a livelihood, had become a States Rights Democrat, and, as usual with proselytes, was the most zealous of believers. He was a lawyer of some ability, a successful politician, an active worker in Masonry, and made much pretense as a poet. Nothing that he ever wrote survives today.

Each of the Indian Agents began enlisting men into the Confederate service and using them to impose Secession ideas upon their fellow-tribesmen who were either indifferent or actually hostile.

The missionaries, being mostly from the North, were strongly for the Union, and their influence had to be encountered and broken down.

The Indian Agents were commissioned Colonels in the Confederate service, and were expected to raise regiments, with the Chiefs as subordinate officers. The leader among the Agents was Douglas H. Cooper, Agent for the Choctaws, a man of courage, decision and enterprise, who raised a regiment mainly of the half-breeds of the Choctaws and Chickasaws.

The Cherokee regiment was almost wholly half-breeds, with Stand Waitie, a half-breed, courageous, implacable, merciless, as its Colonel. Albert Pike was rewarded for his great service in bringing the Indians into line with a commission of Brigadier-General, C. S. A., and placed in command of the whole force.

Principal Chief John Ross temporarily bowed to superior force and gave his adhesion to the Southern Confederacy. A large portion of his people would not do this. They, with a similar element in the other Nations, gathered around the venerable Chief Hopoeithleyohola, nearly 100 years old, and whose span of life began before the Revolutionary War. He had been a dreaded young war leader against Gen. Jackson in the sanguinary scenes at Fort Mimms, Tallapoosa, and Red Sticks in 1813-14. When he was a boy his people were allied with the Spaniards in Florida to resist the British encroachments upon their tribal empire in Georgia. When he was a War Chief, the British at Pensacola and Mobile had put muskets and ammunition into his hands for his men to resist the North Carolinians, Georgians, Tennesseans and Kentuckians. In every decade he had fought and treated with the grandfathers and fathers of the same men who were trying to

coerce him. Every battle and every treaty had ended in a further spoliation of the "hunting grounds" of his people. He was now to end his career as he began, and consistently pursued it, in stern resistance to his hereditary enemies. He calculated that he could put into the field about 1,500 reliable, well-armed warriors, who would be more than a match for the Indians who had entered into the Confederate service. If the white Confederates came to their assistance, he could make an orderly retreat into Kansas, where he hoped to receive help from Union troops, if they should not have advanced before then.

Col. Douglas H. Cooper was sent against him, and at first tried diplomacy, but the wily old Hopoeithleyohola had seen the results of too many conferences, and refused to be drawn into one. Cooper then assembled a force of 1,400 men, consisting of some companies of white Texas cavalry and the Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole regiments, under their War Chiefs, D. N. McIntosh and John Jumper, and moved out to attack Hopoeithleyohola, who beat them back with considerable loss.

The advance of Gen. Fremont called for the concentration of every available man to oppose him, so Hopoeithleyohola was given a few weeks' respite. As soon, however, as the Union army retreated to Rolla and Sedalia, Col. Cooper resumed his operations against Hopoeithleyohola, who at Chusto-Talasa, Dec. 9, inflicted such a severe defeat upon him that Cooper retreated in a crippled condition to Fort Gibson. There Col. James McIntosh, commanding the Confederate forces at Van Buren, Ark., went to his assistance with some 1,600 mounted Texans and Arkansans, and the combined force closed in upon the

Union Indians at Shoal Creek. Hopoeithleyohola and his Lieutenant, Haleck-Tustenugge, handled their men with the greatest skill and courage in an obstinate battle, but after four hours of resistance the overpowered Union Indians were driven, pursued by Stand Waitie's murderous half-breeds, who took no men and but few women and children prisoners.

Back over the wide, shelterless prairie, bitten by the cruel cold and pelted by the storms of an unusually severe Midwinter, Hopoeithleyohola led his defeated band to a refuge in far-away Kansas. The weather was so severe that Col. Cooper reports some his men as frozen to death as they rode along, but the scent of blood was in the half-breed Stand Waitie's nostrils, and he pressed onward remorselessly.

More than 1,000 men, women and children of Hopoeithleyohola's band left their homes to whiten and mark the dismal trail, and the aged Chief himself died shortly after reaching Fort Scott, where he was buried with all the honors of war.

Upon the fertile Indian Territory descended the war storm which blighted the work of the missionaries, and completely ruined the fairest prospects in our history for civilizing and Christianizing the aborigines. When the storm ended, one-quarter of the people had perished, the fences, houses, mills, schoolhouses and churches were all burnt, and the hundreds of thousands of horses, cattle, sheep and hogs had disappeared so completely that the Government was compelled to furnish the Indians with animals to stock their farms anew.

Sterling Price had reached his zenith in the capture of Lexington, Sept. 20, 1861. In substantial

results it was the biggest achievement of the war that far. Bull Run had been, indeed, a much larger battle, but at Lexington Price had captured 3,000 prisoners, including five Colonels and 120 other commissioned officers; 1,000 horses and mules; 100 wagons; seven pieces of artillery; 3,000 stands of arms; \$900,000 in money, and a very large quantity of Commissary and Quartermaster's supplies.

Though he was to fight nearly four years longer with the greatest enterprise and determination, though he was to command vastly stronger forces, and though he was to be followed by myriads of Missourians with unfaltering courage and enthusiasm, he was never to approach a parallel to this shining achievement.

It was felt that Lexington was only the earnest of incomparably greater things he was going to do in delivering Missouri from the hated Yankees, and making hers the brightest star in the Southern Confederacy, paling with her military glory even historic Virginia. Then McCulloch would come up with his Texans, Louisianians and Arkansans, and Albert Pike with his horde of Indians. There would be such an overthrow and annihilation of their enemies as the world had never before seen, followed by a race to get to St. Louis before Polk, Pillow and M. Jeff Thompson could reach her from down the Mississippi.

Sterling Price was eager to fight Fremont among the rough, high lands south of Springfield, and his ardent followers wanted a repetition of the triumph of Lexington; but McCulloch would not come up from his fastness at Cross Hollows. Without him Sterling Price, his strength depleted by defections on

his long retreat, did not feel warranted in offering battle, even with the advantage of the defensive hills.

McCulloch was importuned to come forward without success. The best comfort he could give Sterling Price was to destroy that part of Missouri and make it worthless to the enemy. McCulloch wanted to advance into Kansas, however, and utterly destroy that Territory, to strike terror to the Abolitionists. It speaks very badly for their intelligence system that both Price and McCulloch maintained, that neither of them was aware for days that the Union army had left Springfield, Nov. 8, on its retreat to Rolla and Sedalia. Although their camps were only some 70 miles from Springfield, they did not learn of the retreat until Nov. 16, when McCulloch, seized at last with a sudden desire to enter Missouri, rushed all his mounted men forward in hopes to capture trains and detachments. They were disgusted to find upon arriving at Springfield that the last Union soldier and wagon had left there more than a week previous.

After some destruction of property, McCulloch sullenly returned to his old position in Arkansas, where, leaving his command to Col. James McIntosh, lately Captain in the United States Army, he departed for Richmond to give the Confederate War Department his version of the occurrences in his territory.

Sterling Price had learned the same day, Nov. 16, of the departure of the Union army, and set his columns in motion northward, announcing that he was going to winter on the Missouri River. Again he sent an appeal to McCulloch to cooperate, but Col. McIntosh declined, on the ground that the troops were not properly clad for the rigorous weather so far north, and, besides, he did not think that the expedition would do any good.

† Sterling Price simply let loose his army on the country evacuated by the Union troops, and a reign of indescribable misery ensued for the Union people and those who were vainly trying to keep the neutral middle of the road. The army was spread out as much as possible in order to gather in recruits and supplies and assert its influence most widely.

From Marshall, in Saline Co., Sterling Price issued a most remarkable proclamation to the people, calling for 50,000 volunteers. He reminded them that their harvests had been reaped, their preparations for Winter had been made, and now they had leisure to do something to relieve the people from the "in-flictions of a foe marked with all the characteristics of barbarian warfare." He admitted that the great mass of the people were not in the war, and especially the substantial portion of the population, for, he said, "boys and small property-holders have in the main fought the battles." He begged, he implored that the herdsman should leave his folds, the lawyer his office, and come into camp to win the victory. He even dropped into poetry in his tearful earnestness, quoting the school boy's declamation from Marco Bozarris:

Strike, till the last armed foe expires;
Strike, for your altars and your fires!
Strike for the green graves of your sires,
God, and your native land!

An infinitely harmful part of the proclamation was the following:

Leave your property at home. What if it be taken—all taken? We have \$200,000,000 worth of Northern means in Missouri which cannot be removed. When we are once free the State will indemnify every citizen who may have lost a dollar by adhesion to the cause of his country. We shall have our property, or its value, with interest.

This was naturally interpreted as meaning ^{the} all those not distinctly favorable to Secession forfeited their property to those who were.

This seemed ample warrant to the Poor White Trash banditti for seizure of the property of any man whose principles might not be of exactly the right shade.

Experience teaches us that that class of people are pretty certain to find heterodox the opinions of any man who has something they may want. It certainly made a very dark outlook for anybody in Missouri to hold moveable property.

The turbid thrasonics of the proclamation shows that it was not written by Price's Adjutant-General, Thomas L. Snead, who was a literary man. He was then absent at Richmond looking after the fences of his General. The proclamation sounds the more as if it came from the pen of our poetical acquaintance, M. Jeff Thompson, the "Swamp Fox" of the Mississippi. It concluded in this perfervid style:

But, in the name of God and the attributes of manhood, let me appeal to you by considerations infinitely higher than money! Are we a generation of driveling, sniveling, degraded slaves? Or are we men who dare assert and maintain the rights which cannot be surrendered, and defend those principles of everlasting rectitude, pure and high and sacred, like God, their author? Be yours the office to choose between the glory of a free country and a just Government, and the bondage of your children! I will never see the chains fastened upon my country. I will ask for six and one-half feet of Missouri soil in which to repose, but will not live to see my people enslaved.

Do I hear your shouts? Is that your war-cry which echoes through the land? Are you coming? Fifty thousand men! Missouri shall move to victory with the tread of a giant! Come on, my brave boys, 50,000 heroic, gallant, unconquerable Southern men! We await your coming.

STERLING PRICE,
Major-General Commanding.

Sterling Price established his headquarters again

at Osceola, on the banks of the Osage, but sent forward Gens. Rains and Steen to Lexington, the best point on the Missouri to hold the river and afford a passage for recruits coming in from the northern part of the State.

The results of the proclamation were not commensurate with the desperate urgency of the appeal. Large parties of recruits, it is true, tried to make their way toward Price's camp, but many of them were intercepted, and dispersed; strong blows were delivered against Price's outlying detachments, driving them in from all sides. Meanwhile those he had in camp were melting away faster than new ones were coming in.

Sterling Price had other troubles. He was not a favorite in Richmond. Jefferson Davis was a man never doubtful as to the correctness of his own ideas, and he was most certain of those relating to military men and affairs. He had had extraordinary opportunities for familiarizing himself with all the fighting men, and possible fighting men, in the country. He graduated from West Point in 1828, 23d in a class of 33; none of whom, besides himself, became prominent. He had served seven years as a Lieutenant in the Regular Army on frontier duty, and as Colonel of a regiment in the Mexican War, where he achieved flattering distinction. He had been four years Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, and four years Secretary of War. It must be admitted that his judgment with regard to officers was very often correct; yet he was a man of strong likes and dislikes. His reputation was that of "having the most quarrels and the fewest fights of any man in the Army." Undoubtedly his partialities

drew several men into the Confederate army who would otherwise have remained loyal, and his antipathies retained some men in the Union army who would otherwise have gone South. His reasons for disliking Price are obscure, further than that Price was a civilian, who had had no Regular Army training or experience, and that he believed Price to be in conspiracy to set up a Trans-Mississippi Confederacy. But little evidence of such intention is to be found anywhere, yet that little was sufficient for a man of Davis's jealous, suspicious nature. Repeatedly, at the mere mention of Price's name, he flew into an undignified passion and denounced him unsparingly.

Price's men were carrying havoc as far as they could reach. Nov. 19 they burned the important little town of Warsaw, the County seat of Benton County and a Union stronghold. In 1860 the people of Benton County had cast but 74 votes for Lincoln and but 100 for Breckinridge, while they gave Bell and Everett 306 votes and Douglas 574. Dec. 16 Platte City, County seat of Platt County, was nearly destroyed by them. This was another Union community, and a large majority of the people were Bell-and-Everett Unionists or Douglas Democrats. Dec. 20 a concerted foray of guerrillas and bushwhackers burnt the bridges and otherwise crippled nearly 100 miles of Northern Railroad. But Halleck's splendid systematizing had begun to tell. The northern part of Missouri was made unbearably hot for bridge-burners and other depredators by the swift execution of a number of "peaceful citizens" caught red-handed, and the probability that others would be caught and served in the same way. Gen. John Pope,

commanding in Central Missouri, began at last to show the stuff that was in him, and by a skillful movement got into the rear of Rains and Steen, compelling them to hurriedly abandon the line of the Missouri River, and striking them so sharply in their flight as to capture 300 prisoners, 70 wagons, with loads of supplies for Price's army, and much other valuable booty. Another of Pope's columns, under Col. Jeff C. Davis, surprised a camp at Milford, Dec. 18, and forced its unconditional surrender, capturing three Colonels (one of whom was a brother of Gov. Magoffin, of Kentucky), 17 Captains, and over 1,000 prisoners, 1,000 stands of arms, 1,000 horses and mules, and a great amount of supplies, tents, baggage, and ammunition. In a couple of weeks Gen. Pope, with a loss of about 100 men, captured 2,500 prisoners.

Jan. 2 Gen. Fred Steele, commanding at Sedalia, and a level-minded man, who kept himself well informed, telegraphed to Gen. Halleck:

Price's whole force not over 16,000. In all 63 pieces of artillery, none rifled. Horses very poor. Price says he is going to Jefferson City as soon as they are organized. At present he has no discipline; no sentinels or picket to prevent passing in and out. Rains drinking all the time. Price also drinking too much.

Clearly Price had in him none of the startling aggressiveness which distinguished Lyon and Stonewall Jackson. He made no effort to suddenly collect his forces and inflict an overwhelming blow upon one after another of the columns converging upon him and defeat them in detail. Instead, he lost heart, and, abandoning the strong lines of the Osage and the Pomme de Terre, fell back to Springfield, where comfortable quarters were built for his men, and he

gathered in an abundance of supplies from the Union farmers of the surrounding country, expecting that he would be left undisturbed until Spring.

Thus the year 1861 ended with some 61 battles and considerable skirmishes having been fought on the soil of Missouri, with a loss to the Union side of between 500 and 600 killed, treble that number wounded, and about 3,600 prisoners.

The Confederate loss was probably in excess in most of the engagements. Besides, they had lost fully four-fifths of the State, and were in imminent danger of being driven from the restricted foothold they still retained in the southwestern corner.

The Union State Government, with the conservative, able Hamilton R. Gamble at the head, was running with tolerable smoothness. Courts were sitting in most of the Counties to administer justice. Under Halleck's orders Judges, Sheriffs, Clerks, jurors, parties and witnesses had to take the oath of allegiance. Gen. Schofield was rapidly organizing his 13,000 Missouri Militia to maintain peace in the State, and incidentally to keep many of the men enrolled out of the rebel army.

CHAPTER XVII.

PRICE DRIVEN OUT OF THE STATE.

WHEN he abandoned the strong line of the Osage and took up his position at Springfield, Gen. Sterling Price, like the Russians against Napoleon, relied upon his powerful allies, Gens. January, February and March. At that time the roads in Missouri were merely rough trails, running over hills and deep-soiled valleys of fertile loam, cut every few miles by rapid streams. The storms of Winter quickly converted the hills into icy precipices, the valleys into quagmires, and the streams into raging torrents. The Winters were never severe enough to give steady cold weather, and allow operations over a firmly-frozen footing. Rain, sleet and snow, hard frosts and warm thaws alternated with each other so frequently as to keep the roads in a condition of what the country people call a "breakup," when travel is very difficult for the individual and next to impossible for an army.

When, therefore, at the last of December, Gen. Price returned to Springfield, in the heart of the rich farming district of southwest Missouri, and 125 miles or more distant from the Union bases—Rolla and Sedalia, at the ends of the railroads, he had much reason for believing he would be left undisturbed for at least two months, which rest he very much needed to prepare for the strenuous campaign that he knew the industrious Halleck was organizing against him. He wanted the rest for many reasons. Yielding to the strong pressure of Missourians, Jef-

person Davis had agreed to appoint Price a Major-General, C. S. A., but upon the condition that he bring in the Confederate service a full division of Missouri troops.

With his towering influence in Missouri this would not have been a difficult thing to do with the whole State to draw from. It was quite otherwise with three-fourths of Missouri held by the Union troops and Halleck's well-laid nets everywhere to catch parties of recruits trying to make their way to Price.

Still, Price was justified in his confidence that the Union troops would be satisfied with holding northern and central Missouri during the Winter, and would not venture far from their base of supplies on the Missouri River and the termini of the railroads at Rolla and Sedalia.

Whatever aggressive disposition they might have which the condition of the roads would not dampen would be quelled by the knowledge that McCulloch's army of Texans, Louisianians, Arkansans and Indians lay at Cross Hollow, within easy supporting distance of him.

Therefore, Price settled down at Springfield, and his men built comfortable cabins in which to pass the time until Spring. The Union farmers in the country roundabout were stripped of their grain and cattle for supplies, and Price proceeded with the organization of his Confederate division.

Jefferson Davis's feelings toward Price and Missouri are in a measure revealed in the following querulous letter, which also indicates Mr. Davis's tendencies to pose as a much-enduring, martyr-like man:

Hon. W. P. Harris, Confederate States Congress.

My Dear Sir: Language was said by Talleyrand to be useful for the concealment of one's thoughts; but in our day it fails to communicate any thought. If it had been otherwise, the complaint in relation to Gen. Price of which you speak could not have been made. The Commissioners of Missouri were informed that when that State offered troops they would be organized according to our military laws, and Generals would be appointed for brigades and divisions. Until then I have no power to appoint Generals for those troops. The same statements, substantially, were made to the members of Congress from Missouri who called on me yesterday. They were also informed that, from conversation with informed persons and from correspondence now on file in the War Department, I was convinced that it was needful to the public interest that a General should be sent to the Arkansas and Missouri Division who had not been connected with any of the troops on that line of operations; and to the statement that the Missouri troops would not fully enlist under any one except Gen. Price, I asked if they required their General to be put in command of the troops of Arkansas, of Texas, and of the other Southern States. To bring these different forces into harmonious co-operation is a necessity. I have sought to effect it by selecting Gen. Heth to command them in combination. If it is designed, by calling Heth a West Point Cadet, merely to object to his education in the science of war, it may pass for what it is worth; but if it be intended to assert that he is without experience, his years of active and distinguished service on the frontier of Missouri and the territory west of it will, to those who examine before they censure, be a sufficient answer. The Federal forces are not hereafter as heretofore to be commanded by pathfinders and holiday soldiers, but by men of military education and experience in war. The contest is therefore to be on a scale of very different proportions than that of the partisan warfare witnessed during the past Summer and Fall. I have long since learned to bear hasty censure, in hope that justice, if tardy, is sure; and in any event to find consolation in the assurance that all my ends have been my country's.

With high respect,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

Gen. Ben McCulloch thought best to go on to Richmond to explain his course since Wilson's Creek, and also to look after the very tender subject of his rank and powers. He left Gen. James S. McIntosh in command of his troops. McIntosh had grievances of his own. He was not being recognized by the Confederate authorities as he thought a man of his abilities and soldierly experience should have been, and he

seems to have liked cooperation with Gen. Price very much less even than did Gen. McCulloch. In no very gentlemanly terms he repelled Price's proposition to combine their forces and push forward to the Missouri River. The best that Price could get out of him was the assurance that if the Federals advanced upon him at Springfield he, McIntosh, would come forward to his assistance.

Price had greatly underestimated Gen. Halleck's energy and aggressiveness. Gen. Halleck was the first of our commanders to really rise to the level of the occasion and take a comprehensive grasp upon affairs. Unlike some others, he wasted no time in sounding proclamations or in lengthy letters of advice to the Administration as to the political conduct of the war. He was a soldier, proud of his profession, true to his traditions, and possibly had ambition to be reckoned among the great commanders. He had been noted for high administrative ability, and this trait was well illustrated in his grasp of the situation in Missouri and on the borders of the State. His main communications to the people were orders, plain, practical, and to the point. Whatever he did was on the highest plane of the science of warfare as he understood it.

Proper military discipline and subordination were introduced everywhere and a rigid system of accountability. He had troubles with his own men to add to his difficulties with the enemy. We find the most note of this with reference to the Germans.

The Missouri Germans were a splendid lot of men, taken as a whole, and had an unusual number of officers who were trained soldiers of considerable military experience. At the head of this class was Gen.

Peter J. Osterhaus, who had been a private soldier under Lyon in securing the Arsenal, and had commanded a battalion with high credit to himself at Wilson's Creek. He was now a Colonel commanding a brigade.

With this excellent material there was a large per cent that ranged from worthless to actually criminal. Many adventurers from the European armies had hastened to this country to sell their swords to the best advantage, and many black sheep, who had been forced out of their armies, sought in our troubles and our ignorance of military matters an opportunity for their own exaltation and profit. Halleck dealt with all with a firm, unsparing hand. He began to weed out the worthless officers and to court-martial the rascals. Company, battalion and regimental organizations which he found too mutinous and disorderly for hopeful management, he either disarmed and set to hard labor or discharged from the service.

The raids of the vengeful Kansans across the Missouri borders gave him excessive annoyance, and he issued orders that all Kansas parties entering the State should be arrested and disarmed. That he might have more complete control of them, however, he recommended that the Department of Kansas be merged with his command, and as this was in harmony with Gen. Hunter's ideas, it was subsequently done. In the meanwhile he had to look out for the Mississippi River and the highly important point of Cairo. He started to construct a fleet of gunboats to help control the river and assist the Army in its operations. His next neighbor to the eastward was Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, commanding the Department

of the Ohio, which extended from the Cumberland River to the Allegheny Mountains. Gen. Buell's complete cooperation was necessary to the management of affairs in the Mississippi Valley, but this seems to have been difficult to secure. Buell had his own ideas, and they frequently did not harmonize with those of Gen. Halleck. Halleck recommended that Buell's Department be put under his own command, which was also done later.

Bridge-burning and other outrages by straggling bands claiming to be Confederates seriously disturbed the peace, embarrassed operations, and worried the Commanding General. Halleck reported that within 10 days prior to Jan. 1, 1862, these bridge-burners had destroyed \$150,000 worth of railroad property and that they had concocted a plan to burn, simultaneously, every railroad bridge in the State, and set fire to the city of St. Louis in a number of places. In his comprehensive order advising summary and severe punishment against these marauders he took careful guards against such being made the pretext for any private vengeance or official malice, and instituted Military Commissions of not less than three responsible officers, acting under the solemnity of an oath, and making written reports of their proceedings. This order brought down a storm of abuse from the Secessionist and semi-Secessionist press, which Halleck calmly disregarded.

Gen. Sterling Price on Jan. 12 wrote Gen. Halleck a strong letter protesting against the order and asking the question whether "individuals and parties of men specially appointed and instructed by me to destroy railroads, culverts, bridges, etc." were, if captured, to be regarded as deserving of death.

Gen. Halleck in reply said:

You also complain that "individuals and parties of men specially appointed and instructed by you to destroy railroads, culverts and bridges by tearing them up, burning, etc., have been arrested and subjected to a general court-martial for alleged crimes." This statement is in the main correct. Where "individuals and parties of men" violate the laws of war they will be tried, and if found guilty will certainly be punished, whether acting by your "special appointment and instruction" or not. You must be aware, General, that no orders of yours can save from punishment spies, marauders, robbers, incendiaries, guerrilla bands, etc., who violate the laws of war. You cannot give immunity to crime. But let us fully understand each other on this point. If you send armed forces wearing the garb of soldiers and duly organized and enrolled as legitimate belligerents to destroy railroads, bridges, etc., as a military act, we shall kill them, if possible, in open warfare, or, if we capture them, we shall treat them as prisoners of war.

But it is well understood that you have sent numbers of your adherents in the garb of peaceful citizens, and under false pretenses, through our lines into northern Missouri, to rob and destroy the property of Union men and to burn and destroy railroad bridges, thus endangering the lives of thousands, and this, too, without any military necessity or possible military advantage. Moreover, peaceful citizens of Missouri, quietly working on their farms, have been instigated by your emissaries to take up arms as insurgents, to rob and plunder and to commit arson and murder. They do not even act under the garb of soldiers, but in false pretenses and in the guise of peaceful citizens. You certainly will not pretend that men guilty of such crimes, although "specially appointed and instructed by you," are entitled to the rights and immunities of ordinary prisoners of war. If you do, will you refer me to a single authority on the laws of war which recognizes such a claim?

You may rest assured, General, that all prisoners of war not guilty of crime will be treated with all proper consideration and kindness. With the exception of being properly confined, they will be lodged and fed, and where necessary clothed, the same as our own troops. I am sorry to say that our prisoners who have come from your camps do not report such treatment on your part. They say that you gave them no rations, no clothing, no blankets, but left them to perish with want and cold. Moreover, it is believed that you subvert your troops by robbing and plundering the non-combatant Union inhabitants of the southwestern Counties of this State. Thousands of poor families have fled to us for protection and support. They say that your troops robbed them of their provisions and clothing, carrying away their shoes and bedding, and even cutting cloth from their looms, and that you have driven women and children from their homes to starve and perish in the cold. I have not retaliated such conduct upon your adherents here, as I have no intention of waging such a barbarous warfare; but I shall, whenever I can, punish such crimes, by whomsoever they may be committed.

An examination of the correspondence leads to the conclusion that Halleck possessed very superior talents as a letter writer.

Contrasted with Fremont, McClellan, Buell and others, Halleck gave great satisfaction in Washington, and Secretary Stanton telegraphed him as follows :

Your energy and ability receive the strongest commendation of this Department. You have my perfect confidence, and may rely upon the utmost support in your undertakings. The pressure of my engagements have prevented me from writing, but I shall do so fully in a day or two.

Though he made the most of every resource, Halleck was sorely pressed for money and supplies for his force. His letters and messages mention the shipment of pantaloons to this one, shoes to another, blankets to a third, as he could get hold of articles to supply present wants, and of counsels of patience as to delays in paying off, since the Paymasters were far behind in their work. Jan. 17 he telegraphed to Gen. Curtis :

General: Yours of yesterday received. I regret to inform you that neither the Pay nor Quartermaster's Departments have any money. Troops are sent from here to Cairo without pay. I can do no better for you. The moment money is received the forces under your command shall be supplied. They were all paid to the 31st of October. Some here and in north Missouri are not paid for September and October. I have done everything in my power for the troops at Rolla, and they have no cause to complain of me.

The truth is that Congress is so busy discussing the eternal nigger question that they fail to make any appropriations, and the financial departments are dead broke. No requisitions for money are filled.

The extra-duty pay will be forthcoming as soon as we get any money. Assure these men that they will be paid, but they must have patience. I am doing everything in my power for them.

We must all do the best we can to make the men comfortable and contented till we get more means. I rely upon you to use all your powers of conciliation, especially with the German troops. You told me you could manage them, and I rely upon you to do it. At present we have more difficulties to conquer with our own men than with the enemy.

While engaged in these numberless activities Gen. Halleck came down with a severe attack of measles, and was confined to his room for two weeks, but there does not appear to have been any intermitence in his energy.

Gen. Halleck's plans contemplated sending forward a column sufficient to crush Price, if he could be brought to battle, and drive him out of the State anyway. Another column was to advance from Ironton or Fredericktown and interpose between Polk at Columbus and Price, to prevent the former from assisting the latter. In the meanwhile Gen. Polk would have sufficient to occupy his attention in his "Gibraltar," as Gen. Grant would make a flank movement up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. Halleck had come to the conclusion that Columbus would cost too much in life and blood to be taken by a direct assault, and it would be better therefore to turn it.

This plan was an excellent one, as Halleck's plans usually were, at that time, and it was subsequently carried out substantially as conceived.

There were the most conflicting reports as to the number of men Price had with him at Springfield at that time, but it was supposed all the way from 25,000 to 50,000, with rather the stronger emphasis on the greater number. The Secessionists insisted upon the immensity of the army which had flocked to Price encouraged by the events untoward to the Union cause of the last half of 1861 and the indignation aroused by the invasion and depredations of the Kansas Jayhawkers and the "St. Louis Dutch."

It was reasonable to suppose, from the state of feeling in Missouri, that Price might have from 40,-

000 to 50,000 men, but Halleck, who was unusually well-informed for our Generals at that period of the war, decided that a column of about 10,000 men would be sufficient for the work. In this he was at a disagreement with Gen. Curtis and others in nearer contact with Price, who estimated the Secessionist force at Springfield in the neighborhood of 20,000 or 25,000. Yielding to their urgent representations, he increased his force to about 15,000, of which 3,000 were required to guard the lengthening line of communications, leaving a movable column of 12,000 to move directly against Price. This force was officially designated the "Army of the Southwest," and there was assigned to its command our old acquaintance, Brig.-Gen. Samuel R. Curtis, West Point graduate, lawyer, Mexican veteran, railroad engineer, and Congressman. This made more or less heart-burning among Brig.-Gens. Franz Sigel, B. M. Prentiss, S. A. Hurlbut, S. D. Sturgis and others who had hopes in that direction. Sigel stood no chance for the place, however, for Halleck had conceived a strong distrust of him growing out of his action at Wilson's Creek, and also because he was a leader among the radical Germans who wanted to pull slavery up by the roots. Sturgis felt that more consideration should have been given to him as commander of the army at Wilson's Creek after Lyon fell. Curtis, in turn, gave strong dissatisfaction to some of the brigade commanders by selecting Jeff C. Davis, a Captain in the Regular Army and Colonel of the 22d Ind., and Eugene A. Carr, also a Captain in the Regular Army and Colonel of the 3d Ill. Cav., to command two of his four divisions.

In its forward movement the commanders had the

benefit of the burning zeal of the young volunteers. These, who had enlisted to put down the rebellion, wanted to lose no time in doing their work. They were not minded to lie around camps, no matter how comfortable, during the long Winter months. In the Northern homes from which they came the Winter had always been a season of great activity. They could not understand why it should not be so in Missouri and they hungered for active employment to the great end of suppressing the rebellion. Their recent successes had inspired them with hopes that they might be able to finish up the work and get back home in time for their Spring duties.

Though the Winter of 1861-'62 was an exceptionally hard, disagreeable one in Missouri, the volunteers left their camps with alacrity, pressing forward through the storms and mud with sanguine hopefulness that they were now about to accomplish their great purpose. Gen. Curtis selected his first base at Lebanon, 55 miles distant from Springfield, and sent forward Col. Carr with about 1,700 infantry and cavalry to occupy that point, gain information as to the condition of things in Price's camp, and to set on foot preparation for supplying the advancing army from the surrounding country.

The Union commanders were to learn a lesson from Price, who did not encumber himself with long trains, but "compelled war to support war" by drawing his supplies from the country through which he operated. Under Halleck's orders Gen. Curtis directed that the cavalry should locate all the mills convenient to the line of march, set them to work grinding grain, and encourage the Union farmers to bring in their grain, hogs and cattle, for which the Quar-

termaster would pay them fair prices. This work was an admirable education for Halleck's Chief Quartermaster, a young Captain named Philip H. Sheridan, who was to turn the lessons then learned to magnificent account afterwards.

Lebanon was taken possession of without more resistance than a running fight in which a notorious Capt. Tom Craig, of the Confederate army, was killed. Gen. Curtis arrived at Lebanon Jan. 31, leaving Sigel and Asboth at Rolla to follow as fast as the roads would permit. The recent severe storms of sleet and snow had been quite trying to the men and animals, but the columns were pressed forward, and on Feb. 7 Sigel's and Asboth's men were all in Lebanon, where they were joined by Jeff C. Davis's Division marching from Otterville by the way of Linn Creek.

Halleck's orders to Curtis were clear, comprehending and purposeful. Curtis seems to have been not a little apprehensive of the force he might have to encounter, but Halleck constantly urged him forward, at the same time enjoining him to keep his troops well in hand, and not allow Price to attack him in detail. He was to "throw out his cavalry carefully, like fingers to the hands." Most particularly he was not to allow Sigel to go off on any independent expedition and serve him as Sigel had served Lyon at Wilson's Creek. Halleck urged Hunter to advance his Kansas troops down through his department so as to threaten Price's left flank, and he told Curtis that if he, Curtis, would take care of Price, that he himself would look out for Johnson, Polk, Beauregard and Hardee.

The splendid young Missouri, Iowa and Illinois

volunteers, welded into superb regiments by months of service, with the worthless of their officers removed by Halleck's rigid pruning, pressed forward with an enthusiasm that no storms could diminish or wretchedness of roads discourage. They forded swollen, icy streams, pulled their wagons up steep hills, or pried them out of quagmires, and bore the fury of the storm with sanguine cheerfulness, believing they were now moving directly forward to the great end of crushing the enemies of the Government and closing the war.

Price's outlying detachments were come up with and struck with a suddenness and vigor that sent them flying in utter rout. It speaks very ill for Price, with all his means for accurate information, that he knew nothing of this rapid advance of the Union army until the heads of Curtis's columns were at his very pickets. He was entirely unready for battle, and could only hastily gather his men together and make a quick retreat to the rough hills south of Springfield, leaving all his stores and his laboriously-constructed cantonments for the Union army. Feb. 13 Curtis had the satisfaction of reporting to Halleck as follows:

The Flag of the Union floats over the Court House of Springfield, Mo. The enemy attacked us with small parties at 10:30 o'clock 12 miles out, and my front guards had a running fire with them most of the afternoon. At dusk a regiment of the Confederate cavalry attacked the outer picket, but did not move it. A few shots from a howitzer killed two and wounded several. The regiment retreated to this place, and the enemy immediately commenced the evacuation of the city. I entered the city at 10 a. m. My cavalry is in full pursuit. They say the enemy is making a stand at Wilson's Creek. Forage, flour and other stores in large quantities taken. Shall pursue as fast as the strength of the men will allow.

In Gen. Sheridan's "Memoirs" he gives this sidelight on the advance upon Springfield:

By hard work we soon accumulated a sufficient quantity of flour and corn meal to justify the resumption of our march on Springfield, at or near which point the enemy was believed to be awaiting us, and the order was given to move forward, the Commanding General cautioning me, in the event of disaster, to let no salt fall into Gen. Price's hands. Gen. Curtis made a hobby of this matter of salt, believing the enemy sadly in need of that article, and he impressed me deeply with his conviction that our cause would be seriously injured by a loss which would inure so greatly and peculiarly to the enemy's benefit; but we discovered afterward, when Price abandoned his position, that about all he left behind was salt.

When we were within about eight miles of Springfield Gen. Curtis decided to put his troops in line of battle for the advance on the town, and directed me to stretch out my supply train in a long line of battle, so that in falling back, in case the troops were repulsed, he could rally the men on the wagons. I did not like the tactics, but, of course, obeyed the order.

The line moved on to Springfield, and took the town without resistance, the enemy having fled southward, in the direction of Pea Ridge, the preceding day. Of course, our success relieved my anxiety about the wagons; but fancy has often pictured since the stampede of six-mule teams that, had we met with any reverse, would have taken place over the prairies of southwest Missouri.

It was felt almost certain that Price had only abandoned Springfield in order to offer battle more advantageously in the rough hills south of the town where Wilson's Creek had been fought. The spirit of the army was up, and it moved promptly forward to engage him in his chosen fastness. The Secessionist historians and the admirers of Price, Marmaduke, Shelby and others give thrillingly sanguinary stories of the fierce resistance offered in the defiles and passes through the foothills of the Ozarks, but these statements are not supported by either the official reports or the regimental histories of the Union army. These all concur in the statement that while there was a great deal of noisy cannonading, Price's troops yielded ground quite easily, and all

were surprised that no more effective resistance was made at places that offered such wonderful opportunities for defense.

In his report to Gov. Jackson Gen. Price gives this succinct statement of his share in the movement:

About the latter part of January my scouts reported that the enemy were concentrating in force at Rolla, and shortly thereafter they occupied Lebanon. Believing that this movement could be for no other purpose than to attack me, and knowing that my command was inadequate for such resistance as the interest of my army and the cause demanded, I appealed to the commanders of the Confederate troops in Arkansas to come to my assistance. This from correspondence I was confidently led to expect, and, relying upon it, I held my position to the very last moment, and, as the sequel proved, almost too long, for on Wednesday, Feb. 12, my pickets were driven in, and reported the enemy advancing upon me in force. No resource was now left me except retreat, without hazarding all with greatly unequal numbers upon the result of one engagement. This I deemed it unwise to do. I commenced retreating at once. I reached Cassville with loss unworthy of mention in any respect. Here the enemy in my rear commenced a series of attacks running through four days. Retreating and fighting all the way to Cross Hollows, in this State, I am rejoiced to say my command, under the most exhausting fatigue all that time, with but little rest for either man or beast and no sleep, sustained themselves and came through, repulsing the enemy upon every occasion with great determination and gallantry. My loss does not exceed four to six killed and some 15 to 18 wounded. That of the enemy we know to be ten times as great.

Gen. Price's estimate of the losses he inflicted is widely divergent from that of Gen. Curtis, who does not admit any losses in killed in the noisy engagements while pushing Price back through the rough gorges, until he arrived at the Sugar Creek Crossing, six miles into Arkansas, where he lost 13 killed and 15 or 20 wounded in a very spirited little fight with the combined troops of Price and McCulloch, and camped that night upon the battlefield from which the enemy had retreated. Here Col. Cyrus Bussey joined him with five companies of the 3d Iowa Cav., having made a forward march from Rolla, Mo., in four days.

Curtis was so encouraged by his success that he kept on pushing Price back upon McCulloch, even upon the boasted "Gibraltar" at Cross Hollows, and then, to the astonishment and delight of himself and the whole army, forced the evacuation of this stronghold by a flank movement. The rebels' abandonment of it was so complete that they burned all their stores and the great array of cabins built for quarters, leaving only the chimneys to mark the long rows.

Thus any expectation of a sanguinary battle fell in disappointment. So much had been said about Cross Hollows that the Union troops were certain that they would have to fight a desperate battle at or near it. It was known that at least 4,000 regularly-organized troops had been quartered there for months, subjected to thorough drill and discipline. Gen. McCulloch had boasted that he had prepared a trap in which to catch and ruin the Federal General if he ventured that far south. McCulloch's only fear was of being unable to draw the Federal General into the trap.

The Confederates left their sick and wounded behind them in the hospitals, and the untiring Gen. Asboth, commanding the cavalry, pushed the rear guard rapidly through to Bentonville. Returning to Curtis's camp a day or two later, Gen. Asboth was sent with a force of cavalry to Fayetteville, a most important town in northwestern Arkansas, where he learned that his enemies had hid themselves in the Boston Mountains.

Gen. Curtis had completed his work of driving Price from Missouri and some distance beyond her borders. He then drew his forces together and

established himself at Cross Hollows, with the ultimate intention of retiring to the better position of Sugar Creek Crossing, in the event of the enemy concentrating any force against him. In the meanwhile he would hope that the turning movements which Halleck had planned would occupy Price's and McCulloch's attention, and draw them away from him.

CHAPTER XVIII.

GEN. EARL VAN DORN TAKES COMMAND.

JEFFERSON DAVIS carried out his determination to appoint an officer superior in rank to both Gens. McCulloch and Price. After first appointing Gen. Harry Heth, and then offering the appointment to Gen. Braxton Bragg, he selected another of his favorites, Gen. Earl Van Dorn, who had been a fiery partisan among the officers of the Regular Army for States Rights and Secession, was a native of Mississippi, and had graduated from West Point in 1842, 52d in a class of 56. Whatever his intellectual qualities may have been, he was a man of great force and energy, and had won two brevets for distinguished gallantry in the Mexican War. He gained still more distinction by his successful expeditions against the fierce Comanches, a tribe then in the height of its power. In one of these his small command killed 56 Indians. In his engagements with the Comanches he had received four wounds, two of which were quite serious. He had been very active in bringing about Gen. Twiggs's disgraceful surrender of his command in Texas.

When Jefferson Davis, as Secretary of War, organized the additional regiments for the Regular Army he took particular pains to promote into them men of his way of thinking on States Rights, and who would be useful in the coming contest which he foresaw.

One of these new regiments,—then called the 2d U. S. Cav., later changed to the 5th U. S. Cav., was

quite remarkable for this selection, as it showed Mr. Davis's thorough acquaintance with the character of the Regular officers, and what they could be relied upon to do when Secession should be brought about. He made Colonel of the regiment Albert Sidney Johnston, later General, C. S. A.; Lieutenant-Colonels, Robert E. Lee, afterward General, C. S. A.; W. J. Hardee, Lieutenant-General, C. S. A., and E. Kirby Smith, General, C. S. A., and the Majors were George H. Thomas, W. H. Emory, Major-Generals, U. S. A., and Earl Van Dorn, Major-General, C. S. A.

Mississippi seceded Jan. 9, 1861. Earl Van Dorn promptly tendered his resignation and became active, if he had not been before, in bringing about the surrender by Gen. Twiggs of the United States troops, stores and munitions of war in Texas, by which we lost nearly half of the entire strength of the Regular Army, besides some \$2,000,000 of supplies, the control of the Mexican frontier, and a large portion of Indian frontier. Van Dorn had been commissioned Colonel in the Confederate army, and hoped to add the surrendered troops to the military establishment of the Southern Confederacy. He put a great deal of pressure upon the officers and men to induce them to change their allegiance, but was remarkably unsuccessful in the latter, not a single enlisted man accepting his offers of promotion and increased pay. Only those officers went over whose course had been predetermined. None of previous loyalty wavered for an instant.

Gen. Twiggs had made a capitulation with Gen. McCulloch, of Texas, as if treating with another Nation. The terms were that the troops should be conveyed to the nearest seaport, and thence sent

home. The steamer "Star of the West," which had come into notoriety as being the object at which the first gun of the rebellion was aimed, had been sent to Indianola, Tex., to receive Twiggs's troops. Van Dorn, enraged by his failure to accomplish his purpose, violated the terms of the capitulation. He marched his forces upon the unarmed troops gathered near Indianola, compelled them to surrender, and captured the "Star of the West." The officers and men were kept prisoners in Texas for months afterwards, and subjected to much hardship.

Halleck wrote to Curtis: "Beware of Van Dorn. He is an energetic officer."

Van Dorn was not to justify the high expectations entertained of him, and after several failures to improve great opportunities he finally fell, in 1863, at the age of 42, before the pistol of an injured husband.

Van Dorn promptly repaired to his command, and seems to have been welcomed with entirely loyal subordination by both Price and McCulloch, though both were much older than he, and had held higher commands, Gen. Price having been a Brigadier-General at a time when Van Dorn was only a First Lieutenant.

At first Van Dorn meditated moving into Missouri by the Pocahontas route, intermediate between the Mississippi route and that by the way of Springfield. He began assembling troops at Jacksonport, Ark., to move directly up through the Ozark Mountains. Then the isolated situation of Gen. Curtis's little army, with scattered detachments thrown out in every direction, tempted him to concentrate suddenly his forces and make the effort to cut off the outlying

Union detachments and finally crush the main body. Therefore, he hastened to the Boston Mountains, sending messages to the scattered Confederates to meet him there, and was welcomed on a chilly, snowy March 3 with the Major-General's salute of 40 guns, which were heard by Gen. Curtis at Cross Hollow.

After driving Gen. Price off into the Boston Mountains and successfully flanking Gen. McCulloch out of his "Gibraltar" at Cross Hollow, Gen. Curtis prudently halted his army there to consider his next move. The line of Sugar Creek offered fine opportunities for defense, and from there he could hope to maintain his communications along the great road leading to Springfield and Rolla. Not having been able to force either McCulloch or Price to a decisive battle in which he might destroy or at least cripple them, it did not seem discreet to venture further forward where every step made them stronger and him weaker.

Halleck had relied upon Gen. Hunter sending down a flanking column from Leavenworth by the way of Fort Scott, but this had not materialized, owing to the disputes between Gens. Hunter and Jas. H. Lane. Thus 5,000 men who should have been effectively employed, either in menacing Van Dorn's flank or increasing Curtis's strength, were held idly, at Leavenworth.

Halleck had also relied upon the effect of Gen. Grant's startling victory at Fort Donelson, which shattered the first Confederate line, to withdraw a large portion of the forces west of the Mississippi, and relieve pressure upon Curtis. Nor had this at that time resulted. Though the general Confederate

line had fallen back to Corinth, Van Dorn, anxious to distinguish himself in his new field, proposed to advance independent of this recession, and by a bold, quick stroke retrieve the Confederate disaster east of the Mississippi.

Gen. Curtis had divided his army into four so-called divisions of two brigades each. The divisions were not stronger than ordinary brigades.

The organization was as follows:

FIRST DIVISION.

Col. Peter J. Osterhaus commanding.

First Brigade, Col. W. N. Coler—17th Mo., Maj. A. H. Poten; 25th Ill., Maj. Richard H. Nodine; 44th Ill., Col. C. Knobelsdorff.

Second Brigade, Col. N. Greusel—12th Mo., Maj. Hugo Wangelin; 36th Ill.; Capts. Jenks's and Smith's companies of Illinois Cavalry; Welfley's Battery, Mo. L. A.; Capt. Louis Hoffman's 4th Ohio Battery.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig.-Gen. A. Asboth commanding.

First Brigade, Col. Frederick Schaefer—2d Mo., Lieut.-Col. B. Laibold; 15th Mo., Col. Francis J. Joliat.

Not Brigaded—4th Mo. Cav., Maj. G. Heinrichs; 5th Mo. Cav., Col. Joseph Nemett; Mo. L. A. Battery, Capt. G. M. Elbert; 2d Ohio Battery, Lieut. Chapman.

THIRD DIVISION.

Col. Jeff C. Davis commanding.

First Brigade, Col. Thos. Pattison—8th Ind., Col. Wm. P. Benton; 18th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Henry D. Washburn; 22d Ind., Lieut.-Col. John A. Hendricks; 1st Ind. Battery, Capt. Martin Klaus.

Second Brigade, Col. Julius White—37th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Myron S. Barnes; 59th Ill., Lieut.-Col. C. H. Frederick; 1st Mo. Cav., Col. C. A. Ellis; Battery, Ill. L. A., Capt. Peter Davidson.

FOURTH DIVISION.

Col. Eugene A. Carr commanding.

First Brigade, Col. G. M. Dodge—4th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. John Galligan; 35th Ill., Col. G. A. Smith; 1st Iowa Battery, Capt. J. A. Jones.

Second Brigade, Col. Wm. Vandever—9th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. F. J. Herron; Mo. Infantry, Col. John S. Phelps; 3d Ill. Cav., Maj. John McConnell; 3d Iowa Battery, Capt. M. M. Hayden.

Unassigned—3d Iowa Cav., Col. Cyrus Bussey; Battalion Mo. Cav., Maj. W. D. Bowen; 24th Mo., Maj. Eli Weston.

Feb. 12 Gen. Curtis reported his entire strength to be 12,095 men and 50 cannon. Of these one gun and about 1,500 men were patrolling the long line of communications, leaving 10,500 men and 49 pieces of artillery actually with Curtis.

From this again must be deducted Maj. Conrad's detachment of 250 men, so far away as to be unable to reach the main body until after the battle. Thus Curtis had almost exactly 10,000 men.

The great distance back to the base of supplies and the terrible roads made it necessary to subsist as far as possible off the country. That part of Arkansas was settled by much the same people as lived around Springfield, with many thrifty farmers who had made a fair start toward developing good homesteads. The troops were scattered out in front of Sugar Creek over a distance of 60 miles, gathering in corn and wheat, and running the mills that had escaped McCulloch's torch, to supply breadstuffs. Cattle and hogs were taken and paid for, and the cavalry, artillery and train animals were turned out to graze wherever pastures could be found. The Union advance had been pushed as far south as the important little town of Fayetteville, but this was feared to be too near the Boston Mountains, and it was retired, leaving a large number of Union men who had shown their colors to the vengeance of McCulloch and their rebel neighbors.

The majority of the people of that section being devoted Unionists, Gen. Curtis easily kept himself well-informed as to the movements of his enemies. He had decided, in the event of an advance, to take his stand at Pea Ridge, an abrupt elevation at the foot of which Sugar Creek ran to the westward. All

the roads leading northward crossed Sugar Creek, and several of them came together some two or three miles north of a country hostelry known as Elkhorn Tavern on the main road to Springfield, at the northeastern end of Pea Ridge.

At 2 p. m., March 4, Gen. Curtis was at Cross Hollow with Col. Carr's Fourth Division. The extreme left of his army was Col. Wm. Vandever, of the 9th Iowa, at War Eagle Mills, near White River, 42 miles to the southeast. The extreme right—the First and Second Divisions, under Gen. Franz Sigel—was at Cooper's Farm, four miles in front of Bentonville and 14 miles to the southwest of Sugar Creek. The Third Division, under Col. Jefferson C. Davis, had moved back to the line selected in rear of Sugar Creek, where Col. Bussey with his regiment was in camp.

By 2 o'clock scouts and fugitives had convinced Gen. Curtis that Van Dorn had concentrated his forces, and was in rapid march upon him, only a few miles away. He sent orders by swift riders to all his outlying parties to march at once to the designated rendezvous at Sugar Creek, and started back himself with Carr's Division, arriving on the crest about 2 a. m. of March 5, and immediately setting his men to work preparing for the battle. Col. Dodge worked until midnight blockading with fallen trees the road from Bentonville to Springfield west of Leetown.

In spite of their wide dispersion, Gen. Van Dorn brought McCulloch's, Pike's and Price's forces together with great rapidity. How many fighting men he was able to assemble is a question. Gen. Curtis gravely estimated it at 30,000. Gen. Van Dorn in

his reports after the battle, when he was putting the best face upon matters, stated his force at one time at 16,000 men, and again at "less than 14,000."

Probably if we follow an old arithmetical device, adding Curtis's overstatement and Van Dorn's understatement together and dividing the sum by two—the number of statements—we may get somewhat near the truth. This would give Van Dorn 22,000 men. Students since the war have arrived at the conclusion that he actually had 26,000 men.

Analysis of the various reports points to this being nearly correct.

Feb. 24—nine days before the battle—Van Dorn reported to Albert Sidney Johnston that with the combined forces of McCulloch, Pike and Price, he would "be able to take about 26,000 men into battle."

The best organized and drilled troops west of the Mississippi were McCulloch's. March 2 he reported his "effective total" to be 8,384 men, with 18 cannon. He received some accessions after that, raising his whole force to nearly 10,000 men.

His division was organized as follows:

FIRST BRIGADE.

Col. James McIntosh commanding—1st Ark. M. R., Col. T. J. Churchill; 2d Ark. M. R., Col. James McIntosh; 4th (9th) Tex. Cav., Col. W. B. Sims; 6th Tex. Cav., Col. B. W. Stone; South Kansas-Texas Regiment, Col. E. Greer; Lamar Cav., Capt. H. S. Bennett.

SECOND BRIGADE.

Col. Louis Hebert commanding—4th Ark., Col. E. McNair; 14th Ark., Col. M. C. Mitchell; 16th Ark., Col. Hill; 17th Ark., Col. Frank Rector; 21st Ark., Col. D. McRae; 1st Ark. Battery, Maj. W. H. Brooks; 3d La., Col. Louis Hebert; Tex. Cav., Col. W. C. Young; Tex. M. R., Maj. J. W. Whitfield; Art. Bat. (four companies), Capt. W. R. Bradfute.

Nothing definite can be ascertained as to Albert Pike's force. A short time before the battle he

wrote confidently about having 10,000 men. The force he actually brought up is generally stated at 6,000, two of the regiments being white.

The following extract from Gen. Sterling Price's report of March 22—eight days after the battle—gives us the best obtainable idea of the strength and organization of his force:

My forces consisted of the First Brigade, Missouri Volunteers, Col. Henry Little commanding; the Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Slack commanding; a battalion of cavalry, under command of Lieut.-Col. Cearnal, and the State troops, under the command of Brig.-Gens. Rains, Green, and Frost, Cols. John B. Clark, Jr., and James P. Saunders, and Maj. Lindsay; numbering in all 6,818 men, with eight batteries of light artillery.

Price, most probably, did not differ from other beaten commanders in minimizing his force to the utmost, so that it is entirely reasonable to assume that he had 2,000 or 3,000 more than he reported. Probably he and Van Dorn excluded from their fighting strength thousands, like Pike's Indians, who proved themselves worthless in the actual shock of battle.

Therefore we have the following aggregate of minimum strength:

McCulloch	10,000
Pike	6,000
Price	9,000
	<hr/>
	25,000

It seems, therefore, entirely fair to say that Van Dorn had at least double Curtis's 10,000 when he left Cove Creek on the morning of March 4, with three days' cooked rations in his men's haversacks, and the intention of destroying the invaders and recovering the State of Missouri.

Both sides were keenly eager for battle. The Con-

federates had been harangued with stories of great victories in the East, which they were to emulate; the Indians were fierce for scalps and plunder; the Missourians burning to march back to their homes in triumph.

On the other hand, Curtis's men, weary of interminable marching and skirmishing, longed to deliver a decisive blow which would end all.

Van Dorn's plan of battle was well-conceived, and if his immense preponderance of force had been adequately handled it would have won a crushing victory.

McCulloch, during his long stay at Cross Hollow, had familiarized himself with the ground, and Price was also well acquainted with it. In the conference held in Gen. Van Dorn's tent it was decided not to attack in front, where Gen. Curtis had prepared, and where he had in addition to his obstructions the advantage of the steep side of the ridge. Instead, a movement would be made on Bentonville, to the southwest of Curtis, where it was hoped to catch Sigel and destroy him before he could receive assistance, then destroy Curtis before Vandever's Brigade could reach him from Huntsville. Pike's Indians were to follow McCulloch's Division, and when Curtis was beaten the wild Indian riders would be let loose to exterminate the fugitives.

Sigel, with his usual indifference to orders, did not immediately obey Curtis's command to abandon his camp four miles west of Bentonville and move back to Sugar Creek. Instead he deferred starting his troops from Cooper's Farm until 2 o'clock of the morning of the 6th, and stopped himself with a small force at Bentonville while his troops and train were

passing through the town, and he was attacked about 11 o'clock. Van Dorn reports that it was 11 o'clock before he could get the head of his column to Bentonville, and "we had the mortification of seeing Sigel's Division, 7,000 strong, leaving it as we entered. Had we been an hour sooner we should have cut him right off with his whole force, and certainly have beaten the enemy the next day."

Sigel had kept back about 600 men. His troops were part of the 12th Mo. and seven companies of cavalry, besides five field guns. They were resting with stacked arms when the rebel cavalry swarmed in upon the town from various directions. Sigel was able, however, to get his men together and march out of town to cover of some woods, where his artillery drove back the Confederates, who charged them, and the retreat was resumed.


This performance was repeated several times along the road, which ran around the ridges through a growth of scrubby blackjacks, which broke up Sigel's men and also the eager Confederates who were trying to cut them off.

Col. Elijah Gates, 1st Mo. Cav., Price's Division, led the pursuers with great activity and skill. There were incessant assaults with constant volleys of artillery, until Col. Osterhaus, who had reached Curtis's line, was ordered back to his relief, preceded by Col. Bussey with the 3d Iowa Cav. When they met Gen. Sigel he had just broken through the Confederate cavalry, which was still making efforts to surround him, but the arrival of the reinforcements caused the Confederates to withdraw, and the Union troops marched back to the camp which had been formed at Sugar Creek. The Union loss in this affair was reported as 35 killed and wounded.

BATTLE FIELD OF PEA RIDGE, ARK.

A—1st Position
B—2d
C—3d
" "

From Bentonville



After a forced march of 42 miles from Huntsville, Col. Vandever's Brigade reached Pea Ridge at dusk, and Curtis had his whole army together. A night attack from the south was confidently expected, and every preparation was made for it.

When night came on Van Dorn built fires, pretending to go into camp, but moved forward until he came upon the blocked road, which halted him until after midnight, when he moved forward much embarrassed by the obstructions Dodge had placed in the wretched roads. Dodge on his return from blockading the roads notified Gen. Curtis of Price's movement to the rear, but Gen. Curtis did not believe it, as other reports were to the effect that Van Dorn's attack would be on the Sugar Creek front.

Price having been delayed until after midnight, did not reach the telegraph road, a mile or so north of Elkhorn Tavern, until 7 o'clock on the morning of the 7th.

McCulloch, in the meanwhile, was forming his men in the fields and woods near Leetown, west of Pea Ridge, with Albert Pike's Indians behind him.

While, therefore, Curtis's men were straining their eyes southward from his strongly fortified position on Sugar Creek for the advance of the enemy, the whole Confederate army had gained their flank and rear, with Price's Division directly across their line of communication and retreat.

Seeing no enemy in front, Curtis's men had a good, leisurely breakfast, but about 7 o'clock their commander was startled to learn of McCulloch's position on his right and Van Dorn and Price in his rear. With great promptness he faced his men about and swung his line back so that his new right

—formerly his left—rested on Elkhorn Tavern, while his left rested where his old right had been, on the slope above Sugar Creek. This reversed the order of the divisions—Col. Carr's being the right at Elkhorn Tavern and Gen. Asboth's the extreme left, with Col. Osterhaus's and Col. Davis's in the center.

It was now about 8:30 o'clock, and Gen. Curtis directed Col. Osterhaus to advance a force of cavalry, artillery and infantry and bring on the battle.

There was soon after a swelling up of the firing about Elkhorn Tavern, where Carr was, which disturbed Curtis. He wanted the battle where he was preparing for it, and hoped that his opening it would stop any flank movements to his right. While Osterhaus was getting ready to advance, Curtis rode over to Elkhorn Tavern to see what the trouble was with Carr.

During the early morning Price's troops getting into position on the main road had run afoul of the Union pickets about a mile northeast of Elkhorn Tavern. A little after 7 o'clock two companies of cavalry and one of infantry were sent out in that direction to investigate. They found a force of cavalry, which they drove back until they saw the woods full of Confederates, when they took cover behind trees and rocks and began a noisy skirmish, with the enemy slowly pressing forward and extending out on both flanks, as Van Dorn and Price brought their troops up and put them into line.

The affair showed such seriousness that Col. Dodge came up about 9 o'clock with his brigade, and formed in line of battle to the right of Elkhorn Tavern, with the 35th Ill. on the left, the 4th Iowa in

the center, the 3d Ill. Cav. on the right, and the pieces of the 1st Iowa Battery distributed along the line, and immediately moved forward and engaged the enemy.

In the meanwhile Van Dorn and Price were placing their strong force of eight batteries in advantageous positions to crush out the Union artillery and pave the way for the advance of the infantry. When the storm burst the Confederate artillery quickly overwhelmed the Union guns, but Col. Dodge was able, after a sharp struggle, to beat back across the open fields the advance of the very much superior forces of the Missouri divisions, commanded by Gens. Steen, Clark, Frost, Rains and Green. He was so hard pressed, however, that Col. Carr, who accompanied Col. Dodge, sent back for his other brigade—Col. Vandever's—a mile and a half away, which arrived and went into position near Elkhorn Tavern in time to aid in repelling a fresh assault.

More artillery had been brought up, but not enough to successfully contend with Van Dorn's massed guns.

The Union infantry lay behind the cover of fences, logs and stumps, and when the Confederate infantry was pushed forward waited until it was within 100 paces, and then poured a deadly fire into it which shattered the ranks and drove it in retreat. Gen. Slack, one of Price's ablest brigade commanders, was killed and Lieut.-Col. Cearnal severely wounded.

There was a lull in the battle about 2 o'clock while Van Dorn and Price were reforming their men for a fresh and more determined assault. The brunt of it fell upon Col. Vandever on the crest of a hill about 300 yards north of Elkhorn Tavern. Vandever suc-

ceeded in driving back the enemy, though at a great cost, since the 9th Iowa lost upward of 100 men and Col. Phelps's 26th Mo. about 75.

Though the enemy was repulsed, Col. Vandever deemed it better to fall back to Elkhorn Tavern, leaving the battleground in the possession of the enemy.

Col. Carr sent to Gen. Curtis for reinforcements, but Curtis, still believing that the main fighting was in front of Leetown, could only spare him his headquarters guard, with two howitzers. He also sent urgent counsel to Carr to "persevere" and hold his ground with the utmost obstinacy.

Another lull in the battle occurred while Van Dorn and Price were bringing up and forming fresh troops. This time it was Gen. Clark's Missouri Division, reinforced by other troops. The Union soldiers received it, as they had the others, lying behind fences and logs and waiting until the enemy was where every shot would tell.

It was about 3 o'clock when this charge was repulsed.

Again Col. Carr sent to Gen. Curtis for reinforcements, and this time the General sent him five companies of the 8th Ind., under Lieut.-Col. Shunk, and three rifled cannon.

Van Dorn and Price now brought up everything, and concentrated their energies for a supreme effort to drive the stubborn Yankees from the field and achieve a victory before darkness should intervene. Their artillery speedily overpowered and drove off the Union guns, but when the infantry advanced it met the same terrific fire. This time the rebels did not give way, but pressed on around the left flank so that the Second (Vandever's) Brigade had to fall

back. The First Brigade (Dodge's) held its position until night. The log barricades it had built enabled it to defeat charge after charge of the enemy, and when they swung around this flank a part of the 8th Ind. and 3d Ill., in a countercharge, drove the enemy back, protecting and holding that flank until dusk. In this bloody melee Lieut.-Col. Herron and Lieut.-Col. Chandler were wounded and captured, and nearly all the field officers were more or less severely wounded. Col. Dodge had three horses shot under him, and was himself wounded, and Col. Carr received the fourth wound of that day. Three of the Union guns were taken.

The Second Brigade when it fell back took up a new and strong position a quarter of a mile to the rear, facing open ground, and resumed the battle.

As evening was coming on, Curtis became at last convinced that the fighting in his front was over, and started the First and Second Divisions over to the right to the assistance of the Fourth. Gen. Asboth hurried forward in person with four companies of the 2d Mo. and four guns of the 2d Ohio Battery, and assisted in checking and driving back the last assault.

Gen. Curtis came up, formed a new line along the edge of the timber, with the fields in front, and the men lay down on their arms for the night.

Let us return to the left, in front of Leetown, where the main battle had been expected by both sides.

Col. Osterhaus does not seem to have formed any very clear plan when he went out from the center at 9 o'clock to open the battle with McCulloch's and Pike's forces. Gen. Curtis sent Col. Bussey out in

advance with five companies of the 3d Iowa Cav., four of the 5th Mo. Cav., four companies of the 1st Mo. Cav., and two companies of the 4th Mo. Cav., with three pieces of Capt. Elbert's Battery. Col. Greusel's Brigade of infantry followed the cavalry at a short distance.

Col. Bussey went out to Leetown and thence to the open fields about half a mile north. The infantry took position in the fields north of Leetown. Col. Osterhaus came up to the head of the cavalry column where Col. Bussey was, and they saw the Confederates in plain view about a quarter of a mile away. It was Van Dorn's trains and cavalry guards which they saw moving towards the telegraph road. They did not see, however, McCulloch's troops, McIntosh's Brigade of cavalry and Pike's Indians formed in heavy masses to the right and close to them.

Col. Osterhaus ordered Capt. Welfley to open on the men in front, and the shells caused a very visible stampede. Osterhaus then ordered Col. Bussey to send two companies down the road to investigate the position. Col. Bussey ordered Lieut.-Col. Trimble, who commanded the 3d Iowa Cav., to execute this order, while he gave his attention to the Fremont and Benton Hussars, then coming forward and forming line in rear of the guns.

Lieut.-Col. Trimble started with five companies of the 3d Iowa Cav., only to run into a heavy line of battle at close musket range, receiving a deadly fire which killed several of his men and was himself severely wounded in the face.

A minute later McIntosh, at the head of five regiments of cavalry, and Pike leading three Indian and two Texas regiments, burst upon the cavalry and

over the guns with appalling yells and a tempest of bullets. The Union cavalry was simply ridden down by overwhelming numbers and mixed up in a hand-to-hand conflict, but fought their way out and retreated through the open field to Osterhaus's infantry, where Col. Bussey rallied them and formed in line.

The yelling Confederates rushed on until they came upon Greusel's line, where their yells were hushed by a storm of canister and bullets which stopped their advance. The Union line moved into the timber, where McCulloch was found working his way towards Curtis's camp. A terrible battle was fought with varying success until at 11 o'clock Col. Jeff Davis came to Osterhaus's assistance with the Third Division. The fighting was obstinate and bloody, generally duels between opposing regiments which crept slowly toward one another until they got within 60 or 70 yards, when they would open fire, maintaining it until one or the other gave way. The irregular lines thus surged back and forward for perhaps an hour, with the Union troops generally gaining ground.

During this fighting Gens. McCulloch and McIntosh were both shot through the heart by Union sharpshooters. Gen. McCulloch, who was easily distinguished by his peculiarly-colored clothes, was killed by Peter Pelican, of Co. B, 36th Ill. How Gen. McIntosh was killed does not appear, further than he was shot through the heart. The shooting that day was remarkably accurate. The men who held the rifles were perfectly accustomed to their use.

After four hours of constant and desperate fighting there was a noticeable fading in the vim of the

Confederate assaults and diminishing stubbornness of resistance to the Union blows. When the Union soldiers pushed on through the woods after their enemies they found them falling back across the fields beyond in great disorder. A few shells from the Union guns frustrated all attempts to rally them. Osterhaus and Davis pushed their skirmishers through the woods for a mile, and the cavalry went still further, finding the three guns of the flying battery with the carriages burned off, and reporting back that everything seemed to be in full retreat for Bentonville.

One squad of cavalry came back with Col. Hebert, the next in command to Gen. McIntosh; Col. Mitchell and Maj. W. F. Tunnard, of the 3d La., of the same division; a Major, two Captains and 33 privates, all having been separated from their commands in the rush through the woods, and unable to regain them.

After the fall of Gens. McCulloch and McIntosh the command in that part of the field devolved upon Gen. Albert Pike, and it is rare that so great a responsibility falls upon one so unfit. Something of a poet Pike certainly was; much more of a successful politician and place-hunter, but nothing of a leader of men upon the battlefield. His soldiership became sicklied o'er when he went beyond the parade ground. Apparently he did not know what to do, nor, if he did, how to do it.

Regimental commanders reported that they were unable to find him.

His own verbose report, made six days after the battle, is quite full of unintentional humor. He says that after the first charge the field was "a mass of the utmost confusion, all talking, riding this way and

that, and listening to no orders from any one." He could get no one to pay any attention to what he said. His Indians, who had stopped in the charge to scalp the dead and wounded, would at once stampede whenever a shell was thrown in their direction. He devoted himself for a couple of hours to what has been described as "heavy standing around."

Then he fell back with some of the troops a short distance and did some more standing around, until a Union artillerist noticed him and threw a shell in his direction, when he fell back out of range, and again stood around until some one informed him that a body of 7,000 Federals was moving around the left flank. He quickly decided that the "position was not tenable," and fell back still more, "when the officers assured me that the men were in such condition that it would be worse than useless to bring them into action again that day." Such is the demoralization of "standing around."

Finally, it occurred to him to take what troops he could gather and join Gen. Van Dorn, whose cannon had been thundering two or three miles away all this time. First, however, he decided to march them back some distance to a creek, "where they could all get a drink, and join Gen. Van Dorn in the morning."

Col. E. Greer, 3d Tex. Cav., who became the senior officer of McCulloch's Division, reported that he gathered up fragments of regiments to the number of 3,000 after the casualties to his superiors, and being informed that Gen. Pike had left the field with the remainder of the command, retired some distance, sending word to Gen. Van Dorn that, unless he ordered otherwise, he would march to join him at 1:30 in the morning. Van Dorn approved of this.

The night of March 7 closed down with a tumult of widely-varying emotions in the 33,000 men who joined battle in the morning. All of Gen. Pike's Indians, except a portion of Col. Standwaitie's regiment of Cherokee half-breeds, and several thousand whites were rushing off toward the Arkansas River at full speed. The remnant of McCulloch's Division, which Col. Greer had rallied, and which had some fight left in it, unutterably weary, hungry and depressed, bivouacked near the battlefield, awaiting Van Dorn's orders. Price's Missourians, who were no less weary and hungry than their comrades, from a night of severest marching and a day of sharp fighting, camped on the ground which they had wrung from Carr's Division by seven hours of bitter struggling and the cost of a number of prominent officers and several hundred men. Their success, though dearly bought, was sufficient to encourage them. They had captured several hundred prisoners and two pieces of artillery. They had driven Carr's Division back a quarter of a mile, were across the Union line of retreat, and Van Dorn had his headquarters at Elkhorn Tavern.

Price had greatly endeared himself to his troops by his conduct during the day. He was everywhere at the front, leading and encouraging his men, and though wounded in the arm had refused to quit the field. His generalship was not so conspicuous as his soldiership. With him and Van Dorn it was the story of Wilson's Creek over again. Instead of lining up their superior force and sending all forward with a crushing solidarity, they had personally led detachments, and when these had been fought out, gone back and brought up fresh forces.

Van Dorn had shown generalship only in the concentration of his artillery. He had been so engrossed in this, and in pushing forward detachments he had better left to the Missouri leadership that he neglected his powerful right wing, which had gone to pieces, as there was no one left to take the place of McCulloch and McIntosh. He hoped, though, with the aid of 3,000 men whom Greer was bringing to him, to complete his victory in the morning.

There was much to depress Curtis's men in their fireless bivouac south of Elkhorn Tavern. Dodge's and Vandever's Brigades had been very roughly handled in the long struggle. Rebel bullets had made sad havoc in their ranks. They had lost two guns and over a quarter of their force in killed and wounded. Osterhaus's and Davis's Divisions, in the center, had had costly encounters with the enemy, and had lost five pieces of artillery. They did not then know that in reality the victory was theirs, but believed that most of the enemy had merely left their front to augment the mass which was formed across their line of retreat. They therefore looked forward to the morrow with well-grounded apprehension. They had no rations in their haversacks, and their animals had been without forage for two or three days. Unless the enemy could be driven from their "cracker line" the very next day, starvation for man and beast stared them in the face.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE VICTORY IS WON.

GEN. CURTIS'S army was far from realizing as the night closed down on that exciting March 7 how completely it had whipped the overwhelming numbers of Van Dorn, Price, McCulloch, McIntosh and Pike. Those of Jeff C. Davis's and Osterhaus's Divisions, who had done the heavy fighting on the Leetown front, knew that they had driven away the mass of the enemy in their front until there was no longer any show of opposition. They of Carr's Division, on the extreme right, the brigades of Dodge and Vandever, realized that they had had a terrible fight, in which they had generally defeated the enemy, inflicting great slaughter, though they had suffered heavily themselves. Still, the enemy had gained a little ground. The men of Carr's Division felt that now, since the rest of the army was coming to their help, they would undoubtedly win a victory in the morning, and clear the rebels from the road leading back to Springfield. This confidence was shared by the men of Jeff C. Davis's and Osterhaus's Divisions, who had come to their assistance, and they all felt more hopeful than did Sigel and Asboth's Division, which had taken little or no part in the fighting. The following remarkable letter from Gen. Asboth to Gen. Curtis, written at 2 o'clock in the morning of March 8, reveals the general belief of that portion of the army that the condition was desperate and it would require extraordinary efforts to release the army from a very hazardous situation:

Headquarters Second Division,
Camp Near Sugar Creek, Ark.,

March 8, 1862; 2 a. m.

General: As Gen. Sigel, under whose command you have placed me, with my division, has not yet returned to our camp, I beg to address you, General, directly, reporting that all the troops of the Second Division were yesterday, as well as now, in the night, entirely without forage; and as we are cut off from all supplies by the enemy, outnumbering our forces several times, and as one more day without forage will make our horses unserviceable, consequently the cavalry and artillery as well as the teams, of no use at all, I would respectfully solicit a decided concentrated movement, with the view of cutting our way through the enemy where you may deem it more advisable, and save by this, if not the whole, at least the larger part of our surrounded army.

Gen. Curtis seems to have realized quite early in the afternoon the condition of affairs on his left in front of Leetown, and that the fight there was over. He therefore directed the cavalry under Col. Bussey to take up the best positions, holding the ground. All the infantry and artillery were ordered over toward the Springfield road to form a new line of battle, substantially a prolongation of that established at the close of the fighting by the stubborn resistance of Dodge's and Vandever's Brigades, which had so decisively repulsed the last attacks upon them the previous evening.

Sigel, who had a remarkable faculty for incurring criticism in every battle, had not made use of Gen. Asboth's Division at any time to relieve the pressure upon Davis and Osterhaus, so that it had hardly fired a shot. He now had trouble about getting his troops into line, and it was 8 o'clock in the morning before he finally took his place on the left, notwithstanding the fact that he was ordered to have his divisions in line before daylight. Curtis had now all his artillery up, and though it was not so numerous as that opposed to him, it was better equipped

and drilled, and promptly opened the battle with a fire to which the Confederate guns could make no adequate reply. The whole line then moved forward with blazing rifles, sweeping unchecked up the hillsides, straight for the enemy's front. In a few



JOHN ROSS.

minutes the Confederate line parted in the center and disappeared. Most of the Missourians fell back toward Keetsville, directly north. Greer and his remnants ran around our left toward Bentonville, pursued by Col. Bussey's cavalry. Van Dorn and Price with another remnant broke around our right, going through an obscure hollow and taking the road to Huntsville.

Like most men of impetuous initiative, Van Dorn when he was whipped was badly whipped. He sent riders post haste to order his trains burned, but Gen. Green, who commanded the train guard, was of cooler mettle, and succeeded in getting the trains away safely.

Gen. Sigel pursued the central portion through Keetsville, seven miles to the north, capturing nearly 200 prisoners and a great quantity of arms and stores. He believed Curtis would retreat, and was well on his way to Springfield when ordered back by Curtis to make his camp on the battlefield with the rest.

Gen. Curtis officially reported his loss as follows:

UNION LOSSES.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
First (Sigel's) Division.....	11	4	89	2	38	144
Second (Asboth's) Division.....	3	17	3	60	36	119
Third (Davis's) Division	4	42	18	256	9	329
Fourth (Carr's) Division	6	95	29	491	2	78	701
3d Iowa Cav. (Col. Bussey)	24	1	18	9	52
Bowen's battalion	1	1	2	2	6
Total.....	13	190	56	916	4	172	1,351

It will be noticed by the above figures that Davis's Division lost four officers and 42 men killed, 18 officers and 256 men wounded, while Sigel's two divisions lost only three officers and 28 men killed, seven officers and 149 men wounded.

The heaviest loss fell upon the 9th Iowa, which had 39 killed, 176 wounded and four missing. The next heaviest was upon the 4th Iowa, which had 18 killed, 139 wounded and three missing.

Gen. Van Dorn estimated his loss at 1,000 killed and wounded and 300 missing. This is known to be inaccurate, because more Confederate than Union dead were buried on the battlefield, and Gen. Curtis sent 500 prisoners to the rear.

The question naturally occurs: Why did Van Dorn relinquish such a supreme effort with such a small loss?

Our amusing acquaintance, Gen. Pike, does not conceal the fact that he and those around him were very badly whipped. After joining Van Dorn he resumed his old habit of standing around "observing the enemy." He reports that he did this for two

hours at a stretch when Curtis was delivering the final crushing blows upon Van Dorn. He then moved with much promptness toward the rear, for an officer came up with the stunning intelligence, "You are not safe here, for the enemy's cavalry are within 150 yards of you." This seemed to have escaped his "observation" up to that time. He rode off, and his pace was accelerated by hearing another officer cry out. "Close up; close up; or you will all be cut to pieces."

He halted presently, but had to start again, for a shell was sent by the enemy up the road from the point of the hill around which he had just passed. The cry of "The cavalry are coming" was raised, and everything became confusion." He escaped the "enemy's cavalry by rapid riding," but was unable to get ahead of his fastgoing troops and stop them, until they reached Elm Spring, many miles away. He came to this sage conclusion:

The enemy, I learn, had been encamped at Pea Vine Rldge for three weeks, and Sigel's advance was but a ruse to induce our forces to march northward and give them battle in positions selected by themselves.

There were others who shared his feelings; for he says:

Just before night, Saturday afternoon, I had met Col. Rector in the hills, who told me he had about 500 men with him; that they were in such condition that they could not go more than six or eight miles a day, and that he thought he would take them into the mountains, hide their arms in a secure place, and, as he could not keep them together and feed them, let them disperse. He asked my opinion as to this, and I told him that no one knew where the rest of the army was; that Gens. Van Dorn and Price were supposed to be captured and the train taken; that if his men dispersed with their arms they would throw them away, and that I thought the course he proposed was the wisest one under the circumstances. The enemy were pursuing on all the roads, and as it was almost impossible for even a dozen men in a body to procure food, I still do not see what better he could have done.

Curtis's cavalry found these guns and brought them into camp; also, all the artillery that was captured the day before from Davis's and Carr's Divisions.

Gen. Van Dorn made several reports which are strangely inconsistent with one another, and seem the natural efforts of a man to find the best excuses that will present themselves from day to day for his failure in a great effort. His first report, which was to Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston and the Confederate War Department, and sent two days after the battle, reads as follows:

Headquarters Trans-Mississippi District,
March 9, via Hog Eye; March 10, 1862.

Fought the enemy, about 20,000 strong, 7th and 8th, at Elkhorn, Ark. Battle first day from 10 a. m. until after dark; loss heavy on both sides. Gens. McCulloch and McIntosh and Col. Hebert were killed; Gens. Price and Slack were wounded (Gen. Price flesh wound in the arm); the others badly wounded, if not mortally; many officers killed and wounded; but as there are some doubts in regard to several I cannot yet report their names. Slept on the battlefield first night, having driven the enemy from their position. The death of Gens. McCulloch and McIntosh and Col. Hebert early in the action threw the troops on the right under their commands in confusion. The enemy took a second and strong position. Being without provisions and the right wing somewhat disorganized, determined to give battle on the right on their front for the purpose only of getting off the field without the danger of a panic, which I did with success, but with some losses.

I am now encamped with my whole army 14 miles west of Fayetteville, having gone entirely around the enemy. I am separated from my train, but think it safe on the Elm Springs road to Boston Mountains. The reason why I determined to give battle at once upon my arrival to assume command of the army I will give in report at an early day.

In this it will be seen that he disclaimed any intention on the second day of making more than a fight to cover his retreat. This is clearly an after-thought to excuse the poor battle that he put up. There is no doubt that he had still hoped to whip Curtis's army, and that he had men enough to do it, if they had been handled properly and had fought

with the same determination and aggressiveness that the Union troops did. For some weeks he continued to send in reports, explanatory and partially contradictory of his first.

Gen. Sterling Price's report, made March 22, gives no idea that the retreat was determined on after the events of the first day, but says with relation to the close of the struggle on the evening of March 7:

The fiercest struggle of the day now ensued; but the impetuosity of my troops was irresistible, and the enemy was driven back and completely routed. My right had engaged the enemy's center at the same time with equal daring and equal success, and had already driven them from their position at Elkhorn Tavern. Night alone prevented us from achieving a complete victory, of which we had already gathered some of the fruits, having taken two pieces of artillery and a quantity of stores.

My troops bivouacked upon the ground which they had so nobly won, almost exhausted and without food, but fearlessly and anxiously awaiting the renewal of the battle in the morning.

The morning disclosed the enemy strengthened in position and numbers and encouraged by the reverses which had unhappily befallen the other wing of the army when the brave Texan chieftain, Ben McCulloch, and his gallant comrade, Gen. McIntosh, had fallen, fearlessly and triumphantly leading their devoted soldiers against the invaders of their native land. They knew, too, that Hebert—the accomplished leader of that veteran regiment, the Louisiana Third, which won so many laurels on the bloody field of the Oak Hills, and which then as well as now sustained the proud reputation of Louisiana—was a prisoner in their hands. They were not slow to renew the attack; they opened upon us vigorously, but my trusty men faltered not. They held their position unmoved until (after several of the batteries not under my command had left the field) they were ordered to retire. My troops obeyed it unwillingly, with faces turned defiantly against the foe.

It will be noticed that Price is not as frank as usual in giving reasons for his rapid retirement at the moment when, he claims, he was in the full flush of victory. "The retirement of several batteries not under my command" is a conspicuously inadequate excuse.

In the course of a month or so Van Dorn managed to gather himself together again so as to begin voluminous communications with Richmond, explaining that "I was not defeated, but only foiled in my intentions."

He proposed to return to his old Pocahontas plan, "relieve Gen. Beauregard by marching my army upon the Federals at New Madrid or Cape Girardeau, and thence on to St. Louis." He would turn his cavalry loose on Gen. Curtis's long line of communications, and send Gen. Pike with his Indians to harry southwestern Missouri and Kansas.

The Confederate War Department did not think highly of this, but shortly transferred him and his troops east of the Mississippi.

Gen. Price was also transferred east of the Mississippi, with the Missouri troops he had taken into the Confederate army, and his farewell to the Missouri State troops is worth reproducing as a specimen of the heated rhetoric customary in those days:

Headquarters Missouri State Guard,
Des Arc, Ark., April 8, 1862.

(General Orders No. 79.)

Soldiers of the State Guard: I command you no longer. I have this day resigned the commission which your patient endurance, your devoted patriotism and your dauntless bravery have made so honorable. I have done this that I may the better serve you, our State and our country—that I may the sooner lead you back to the fertile prairies, the rich woodlands and majestic streams of our beloved Missouri—that I may the more certainly restore you to your once happy homes and to the loved ones there.

Five thousand of those who have fought side by side with us under the Grizzly Bears of Missouri have followed me into the Confederate camp. They appeal to you, as I do, by all the tender memories of the past, not to leave us now, but to go with us wherever the path of duty may lead, till we shall have conquered a peace and won our independence by brilliant deeds upon new fields of battle.

Soldiers of the State Guards! Veterans of six pitched bat-

ties and nearly 20 skirmishes! Conquerors in them all! Your country, with its "ruined hearths and shrines," calls upon you to rally once more in her defense, and rescue her forever from the terrible thralldom which threatens her. I know that she will not call in vain. The insolent and barbarous hordes which have dared to invade our soil and to desecrate our homes have just met with a signal overthrow beyond the Mississippi. Now is the time to end this unhappy war. If every man will but do his duty, his own roof will shelter him in peace from the storms of the coming Winter.

Let not history record that the men who bore with patience the privations of Cowskin Prairie, who endured uncomplainingly the burning heat of a Missouri Summer and the frosts and snows of a Missouri Winter; that the men who met the enemy at Carthage, at Oak Hills, at Fort Scott, at Lexington and on numberless lesser battlefields in Missouri, and met them but to conquer them; that the men who fought so bravely and so well at Elkhorn; that the unpaid soldiery of Missouri were, after so many victories and after so much suffering, unequal to the great task of achieving the independence of their magnificent State.

Soldiers, I go but to mark a pathway to our homes. Follow me!

Very few but those who had already been cajoled into the Confederate service followed.

A great deal of bitterness was developed from the discovery upon the battlefield of a number of Union dead who had been scalped by Pike's Indans. Many of these belonged to the 3d Iowa Cav., and the investigation of the matter was conducted by order of Col. Bussey, by his Adjutant, John W. Noble, afterwards Secretary of the Interior. Col. Bussey became Assistant Secretary of the Interior.

The bodies of at least eight of the 3d Iowa Cav. were exhumed and found to have been scalped and the bodies otherwise maltreated after their deaths by the scalping knives and tomahawks of merciless Indians. The matter was made subject of a strong communication from Gen. Curtis to Gen. Van Dorn, and the latter's Adjutant-General, Dabney H. Maury, replied, cordially condemning any such deeds, but claiming that, on the other hand,

many prisoners of war had been killed in cold blood by Curtis's men, who were alleged to be Germans. The letter said:

The General commanding feels sure that you will do your part as he will in preventing such atrocities in the future, and that the perpetrators of them will be brought to justice, whether Germans or Choctaws.

Gen. Curtis was promoted to Major-General for his victory, and well deserved that honor, in spite of some bitter critics. Sigel was also made a Major-General, with much less reason. Asboth had his withheld Brigadier-Generalcy confirmed to him. Cols. Carr, Davis and Dodge were made Brigadier-Generals, but Cols. Osterhaus, White and Bussey, who had done conspicuous fighting, had to wait some months for their promotion, and Cols. Greusel and Pattison never received it.

Among those who received praise for their gallantry that day was Maj. John Charles Black, of the 37th Ill., later a Colonel and Brigadier-General, Commissioner of Pensions under President Cleveland, Representative-at-large from Illinois, Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Army of the Republic, and now President of the United States Civil Service Commission. Maj. Black was severely wounded in the sword arm in the fight, but refused to leave the field until Gen. White ordered him to do so.

Another was Maj. Phillip Sidney Post, of the 59th Ill. He later became Colonel and Brigadier-General; was left for dead on the field at Nashville, but recovered, to be Consul-General at Vienna and represent Illinois for many years in Congress. He was also wounded in the sword arm, and also refused to leave the field until he was peremptorily ordered to do so.

The moral effect of the victory was prodigious and far-reaching. High expectations had been raised by Van Dorn, McCulloch, McIntosh, Price and Albert Pike, which were abjectly prostrated. The mass of fugitives, white and red, who scattered over Missouri, Arkansas and the Indian Territory, each with his tale of awful slaughter and disheartened defeat, had a blighting effect upon the Secessionists, and greatly strengthened the Union sentiment.


It was a desperate two-days' wrestle between the very best that the Southern Confederacy could produce west of the Mississippi River—the ablest commanders and the finest troops—and a small Union army. It was breaking test, under the fairest conditions, of the fighting qualities of the two combatants.

Though bitter, merciless, sanguinary fighting was to perturb the State for three years longer, it was no longer war, but guerilla raiding and bandittism, robbery and murder under a pretext of war. Price, indeed, made an invasion of the State two years later, but it was a hurried raid, without hope of permanent results.

At the conclusion of the battle Missouri was as firmly anchored to the Union as her neighbors, Illinois, Iowa and Kansas.

The battle for Missouri had been fought and won.

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